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Mergers and acquisitions have become an important method for companies to grow 
and gain competitive advantage. Yet, up to 60-80% of all the acquisitions fail. In order to 
access value from the deal, a successful integration is required. Post-merger integration 
is the process where the financial and strategic value of the deal are realized. This re-
search answers the call to create linkages between different post-merger integration crit-
ical success factors and determine factors affecting the integration speed. This study is 
among the first ones to adopt a cross-sectional view to post-merger integration across 
different business functions in a project-based organization and thus provides a new 
viewpoint to the mergers and acquisitions literature.  
The aim of the research is to determine typical integration related problems in different 
business functions in a project-based organization while providing solutions to these 
problems with different post-merger integration best practices. As a result, the research 
sheds light on the determinants of integration speed and creates connections between 
different post-merger integration critical success factors. The research is carried out as 
a combination of case study and action research. A literature review is carried out to form 
a holistic picture of the critical success factors and best practices recognized in the liter-
ature. The empirical part of the research utilizes interview data and participant observa-
tion to surface post-merger integration problems in the case organization. This data is 
analyzed and reflected on the literature. As an outcome, typical post-merger integration 
problems in project-based organizational context are recognized and relevant best prac-
tices applied together with the interview data to address these problems. This research 
introduces 17 propositions addressing integration speed and deal performance hence 
introducing determinants of integration speed and actions improving deal performance.  
The findings of the research imply that by recognizing the business function specific 
problems and success factors, the performance of a merger or acquisition deal can be 
improved. Successful post-merger integration requires the understanding of these prob-
lems as well as the capability to execute the integration in a manner addressing these 
problems. The 17 propositions regarding integration speed and deal performance are to 
guide managers to faster integration while accessing more value from the deal. 
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Yritysostot ovat muodostuneet keskeiseksi välineeksi, jolla yritykset pyrkivät tavoitte-
lemaan kasvua ja kilpailuetua. Kuitenkin jopa 60-80% kaikista yritysostoista epäonnis-
tuu. Onnistunut integraatio on välttämätön yritysoston arvonluonnin kannalta, koska yri-
tysintegraatio on prosessi, jossa tämä arvo realisoidaan. Tämä tutkimus vastaa kehotuk-
seen tutkia linkkejä integraation kriittisten menestystekijöiden välillä sekä kehotukseen 
määrittää integraation nopeuteen vaikuttavia tekijöitä. Työ on eräs ensimmäisistä, joka 
omaksuu poikkileikkausnäkökulman yritysintegraatioon eri liiktoimintafunktioissa projek-
tiorganisaatiokontekstissa tarjoten näin ollen uuden näkökulman yritysostoja käsittele-
vään kirjallisuuteen.   
Tämän tutkimuksen ensisijaisena tavoitteena on määrittää tyypillisiä yritysintegraati-
oon liittyviä ongelmia eri liiketoimintafunktioissa projektiorganisaatiokontekstissa, sekä 
tarjota ratkaisuja näihin ongelmiin eri yritysintegraation parhaiden käytäntöjen avulla 
määrittäen samalla integraation nopeuteen vaikuttavia tekijöitä. Tutkimus on toteutettu 
tapaustutkimuksen ja toimintatutkimuksen yhdistelmänä. Työ perustuu kirjallisuuskat-
saukseen sekä empiiriseen tutkimukseen. Kirjallisuuskatsauksen tavoitteena on luoda 
holistinen kuva kirjallisuudessa tunnistetuista integraation kriittisistä menestystekijöistä 
sekä parhaista käytännöistä. Tutkimuksen empiirinen osa hyödyntää haastatteludataa 
sekä osallistuvaa havainnointia tarkastelun kohteena olevan integraation ongelmien tun-
nistamisessa. Dataa analysoimalla tunnistetaan tyypilliset yritysintegraation haasteet 
projektiorganisaatiokontekstissa. Näiden ongelmien ratkaisemisessa hyödynnetään kir-
jallisuuskatsauksessa esiin nousseita parhaita käytäntöjä haastatteludatan lisäksi. Tut-
kimus esittelee 17 propositiota, joilla voidaan parantaa integraationopeutta sekä yritys-
oston suorituskykyä. Nämä teesit ottavat kantaa integraation nopeuteen sekä yritysos-
tosta saatuun arvoon vaikuttaviin tekijöihin.  
Tutkimuksen löydökset implikoivat, että tunnistamalla liiketoimintafunktiokohtaisia on-
gelmia sekä menestystekijöitä, yritysoston suorituskykyä voidaan parantaa. Onnistu-
neen yritysintegraation edellytyksenä on näiden ongelmien ymmärtäminen sekä kyky to-
teuttaa integraatio tavalla, joka ottaa nämä ongelmat huomioon. Työssä esitellyt 17 pro-
positiota integraationopeuteen sekä yritysoston suorituskykyyn liittyen ohjaavat yrityksen 
johtoa saavuttamaan nopeamman integraation sekä lisäämään yrityskaupasta saadun 
arvon määrää.   
 
Avainsanat: Yritysostot, yritysintegraatio, integraationopeus, yritysoston 
suorituskyky, synergioiden realisointi  
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“The managers we studied acknowledged the importance of the integration process. 
Yet integration was the part of the acquisition process with which they were least com-
fortable. They found it difficult, time consuming, uncertain, and fraught with risks and 
setbacks.” -Jemison & Haspeslagh (1991, p. 105) 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have become an increasingly popular movement for an 
increasing number of companies and consultants to pursue competitive advantages 
through synergy realization. Many researchers agree that improving the performance 
and value of the newly formed organization through synergy realization is the primary 
objective of M&A (Lubatkin 1983; Mukherjee et al. 2004; Holland & Salama 2010; Das & 
Kapil 2012). M&As have been reported to be excellent vehicles to achieve corporate 
growth, economies of scale, vertical integration and diversification (Buono et al. 1985). 
Indeed, M&A is a feasible market entry strategy both nationally and internationally.  What 
is more, M&A have also proven to be an important vehicle for strategic redirection and 
renewal of a company (Jemison & Sitkin 1986). The global M&A volume has expressed 
an increasing trend over the recent decades and was valued at $4.1 trillion globally in 
2018 while being the third largest year ever in regard to M&A volumes (J.P. Morgan 
2019). This illustrates well the relevance of M&A today in the current global business 
environment. The significance of the topic for future is also supported by the overall in-
creasing trend in global M&A activity.  
It can be concluded, that the importance and popularity of M&A is undeniable. Yet, up to 
60%-80% of all acquisitions fail (Bastien 1987; Tetenbaum 1999; Marks & Mirvis 2001; 
Vester 2002). When taking into account the financial magnitude of M&A deals, failures 
in the M&A integration can cause substantial damage for the overall M&A deal perfor-
mance and thus result in major financial losses for the integrating company. This is sup-
ported by the findings of Adnan et al. (2017) stating, that the share value of companies 
announcing an M&A attempt tends to decrease in short term as a result of such news. 
This suggests that the investors and markets acknowledge the financial magnitude of 
the risk of non-successful acquisition. When looked in the light of the high failure per-
centages, the factors influencing the success of M&A is a promising direction for aca-
demic research (Homburg & Bucerius 2006). This is also supported by Hitt et al. (2001, 
pp. 92–101) who suggest that acquiring companies should knowingly study and learn 
from the acquisitions they have made themselves while also learning from acquisitions 
made by other companies. This is in line with Ashkenas et al. (1998) who emphasize the 
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importance of continuous learning and developing acquisition integration into a core ca-
pability and competitive advantage. All these reasons suggest that it is essential for the 
companies to get the M&A integration process right.  
Jemison & Haspeslagh (1991, p. 105) and Huang & Kleiner (2004) suggest that integra-
tion process is the key to making acquisitions work because the value of the deal is 
created during that process. Yet, it is also the one that causes most M&A deals to fail as 
a result of faulty or weak management during implementation (Pritchett 1997, p. 6). This 
is due to the fact that to the current day, neither scholars nor practitioners have a com-
prehensive understanding of M&A variables and their interrelationships (Gomes et al. 
2013). These factors emphasize the gravity of the topic for companies as well as scholars 
who aim to gain more insight into M&A failure and discover what factors make a suc-
cessful acquisition. 
The M&A literature is vast and covers many different aspects of the process. However, 
the literature has been found to be highly fragmented and thus lacking connectedness 
(Gomes et al. 2013). It is also suggested that the number of interdisciplinary studies on 
M&A has been surprisingly small (Gomes et al. 2013) and few unifying theoretical works 
combining the different disciplines of the acquisition have emerged (Haleblian et al. 
2009). Particularly the linkages between different critical success factors (CSF) of the 
implementation process have not received enough attention even though they are re-
garded as an essential factor affecting the M&A success (Gomes et al. 2013). The defi-
nition of a CSF in this work relies on the definition of key success factor by Ketelhöhn 
(1998) and is defined as a thing that needs to be executed well in order to succeed in a 
specific endeavor. According to many scholars, the interrelationships between different 
CSFs should be further studied (Homburg& Bucerius 2006; Gomes et al. 2013) to in-
crease the connectedness of research (Angwin & Vaara 2005). Especially the determi-
nants that influence speed of integration are broadly neglected in literature while only the 
effects have been studied (Bauer & Matzler 2014). It has also been stated, that every 
acquisition is different (Jones 2009). Therefore, by studying cases a deeper and more 
accurate context-related picture can be achieved hence helping to gain more accurate 
knowledge on post-merger integration (PMI). The literature also lacks a business pro-
cess-perspective and does not systematically identify various integration related issues 
arising cross-sectionally at the business process level.  
This research answers the call for research by Bauer & Matzler (2014), Angwin & Vaara 
(2005), Homburg & Bucerius (2006) and Gomes et al. (2013) to create linkages between 
different CSFs of the integration process and to determine factors affecting the integra-
tion speed. This research aims to fill this gap in the M&A literature by studying the speed 
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of integration and the other integration related CSFs in a project-based organization 
(PBO) and this way provides insight into the interconnectedness of the success factors 
in a case context while answering the call of Bauer & Matzler (2014) to provide determi-
nants of integration speed. In other words, this research aims to provide companies and 
managers holistic insight into how the integration can be facilitated and the deal perfor-
mance increased by preventing and solving arising problems in the integration process 
across different business functions of a PBO. As a result, this work provides an action 
plan for the managers or practitioners on how to facilitate integration i.e. increase the 
speed of integration and to increase the deal performance based on the PMI CSFs. In 
addition to addressing the interlinkages, this study also aims to provide a more compre-
hensive understanding of the M&A variables and their interrelationships while also re-
ducing the fragmentedness and increasing connectedness as deemed necessary by 
Gomes et al. (2013). This is done by taking a cross-sectional look into the integration 
process and the event history in order to surface the problems related to acquisition 
integration in different business functions and by solving these problems in PBO context 
with the critical success factors and best practices thus unifying the fragmented literature. 
This study is among the first ones to adopt the cross-sectional view across all relevant 
business functions in a PBO and thus provides a new viewpoint for the M&A literature. 
The aim is to provide understanding into the problems arising at the business functions 
and to identify relevant integration practices needed in different business functions hence 
allowing managers to better prepare for different integration issues and make more in-
formed plans already pre-deal. In an attempt to unify the best practices of M&A integra-
tion while contributing to the interdisciplinary research of M&A, this research has a nota-
ble currency for the scientific community as well as the companies and managers en-
gaging in M&A activity. 
The objectives of this study are to identify typical integration problems of a PBO at busi-
ness function level and to identify actions that could be taken to prevent the problems 
from taking place or to mitigate the effect of these problems in order to ensure speedy 
integration. In addition to the previously mentioned, one objective is to create a holistic 
understanding of the integration problems and solutions in a PBO at different business 
functional levels and establish determinants of integration speed. The business level 
perspective has been motivated by Angwin & Vaara (2005) who recognized a need to 
connect specific M&A processes and practices with other processes that take place in 
the merging entity and its environment. In addition to that, they argue that there is a need 
to connect the studies with broader theories (Angwin & Vaara 2005). Therefore, the re-
search answers the following research questions:  
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1. What integration problems are typical for a PBO management, sales and opera-
tions functions and what are their effects on deal performance? 
2. How can integration linked problems in different business functions be fixed with 
different PMI best practices in order to improve deal performance? 
3. What are the determinants of integration speed i.e. what things help or prevent 
the integration from moving forward and that way affect deal performance? 
In addition to contributing to the performance perspective of the acquisition integration, 
this study also has a major social contribution. M&A result in stress and issues for the 
people working in the acquired organizations. The high turnover of employees in M&A is 
an excellent indicator portraying the scope of social problems associated with the inte-
gration process. Improving the integration process results in less acculturative stress, 
uncertainty or negative atmosphere thus improving the life of the employees. This re-
search carries a major social impact as the interpretivist research strategy and interviews 
of the employees involved in the acquisition integration allow the human side of mergers 
to be better linked to the PMI best practices. This social aspect to acquisition integration 
has often been neglected in the literature, yet it is a central target of this research.  
In addition to the contribution described previously, it is essential to define the scope of 
the research. This research concentrates particularly on domestic acquisitions. Even 
though many of the findings presented in this work will be applicable also in international 
context, this study leaves out cross-border M&A. Due to the complex cultural factors 
related to cross-border M&A they do not fit within the scope and are a subject to further 
study. As the integration approach affects the process of integration (Jemison & 
Haspeslagh 1991, p. 15), this variable needs to be controlled as PMI is a path-dependent 
process (Gomes et al. 2013). This study concentrates on the absorption integration ap-
proach. Absorption is the type of integration, in which two organizations become one 
(Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 15). It is the most challenging integration approach to 
manage as it involves the highest degree of integration. Therefore, absorption acquisition 
is an excellent case to surface integration related problems and can be used to gain key 
takeaways that can be applied to other integrations, were similar problems to arise. What 
is more, the organizational type is restricted to PBOs, and the business functions studied 
are relevant to people intensive PBOs. 
This research first discusses the deal performance and process of value creation before 
moving on to CSFs that have been unified based on a systematic literature review. After 
this, the methodology of the research is described followed by the presentation of data 
and findings. Finally, the results are discussed, and the findings are used to form 17 
propositions for PMI success. 
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 Value creation in M&A: Capabilities-based view 
In order to study the things that speed up integration and increase deal performance, it 
is essential to understand how value in M&A is created. This research adopts a capabil-
ities-based perspective on value creation that builds on the resource-based view (RBW) 
of a firm. RBW suggests that the performance of a company is dependent on the re-
sources of the firm and the firm’s effectiveness to convert these resources into competi-
tive advantages (Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991; Day 1994). Capabilities-based view 
concentrates in particular on the latter aspect of the RBW view emphasizing the firm’s 
capability to utilize resources in the pursuit of a competitive advantage. According Trainor 
et al. (2014) capabilities are defined as the ability of an organization to assemble, inte-
grate and deploy resources in order to achieve a competitive advantage. In other words, 
capabilities are the glue bringing the assets together and enabling them to be deployed 
in a manner that creates advantages for the company (Day 1994). Therefore, the flow of 
information, sharing of resources, learning as well as atmosphere are major tools that 
affect the transfer of capabilities.  
According to Jemison & Haspeslagh (1991, pp. 22–23) both value capture and value 
creation take place in an integration. Value capture refers to the one-time transaction 
linked event of shifting value from the shareholders of the acquired company to the 
shareholders of the acquiring company. According to Wernerfelt (1984) M&A provides a 
vehicle to trade these usually non-marketable resources in a highly imperfect market 
thus allowing returns to be created. However, having these resources is not enough un-
less they can be utilized to promote the competitive position of the company. Therefore, 
the more central concept to PMI is value creation, which refers to the long-term phenom-
enon of synergy realization. Synergy occurs when the capabilities, that are transferred 
between the companies, form into a competitive advantage thus improving the competi-
tive position of the company at the market and hence positively improving its perfor-
mance. (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, pp. 22–23) This is in line with Day (1994) as the 
transfer of capabilities allows the new combined entity to more efficiently deploy assets 
in order to gain advantages. The capability transfer and synergy realization are therefore 
the very core of the capabilities-based view as the view emphasizes the firm’s ability to 
deploy the acquired resources in the most efficient way, i.e. transfer capabilities and 
create synergies in order to create competitive advantages and value.  
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Capability transfer is a central concept when talking about PMI as integration is the 
source of value creation. Jemison & Haspeslagh (1991, p. 106) describe integration as 
the “interactive and gradual process in which individuals from the two organizations learn 
to work together and cooperate in the transfer of strategic capabilities”. Integration is “an 
adaptive process of interaction that takes place when firms come together in an atmos-
phere conductive to capability transfer”. The strategic capability transfer and therefore 
value creation are dependent on the organizational context and the ability to create an 
atmosphere of contextual understanding despite the problems that arise due to the PMI 
process. (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 103) In other words the ultimate goal of inte-
gration is to realize synergies (Lubatkin 1983; Mukherjee et al. 2004; Holland & Salama 
2010; Das & Kapil 2012) i.e. to transfer the capabilities. In other words, in order to create 
value and improve the deal performance, capability transfer has to take place. Actions 
that promote this transfer of capabilities thus improve the deal success and therefore 
should be the focus of the companies engaging in M&A activity.  
When talking about M&A value creation, deal performance is a central concept to under-
stand. In this work, the definition of deal performance is based on the definition of per-
formance. However, the concept of performance can be multifaceted as described by 
Zollo & Meier (2008) and can include for example financial or process-related measures. 
However, in case of M&A the components of performance are strongly connected and 
therefore this research adopts a broader view on performance by defining performance 
as how well the M&A performs, i.e. how well it proceeds towards its predetermined goals. 
The central concepts regarding deal performance and the acquisition integration process 
illustrating the process of value creation in M&A is presented in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Integration value creation process (Modified from Jemison & Haspeslagh 
1991, p. 123) 
Transfer of 
Strategic 
Capabilities
Interactions
Improved 
Deal Value
Atmosphere of 
Capability Transfer
• Reciprocal Understanding
• Willingness
• Capacity
• Slack Resources
• Cause-Effect 
Understanding
Acquiring
firm
Problems in 
the 
Integration 
ProcessAcquired
firm
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According to Jemison & Haspeslagh (1991, p. 110) the atmosphere of capability transfer 
consists of five key ingredients; reciprocal understanding, willingness, capacity, slack 
resources and cause-effect understanding. This view is supported by Gates and Very 
(2003) as well as Rumyantseva et al. (2002) who also recognize the importance of at-
mosphere for the transfer of strategic capabilities and M&A integration success. The at-
mosphere of capability transfer is crucial as it affects the information exchange and learn-
ing post-deal (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 117). According to Kogut & Zander (1992) 
the creation of a supportive environment facilitates the knowledge transfer and is there-
fore crucial for M&A value creation. Reciprocal understanding refers to the need to un-
derstand the other company and its values, history, organizational approach, personnel 
makeup as well as culture. This is because sometimes the strategic capabilities are em-
bedded in the organization or the culture of the company. Reciprocal understanding is 
therefore a prerequisite in order to transfer and apply these capabilities successfully. It 
is all about a two-phased learning process where the two organizations learn the why’s 
and how’s of the capabilities. It is important to understand why and how the capability 
worked in the initial context. This is particularly important for the acquirer. (Jemison & 
Haspeslagh 1991, pp. 111–112) 
Willingness to work together on the other hand is essential as capability transfer requires 
people working together and transferring the capabilities from one organization to an-
other. In case the employees are not ready to work together, this will result in problems 
regarding integration value creation. Typical reasons that make people not want to work 
together are fear of job loss, loss of power over resources, firm size, desire to hold on to 
old ways of working as well as reward system-based motivation. Also, prior experience 
in mergers has been found out to positively affect the willingness to work together in a 
company. (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, pp. 113–114) This view is in line with Ap-
plebaum et al. (2017) who suggest that resistance to change is normal for M&A integra-
tion. Overcoming it by the means of change management measures is the key to M&A 
success (Applebaum et al. 2017).  
Capacity to transfer and receive a capability means that the parties must have the ca-
pacity to participate in the transfer. In other words, the capability has to exist and appro-
priate people in both firms must be able to transfer and receive it. This means that the 
acquirer must have enough resources as well as intellectual and organizational abilities 
in order to be able to use and apply what is acquired. (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, pp. 
114–115) This is in line with Björkman et al. (2007) who suggest that the absorptive 
capacity, i.e. the organizations ability to absorb and assimilate knowledge, affects the 
capability transfer in the organization.  
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The availability of resources is an essential component shaping the acquisition behavior 
(Alessandri et al. 2014) and that there is often a lack of resources during PMI (Vester 
2002). Slack resources are needed in order to give a basis for dealing with strategic 
contingencies at corporate and business levels. Having enough slack resources provides 
protection and room for maneuver this way preventing a premature fixation on short-term 
results in case the acquired unit does not immediately meet the performance expecta-
tions. Slack can also help the middle managers responsible for integration to deal with 
unanticipated events and problems by smoothing out arising problems. (Jemison & 
Haspeslagh 1991, pp. 115–116)  
Lastly, cause-effect understanding is essential as capabilities transfer requires the broad 
purpose and vision of the acquisition to be clarified in operational terms for the middle 
and operating-level managers responsible for the integration (Jemison & Haspeslagh 
1991, p. 116). Because these managers are the ones who need to work out the details 
of how to bring the two firms together, they need to understand the vision and reason of 
the acquisition as well as the underlying causes and effects in order to be able to transfer 
the capabilities and allow synergies to be realized. According to Lakshman (2011) cause-
effect knowledge of the managers is an essential component of knowledge leadership. 
This is supported by Gates & Very (2003) who suggest that managers should identify 
relevant performance measurement measures and adapt the integration plan based on 
these measures. Jemison & Haspeslagh (1991, p. 116) suggest that managers need to 
understand the nature, the source, the timing and the predictability of the benefits that 
are expected from the acquisition. These are all included in the integration plan. If there 
is no precise plan and timetable of when outcomes can be expected, many problems 
may arise. Also overly rigid and detailed plan should be avoided but being specific is still 
needed. (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 116) This is in line with Vester (2002) who also 
recognizes the importance of integration plan for the PMI success.  
2.2 Critical success factors 
2.2.1 Speed of integration 
Time has traditionally been considered as an important dimension of competitive strat-
egy in business context (Gomes et al. 2013). It has also quickly gained foothold in M&A 
literature by becoming one of the most crucial critical success factors related to acquisi-
tion success (Inkpen et al. 2000; Vester 2002; Gomes et al. 2013). Due to challenging 
and complex nature of M&A success combined with the benefits that speed can provide 
for the company, it is no surprise that the speed of acquisition integration has become 
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an imperative for a growing number of practitioners and consultants working on the field 
(Angwin 2004).  
By definition speed is regarded to be the ability to execute movements quickly (Kent 
2016). This definition is based on the physical definition of speed according to which 
speed is the rate of change of position of a body (Rusk 2014). In M&A context, the con-
cept of speed is twofold as it consists of the dimensions of time to completion as well as 
progress over a set period of time (Angwin 2014). In this study, the word speed is thus 
used to refer to how fast a variable under study is changing in relation to the overall time 
to completion. In other words, speed refers to the time it takes for the integration to pro-
ceed to completion. However, it is very difficult to define an exact time when an integra-
tion is complete. Therefore, various frameworks such as the first 100 days model have 
been developed. (Angwin 2004) According to Citicorp’s David Franzen (1987) there is 
“’a window of opportunity’” of 100 days after the acquisition during which people expect 
change and thus the integration and change measures should be completed during that 
time (Buono & Bowditch 1989, p. 15). 
In literature there are also studies criticizing the common and prevailing consideration of 
speed as an imperative by providing insight into the cons of moving fast during the PMI 
process. It has been discovered, that speed can for example cause discomfort and in-
crease the risk of arising conflicts (Olie 1994). What is more, slow integration has been 
found to improve trust building between the employees of the merging firms (Ranft & 
Lord 2002). High integration speed can also be detrimental for the deal success when 
there is low internal relatedness and high external relatedness between the acquirer and 
acquired companies (Homburg & Bucerius 2006). 
However, the costs of moving slowly are found to be much greater than the costs asso-
ciated with moving quickly (Light 2001). However, this research concentrates on ways 
and benefits of increasing speed and therefore the research does not further consider 
the negative effects of integration speed as they have not been regarded relevant for the 
case acquisition. When combined with the fact that companies need to know how to 
move fast no matter what the integration strategy and timeframe chosen, this research 
provides an important new aspect to the prevalent research and complements the views 
by giving insight into how speed can be increased by the means of PMI CSFs. In addition, 
it is easier to move slow than to move fast as the speed can be reduced easily by simply 
postponing the schedule of different activities and milestones. Also, it is more common 
for companies not to be able to move fast enough due to various inabilities than it would 
be for them to move too fast. The role of this work is to give the management an action 
plan on how to move quickly, after a decision has been made based on the adequate 
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speed principles.  Therefore, this knowledge is of great value for companies and scientific 
literature, as it unifies the underlying literature to provide a more holistic and unified pic-
ture of the ways in which speed can be increased in the M&A integration process. As 
every M&A deal is different, this knowledge is to be used together with the previous 
research on the ideal speed of acquisition to formulate the best possible integration plan 
tailored specifically for the context in question. For these reasons, the negative sides of 
the speed in M&A integration process are not covered in this research, but instead the 
research solely concentrates on providing insight into how the integration speed can be 
increased by the means of PMI CSFs.  
The need to move fast in regard to M&A integration is also linked to the change in the 
business environment over the years. The rate of change of the environment has in-
creased and it has become evident, that companies that want to endure and success 
need to be able to answer to changes fast (Angwin 2004). According to Stalk (1988) 
speed can be perceived as an important competitive advantage that can help companies 
to compete and manage in the dynamic business environment. This need for agility has 
also been applied to M&A integration process and can be seen in the need of managers 
to integrate fast in order to keep the company moving and responsive to the changes 
(Angwin 2004).  
The first 100 days-concept has gained momentum in literature and is described to have 
become something of an urban myth among managers and consultants. It is often used 
as a benchmark to measure the progress of integration. (Angwin 2004) Many successful 
companies such as GE Capital perceive the first 100 days after the deal as critical for 
the acquisition success (Ashkenas et al. 1998). At GE Capital the idea in having a 100-
day integration plan is that as change is inevitable in case of M&A, it is best to make the 
changes as quickly as possible (Inkpen et al. 2000). This view is also in line with other 
scholars. According to Feldman & Spratt (1999, pp. 31–34) the first 100 days is when 
the critical actions should take place as this is the limit to employee enthusiasm and Wall 
Street patience. Other perks of integrating within the 100-day period works also as a 
motivating factor for everybody involved and can therefore improve the integration 
(Vester 2002). According to Angwin (2004) PriceWaterhouseCoopers suggests a 100-
day schedule for the whole integration process. Also Vester (2002) suggests that the first 
100 days is the time in which the integration should take place. It is evident, that the first 
100-days have become a prevalent concern of the M&A integration among scholars and 
practitioners (Angwin 2004). 
Many scholars stress the essence of moving rapidly (Ranft & Lord 2002; Vester 2002) 
and consistently (Vester 2002) after the deal in order to increase the success of the 
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integration process. There seems to be a common agreement in the literature, that un-
certainty is maybe the most important corrosive factor causing challenges in the integra-
tion process (Angwin 2004). Yet, by moving quickly the time of uncertainty can be re-
duced (Vester 2002; Angwin 2004). Vester (2002) suggests that moving quickly enables 
the creation of supporting organizational structures thus establishing a sensation of calm 
among the employees because the employees will no longer be guessing about the out-
comes of the deal. If moving slowly however, uncertainty can increase (Gomes et al. 
2013) thus causing the M&A integration value creation to suffer while also negatively 
interfering with other business functions as morale can suffer and customers get forgot-
ten (Vester 2002). Therefore, moving rapidly helps the company to reduce uncertainty 
and therefore decrease the amount of negative surprises and other issues during the 
integration process leading to better integration results and value creation.  
Maybe the most apparent advantage of integrating fast is linked to the financial side of 
the operations. It is typical for a M&A deal to cause a temporary dip in revenue and 
profitability right after the acquisition due to the fact that a part of the resources is directed 
to PMI instead of the core business. There are also many new issues and things that 
interfere with the daily operations and take time for the employees to get used to thus 
reducing the time used for regular business. What is more, according to Jemison & Sitkin 
(1986) the lack of transformational support can fuel uncertainty related to career, finan-
cial security, geographical relocation, feeling of alienation and lack of co-worker trust. 
This increased uncertainty often results in dissatisfaction and low productivity immedi-
ately after the acquisition announcement (Jemison & Sitkin 1986). These challenges re-
garding productivity, distractions in management attention, delayed decision making, dis-
satisfaction, commitment and motivation are referred to as post-acquisition drift (Ranft & 
Lord 2002). For these reasons, the productivity and profitability of company operations 
tend to decrease during the integration process. According to Tetenbaum (1999) post-
merger drift and up to 25-50% drop in productivity can be faced when going through a 
large organizational change. However, rapid integration has been found to minimize the 
amount of post-merger drift (Ranft & Lord 2002). Therefore, reduction in the integration 
time and returning to the status quo or business as usual as fast as possible reduces 
this time of underperforming and is thus an important factor from the financial perspec-
tive. 
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Figure 2. The effect of integration on the revenue and company valuation (Modified 
from Vester 2002) 
There are many advantages of fast integration arising from the fact that it can reduce the 
time in which the acquired assets can be utilized. Therefore, the motives behind M&A 
activity can be used to explain the importance of speed when integrating. M&A is a big 
investment for a company, and it is made in order to access new returns for the invest-
ment. The faster the acquisition is integrated and the faster the status quo is reached, 
the faster the returns on the investment will be accessed (Angwin 2014). In other words, 
time is money for the companies. Acquisitions foster company growth due to the financial 
and strategic returns gained through the investment, and therefore fast integration is also 
an advantage from the company growth perspective. The effect of the acquisition inte-
gration speed on the value of the company due to the realization of investment returns 
is demonstrated in the example of two merging companies; SmithKline and Beechams. 
At the same time there was another merger going on by Bristol Myers Squibb. Due to 
the fact that the SmithKline Beechams was proceeding at a slower integration rate, they 
ended needing to mark down the share price. (Bauman 1997) As the value of the com-
pany reflects the expected future cash flows of the company (Kaplan & Rubak 1995), the 
previous example supports the view of Angwin (2004) suggesting that the companies 
integrating faster than competitors tend to be winners. 
The investment return aspect of PMI can be understood well by taking a look at invest-
ment banks engaging in leveraged buyouts (LBO). Even though LBO’s differ from many 
other companies, their procedures are still worth studying when determining the PMI 
success factors. According to Anslinger & Copeland (1996) successful LBO firms tend 
to outbid the corporate buyers while creating remarkable returns even without having 
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any synergic benefits. This suggests that the integration procedures used by the LBO 
are a good way to understand what makes M&A integration successful. Bruner (2002) 
agrees that LBOs tend to create exceptional returns to buyers and suggest that one 
reason for it are the incentive schemes as the net worth of the managers is closely tied 
to the success of the transaction. Due to the nature of LBO companies, they engage in 
M&A activity in order to create returns. It is also in their interest to access these returns 
as soon as possible. This is reflected by the fact described by Anslinger & Copeland 
(1996), that financial buyers tend to be less patient along the M&A process. It is also 
characteristic for the LBO firms to “push the pace of change” as this “disciplines manag-
ers and sharpens priorities” while giving the employees a challenge (Anslinger & 
Copeland 1996). Decrease in the integration time would therefore help LBO companies 
to access returns faster, create better return and thus work as a competitive advantage 
in the bidding process.   
When discussing about M&A integration it is important to notice that people are in the 
center of the whole process. It is often the people who can make an acquisition succeed 
or fail. Often the legal and accounting aspects are taken care of in an exemplary fashion, 
but the problems arise with the people at the integration phase. This fact emphasizes 
the importance of people management and behavioral psychology perspective of the 
M&A integration process. From a behavioral psychology perspective, it can be remarka-
bly detrimental for the post-acquisition integration in case there is a sustained uncertainty 
among the workforce (Buono & Bowditch 1985). As described by the chairman of former 
National City Corp. A. Daberko:”’ The real enemy of a successful integration is uncer-
tainty’” (Chase 1998). The employees want to know what to expect for example in terms 
of employee layoffs, changes in the organisation and management as well as other prac-
tical matters. They are also interested in the timetable of the changes. However, there is 
proof that integrating faster reduces internal uncertainty among employees. (Homburg & 
Bucerius 2006) One reason for this is that speed gives the employees a perception of 
controlled process making them feel like they are in good hands. Therefore, it is essential 
that the process progresses fast so that the time of uncertainty can be minimized (Hom-
burg & Bucerius 2006). Structural integration introduces defined social structures as a 
result of e.g. clarified reporting structures, hierarchies and incentive schemes that in-
crease clarity and minimize the uncertainty perceived by the employees as the uncer-
tainty related to the expected performance and behavior in the new firm diminish 
(Schweizer & Patzelt 2012). The risk otherwise is that the employee retention rate will 
decrease, and productivity fall as a result of prevailing uncertainty. What makes the un-
certainty even more detrimental is the cumulative network effect of rumour mills causing 
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exponential effects. If the integration speed is increased, the time of uncertainty can be 
reduced, and the exponential effects of the rumour mills can be minimized. (Angwin 
2004) 
The speed of integration is also beneficial when it comes to development of social inter-
action patterns between both the acquiring and acquired organization’s employees. The 
speed of integration increases also the speed at which these social interaction patterns 
and social structures are acknowledged and learned. By allowing people to work together 
at an early stage on everyday work projects and to solve everyday business problems 
the employees will be able to start to build up their own new common culture and under-
standing resulting in reduced uncertainties regarding social context and positions. This 
reduction in uncertainties improves the integration process and therefore increases the 
chances of M&A success. Established social structures are also found to be linked to an 
increased motivation to stay within the new combined organization. This is due to the 
reason that established social structures help the employees to create a sense of cohe-
sion in the organization and increases the amount to which the employees are attracted 
to each other. (Schweizer & Patzelt 2012) Therefore it can be concluded, that rapid ac-
quisition can be used to minimize the post-acquisition integration problems related to 
human resources (Ashkenas et al. 1998; Inkpen et al. 2000). Also employee commitment 
can be maintained and improved through fast integration and the probability of them 
staying within the firm is positively associated with integration speed (Schweizer & Pat-
zelt 2012). These findings are in line with the studies suggesting that there is a positive 
relationship between post-acquisition integration speed and general M&A success (Light 
2001; Vester 2002)  
According to Homburg & Bucerius (2006) the speed of integration is beneficial also from 
the external communications point of view.  The speed of integration has been found to 
be particularly important when the external relatedness of the merging companies is low, 
i.e. the target markets and market positioning of the two merging companies are very 
different. This causes increased uncertainty among the customers as there will more 
likely be changes in the product portfolio or positioning of the products as well as seg-
mentation. All these are factors could negatively affect the customers hence making 
them particularly vulnerable. Therefore, the property of fast integration resulting in de-
creased uncertainty is particularly important in this kind of settings. (Homburg & Bucerius 
2006) 
Faster integration can also cause advantages regarding the marketing functions and thus 
increase customer satisfaction. Marketing and sales operations are essential for com-
municating with the customer and can be utilized to provide the customer with more 
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information. Hence, when the sales and marketing functions are back to status quo 
faster, time of uncertainty for customers can be reduced to minimum. This is especially 
important for the business as it is a common practice for competitors to try to increase 
uncertainty within the customers in order to try to poach them and make them switch 
their provider. In addition to that, reduced uncertainty among customers decreases the 
amount of negative customer reactions. (Homburg & Bucerius 2005; Homburg & Bu-
cerius 2006) It has been found out, that negative customer reactions can significantly 
reduce the M&A success (Morrall 1996; Urban & Pratt 2000). However, faster integration 
results in happier customers as these pitfalls can be avoided.  
Homburg & Bucerius (2005) also found out that there is a positive link between the speed 
of integration and market-related performance. Market related performance is used to 
describe the effectiveness of marketing activities of the new combined organization and 
it consists of e.g. cross-selling, bundling opportunity utilization and exploitation of nego-
tiation position. In other words, by increasing the speed of integration, the previously 
mentioned factors and thus the market-related performance of the company can be pos-
itively affected as the result increases the customer retention. Due to the fact that cus-
tomers are cheaper to retain than to acquire completely new ones, cost savings can be 
generated. (Homburg & Bucerius 2005) 
Recruiting new employees is expensive. If the employee retention rate could be in-
creased, it would result in reduced expenses. As stated previously, integration speed 
can be used to increase employee retention. Often more important than the recruiting 
expenses is the knowledge capital of the people leaving the company. This cannot be 
stressed enough in the context of M&A integration especially in knowledge-intensive in-
dustries where employee retention is key to deal performance.  
The advantages of rapid integration can also be addressed on the strategic level. The 
society and business environment are changing in an increasingly rapid manner mean-
ing that also companies need to adjust to changes more rapidly in order to secure long-
term success and endure in the competitive environment. Speed has become a central 
factor affecting long-term survival of a company as if reduces the time available for com-
petitors to respond to changes. This can give both positional advantage and barriers to 
imitation thus providing the company substantial competitive advantage against its com-
petitors. (Angwin 2004) It can be well understood how speed in M&A integration context 
can work as a competitive advantage when the other advantages that have been men-
tioned so far are considered. Let’s consider for example the value of the company and 
the time of integration. Slow integration can affect the value of a company negatively 
(Bauman 1997). Also being able to capture returns faster contributes to the net worth of 
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the company. This net worth can be leveraged against the competitors thus increasing 
the company’s chances to manage in the competitive environment. In addition, faster 
integration will make it possible to utilize the acquired capabilities or strategic advantages 
such as size or diversification faster and this way get access to the competitive ad-
vantages faster hence helping the company to succeed in the competitive environment.  
In addition to providing advantages on a strategic level against competition, speed of 
integration also has advantages when it comes to managing the uncertainties of the ex-
ternal environment that can potentially be fatal for the success of a company. According 
to Angwin (2004) rapid integration reduces the exposure of the company to uncertainties 
related to the external environment. As stated previously, the company is in a sub-opti-
mal condition before the integration is completed and therefore is more vulnerable to 
changes in the environment (Angwin 2004). Ranft & Lord (2002) suggest that as a result 
of post-merger drift, the management attention might be concentrated elsewhere result-
ing in distraction from the firm’s business operations causing important decisions and 
investments to be delayed. This provides a good opportunity for the competitors to take 
advantage of the situation and use it for their advantage (Ranft & Lord 2002). However, 
by reducing the time of vulnerability by fast integration, the company can manage risk 
and minimize the chance of realization of negative outcomes.  
Distraction from the business operations also causes the company to be less agile be-
cause of the slowed down rate of decision making increasing the time at which the com-
pany can respond to changes (Angwin 2004). This can be for example due to the fact 
that the resources are directed towards integration instead of monitoring the environ-
ment. Also, internal changes are harder to implement before the integration process is 
completed. The lack of ability to rapidly apply these essential change-measures de-
creases the company’s reaction time to changes. Therefore, it is more likely that the 
company will face reduced effectiveness of change measures taken to address macro-
economic, political, competitive or other type of changes in the external environment 
(Angwin 2004). However, by reducing the time of integration, the time that the company’s 
ability to react effectively to external changes can be minimized thus reducing the risks 
faced by the company during PMI. This ability to maximize the agility and ability to re-
spond to changes as a result of fast integration is a powerful advantage that can be of 
great importance for the company in the long run.  
In case of friendly M&A there is also the enthusiasm-principle that is related to the speed 
of acquisition and overall acquisition success. Both acquirers and acquirees anticipate 
changes and have expectations for the deal that feed enthusiasm and euphoria. Accord-
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ing to Angwin (2004) the amount of enthusiasm decreases over time. Hence, acting rap-
idly takes an advantage of the enthusiasm for change and makes implementation of 
change measures easier thus making the integration smoother (Angwin 2004). Accord-
ing to Feldman & Spratt (1999, p. 32) the employees expect dramatic changes after a 
takeover announcement and are ready to accept them. However, if you act too slowly 
and miss this window, implementing the big changes will be harder. If changes were 
made later on, there would be less enthusiasm and readiness for change thus making 
the management process and implementation of changes harder and more time con-
suming. Therefore, acting rapidly possesses the advantage of utilizing enthusiasm in 
order to make change management and implementation of changes more effective this 
way reducing the overall time of post-acquisition integration process.  
The enthusiasm can also be affected by the speed of integration. It has been found out, 
that early post-deal wins delay the decay of enthusiasm within the organization while 
helping to maintain the state of euphoria within the organization (Angwin 2004). Early 
wins are the first fruits of integration that aim to instill confidence and support to different 
stakeholders (Gomes et al. 2013). Quick results are deemed important in order to 
demonstrate the benefits of the integration to the employees (Ashkenas et al. 1998). It 
will also establish an atmosphere of success and this way helps to build up the momen-
tum for change. In case these early victories will not take place, it can reduce the enthu-
siasm among the employees. 
Already earlier it was stated that there tends to be a decrease in value of the combined 
entity during the integration process resulting from regular business being affected neg-
atively. This negative effect is to a great extent due to the resources being allocated to 
the integration process instead of operations in addition to the other regular value de-
creasing factors related to inability to capture value. According to Angwin (2004) by inte-
grating faster, the organization would thus spend less time in sub-optimal condition. In 
addition to reducing the time-related value loss due to revenue dip, it would also have 
other positive effects for the company. One crucial factor mentioned by Angwin (2004) 
is the instability of the company during the integration process. Due to internal disorder 
and challenges, the company is more vulnerable both in regard to internal and external 
threats and therefore reducing the time of this vulnerability is of great value for the com-
pany thus supporting faster integration speed. This view is also in line with other scholars 
(Homburg & Bucerius 2005; Homburg & Bucerius 2006). Due to reduced instability, also 
the amount of costly readjustments related for example to inefficient operations or poorly 
coordinated market interference can be avoided (Angwin 2004). This suggests that rapid 
integration can also be of significant value in regard to cost-savings related to the need 
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of readjustments. What is more, Angwin (2004) suggests that the shortness of the time 
period of integration is also positively related to the controllability of events. Therefore, 
by increasing the integration speed and thus reducing the overall integration time control 
can be increased over the integration processes. This can be of great benefit for the 
company that implements critical changes requiring a high degree of control.  
According to Ranft & Lord (2002) slow acquisition implementation is positively associ-
ated with the post-acquisition autonomy of the acquired firm. They suggest that this au-
tonomy can be an issue when it comes to capturing value from the deal. It is essential to 
communicate with the acquired company and to integrate it to the acquiring company in 
order to capture synergies. If the company is given perfect autonomy with no integration 
at all, it is not possible to access the value that is to be created in the integration process. 
The knowledge-based view of a company suggests, that the critical source of competitive 
advantage is the integration of knowledge rather than the knowledge itself. It is not 
enough for the company to buy knowledge if it is not able to integrate it. (Ranft & Lord 
2002) This is in line with the capabilities-based view (Day 1994). Therefore, it is essential 
for the company to integrate the knowledge in order to be able to use it as a competitive 
advantage. Ranft & Lord (2002) also propose, that there is a curvilinear relationship be-
tween the transfer of technologies and capabilities to the acquirer and the slow integra-
tion speed. These factors suggest that the speed of integration can to some extent also 
promote the realization of value from the deal due to its ability to prevent excessive au-
tonomy and alienation of the acquired firm. Also this view supports the approach that fast 
integration can support the value creation and success of the deal.  
A central concept related to M&A integration is the path-dependency of events (Gomes 
et al. 2013). Path dependency means that the order in which measures are implemented 
affect the overall outcome. When evaluating the effectiveness of actions taken, it is im-
portant to note that early actions are assumed to have bigger effects upon outcomes 
than later actions (Angwin 2004). This is due to the fact that the establishment of config-
urations and capabilities limit the ability to establish substantial difference (Angwin 2004). 
Therefore, companies have a limited ability to learn or anticipate from feedback that is 
provided later on during the post-acquisition process (Angwin 2004). In other words, 
moving fast maximizes the effectiveness of actions taken hence supports the overall 
effectiveness and success of the M&A integration. 
A good example supporting the view of the benefits of quick post-acquisition integration 
on the overall success of the M&A can be found by studying Cisco Systems. Cisco is an 
experienced acquirer who is considered one of the most successful acquirers of all com-
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panies (Goldblatt 1999). Inkpen et al. (2002) describe Cisco’s growth strategy to be cen-
tered around acquisitions. Cisco applies a fast post-acquisition integration strategy aim-
ing to integrate the acquired company within 100 days (Schweizer & Patzelt 2012). One 
way to measure acquisition success is monitoring employee retention (Bunnell 2000, p. 
73). The employee turnover rate at Cisco is extraordinarily low, just 2,1% instead of an 
industry average of 20% (Goldblatt 1999). Inkpen et al. (2000) brings up that the em-
ployee turnover rate in the acquired companies is actually lower than the average turn-
over rate among Cisco’s own employees. Particular interest at Cisco is placed on com-
munication as employees are told well in advance what the plans are because the com-
pany believes that “trust is everything” (Bunnell et al. 2000, p. 74). Also placing top peo-
ple from the acquired firm into key positions in order to make them stay is a standard 
procedure at Cisco (Inkpen et al. 2000). As a result of fast integration and good manage-
ment, the employee turnover rates at Cisco are low resulting in increased value creation 
while increasing the overall success rate of M&A deals. This view is aligned with the 
proposition of Schweizer & Patzelt (2012) stating that there is a positive relationship be-
tween the post-acquisition integration speed and employee commitment during the post-
acquisition integration process. Table 1. Integration speed summarizes the benefits of 
fast PMI integration.  
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Table 1. Integration speed best practices  
Speed of integration 
Implementing changes early is easier (Angwin 2004). When integrating the acquisition 
within 100 days, employee enthusiasm can be leveraged to improve effectiveness of 
change measures (Feldman & Spratt 1999, pp. 31–34). 
Integrating faster reduces the time of uncertainty and the effect of rumour mills (Angwin 
2004). 
Fast integration enables to better respond to the dynamic competitive environment 
Stalk (1988). 
Fast integration reduces the time of sub-optimal operations and shortens the revenue 
dip time (Angwin 2004). 
Benefits of the investment can be realized faster. Positively contributes to company 
valuation. (Bauman 1997) 
Integrate fast to not give competitors a chance to poach your clients or get ahead 
(Homburg & Bucerius 2005; Homburg & Bucerius 2006). 
Higher integration speed can reduce employee retention (Angwin 2004). 
Fast integration improves client relationships and marketing function hence improving 
client satisfaction (Homburg & Bucerius 2005; Homburg & Bucerius 2006). 
Take a look at LBO practices: Tie the net worth of managers to the success of inte-
gration (Bruner 2002), give the employees a challenge, sharpen the priorities and in-
crease the pace of change (Anslinger & Copeland 1996) in order access the benefits 
of integration speed.  
Balance between fast integration and the increased risk of conflicts and discomfort 
among the employees (Olie 1994). 
Acknowledge, that slower integration improves trust building (Ranft & Lord 2002). 
Low internal relatedness and high external relatedness between the acquirer and ac-
quired companies requires slower integration speed (Homburg & Bucerius 2006). 
2.2.2 Integration strategies 
Adequate and effective integration is key for value to be derived from the deal as this is 
the stage where value is created and synergies realized (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, 
p.105; Schweiger et al. 1993; Ashkenas et al. 1998). Yet many deals do not live up to 
the expectations and create the synergies or financial benefits that were expected 
(Schweiger & Weber 1989) suggesting that a high enough degree of integration has not 
been achieved. While greater integration leads to greater synergy realization (Larsson & 
Finkelstein 1999), too much integration can result in M&A failure as the risk for detri-
mental cultural clashes increases (Weber & Schweiger 1992). The risk of the breakdown 
of the combined entity due to organizational diversity increases as the degree of integra-
tion increases (Olie 1994). Thus, it can be concluded, that integration approaches do 
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matter and therefore adopting the right integration strategy is essential for deal perfor-
mance.  
The extent of integration is a central concept when talking about integration strategy. As 
every acquisition is unique, scholars have developed many different contingency frame-
works regarding integration approaches. The appropriate extent of integration is a func-
tion of the synergy potential and the cultural fit of the deal. Howell (1970) identifies three 
integration approaches that are a function of the perceived synergy potential of the deal 
whereas Nahavandi & Malekzadeh (1988) propose an acculturative integration frame-
work that associates the degree of integration with the cultural fit of the company. How-
ever, there are also many frameworks combining both human and task integration into a 
unified framework. According to Gomes et al. (2013) the best-known contingency frame-
work combining these dimensions is the post-acquisition integration model created by 
Jemison & Haspeslagh (1991, pp. 145–149). The model divides integration approaches 
into four according to the need for strategic interdependence and need for organizational 
autonomy. The model is presented in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. Acquisition integration approaches (Modified from Jemison & Haspeslagh 
1991, p. 145) 
According to Jemison & Haspeslagh (1991, p. 142) strategic capability transfer is the 
precursor to value creation. This is based on an assumption that the competitive ad-
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vantage of one firm can be improved as a result of strategic capability transfer i.e. syn-
ergy realization (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 28). However, the pursuit of capability 
transfer may lead to the destruction of the very capability that is to be transferred. This 
is especially the case when the capabilities that are to be transferred reside in people. 
Therefore, the preservation of some capabilities requires organizational autonomy. 
(Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 142) This is in line with other scholars, who suggest 
that tacit and socially complex knowledge is hard to transfer and therefore calls for a high 
degree of integration if the benefits are to be realized as suggested by Puranam et al. 
(2003). Therefore, the acquiring managers should pay close attention to where the ca-
pabilities and potential of the acquisition resides and ask whether autonomy is essential 
to preserve the strategic capability that was bought. If it is, the degree of allowed auton-
omy should be determined. It is important to also consider the specific areas where au-
tonomy is important and thus allowed. Autonomy is deemed essential in case the survival 
of the strategic capability depends on it. (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 143) 
Strategic interdependence describes the strategic fit and how interdependent the two 
entities should be related to capability transfer and resource sharing. Low interdepend-
ence refers to value capture, which is a one-time and transaction related event in which 
value from previous stakeholders is shifted to the new ones. High interdependence on 
the other hand means that value is realized via value creation which is a long-term pro-
cess taking place via the process of strategic capability transfer. (Angwin & Meadows 
2009) Strategic interdependence is a central concept concerning value creation. This is 
due to the fact that strategic capability transfer requires managing interdependencies 
between the two organizations (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 139). Therefore, the 
extent of interdependence is dependent on how value is created in the integration i.e. 
the nature of the resources and capabilities that the value is based on (Jemison & 
Haspeslagh 1991, p. 140; Angwin & Meadows 2009). These interdependencies disturb 
the boundaries of the acquired company and are likely to result in resistance due to 
cultural change (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 139). This is supported by Angwin & 
Meadows (2009) who suggest that high strategic interdependence is related to high lev-
els of change. Therefore, managers often shy away from the integration tasks as they 
are afraid of cultural differences and resistance of change (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, 
p. 139). The three types of capability transfer methods creating value are resource shar-
ing, functional skill transfer and general management capability transfer. In addition to 
that there are likely to be a number of combination benefits such as excess cash, greater 
size or increased borrowing capacity. All those four benefits set different requirements 
for interdependence and therefore determine the extent of interdependence as well as 
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the degree to which the organizational identity of the acquired company will be main-
tained. (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 140-142) 
Now let’s move on to the different integration approaches. According to Brueller et al. 
(2018) the integration process differs profoundly according to the integration approach 
and therefore understanding these different approaches is of great importance. The M&A 
literature generally focuses on three different approaches: absorption, preservation and 
symbiosis (Weber et al. 2011; Brueller et al. 2018). Absorption is a strategy, in which 
there is high need for interdependence and low need for organizational autonomy to 
achieve the pursued value. In other words, absorption acquisitions often result in full 
consolidation of operations, organization and culture of both organizations. Therefore, 
all the differences between the two organizations are eliminated over time and the 
boundary between the two organizations is dissolved (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 
147-148). According to Brueller et al. (2018) absorption is to be the desired endpoint 
when targets assets are not possible to be digested completely. Preservation acquisition 
on the other hand is the very opposite. In preservation acquisition the unit is preserved, 
and interventions are avoided as the need for strategic interdependence is low and the 
need for autonomy is high. Therefore, the acquired company is nurtured, and the ac-
quirer intends to learn from the acquired company in order for value to be created. 
(Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 148-149) According to Brueller et al. (2018) preserva-
tion is needed when target autonomy is critical. Symbiotic acquisitions entail high needs 
for both strategic interdependence and organizational autonomy (Brueller et al. 2018). 
Hence, they are managerially the most complex ones to integrate. It is typical that at first 
the two organizations coexist and gradually become more interdependent. The decrease 
of the need to preserve of autonomy can be decreased over time only via affecting the 
entity so that the acquiring organization voluntarily changes its practices to adapt to the 
new situation. Therefore, both organizations need to adopt some of the original qualities 
of the other. (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 149) Preserving the autonomy might be 
especially difficult in situation where there is lack of quality in the acquired company. 
Especially the quality of the management is a critical factor that might be hard to address 
in symbiotic and preservation acquisitions. Indeed, the profitability of the acquired firm 
has been associated positively with acquisition success. Also, the size seems to matter, 
as the acquisitions of smaller companies both in organizational and market performance 
respect often show a higher rate of success in general. (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 
150-151)   
It is also important to note, that the higher the degree of integration, the longer the inte-
gration time (Schweiger & Weber 1989). Therefore, also the situation and the competitive 
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environment of the company might affect the integration approach that is to be utilized. 
Higher levels of integration can result in slower operational achievements such as 
speedy product launches as the time to market for the first product after acquisition is 
increased while resulting in richer product pipeline in the long term (Puranam et al. 2003). 
Table 2. Integration strategy best practicessums up all the covered integration strategy 
related best practices.  
Table 2. Integration strategy best practices 
Integration strategies 
Define the integration strategy (absorption, preservation, symbiosis, holding) (Jemison 
& Haspeslagh 1991, pp. 145–149). 
Determine the relevant strategic interdependence (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 
140; Angwin & Meadows 2009). 
Do not shy away from integration due to a fear of cultural differences or resistance of 
change as too low levels of integration will result in inability to capture synergies 
(Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 139). 
Consider the appropriate level of integration as a function of the synergy potential 
(Howell 1970) and cultural fit (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh 1988) (utilize frameworks as 
a help). 
Pay attention to where the capability and potential of the deal reside. Remember, that 
pursuing capability transfer can lead to the destruction of the capability. (Jemison & 
Haspeslagh 1991, p. 142) Be careful when the capabilities reside in people (Jemison 
& Haspeslagh 1991, p. 142) or when the capabilities are tacit or socially complex (Pu-
ranam et al. 2003). Organizational autonomy can be used to preserve these capabili-
ties (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 143).  
Higher degree of integration leads to higher integration time and thus requires com-
petitive environment to be considered (Schweiger & Weber 1989). 
2.2.3 Leadership 
In M&A literature one of the most important and widely acknowledged key success fac-
tors of the integration process is post-acquisition leadership (Kitching 1967; Jemison & 
Haspeslagh 1991, pp. 132–133; Angwin & Meadows 2009). According to Kitching (1967) 
the quality of management immediately following the merger determines the success or 
failure of the venture. The importance and necessity of leadership in M&A integration is 
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summed up well by Anslinger et al. (1996): “Don’t do the deal if you can’t find the leader”. 
This portraits the imperative of leadership for the success of the deal. In order for an 
acquisition to succeed, appropriate leadership practices are needed. This view is in line 
with the one of Pritchett et al. (1997, p. 6) stating that a high percentage of acquisition 
failures is caused by faulty management during implementation. The importance of lead-
ership is also highlighted by Jemison & Haspeslagh (1991, p. 132) as the importance of 
leadership becomes evident in M&A due to the tendency for value to be destroyed and 
therefore institutional and interpersonal leadership are needed.  
Leadership is a crucial success factor for the acquisition process management as a lack 
of decisive action from the top in establishing clear company direction and shortfalls in 
change management during the integration process will inevitably lead to failure (Kitch-
ing 1967; Hyde & Paterson 2001; Sitkin & Pablo 2005, pp. 209–210; Nemanich & Keller 
2007; Angwin & Meadows 2009). Indeed, the function of leadership to establish a direc-
tion for the company is one of the most CSFs for the post-acquisition leadership. Accord-
ing to Olie (1994), leadership is an important integration device that should be used to 
propel all the heterogeneous powers in one predetermined direction. Jemison & 
Haspeslagh (1991, p. 132) identify leadership to be essential for the acquisition integra-
tion process and suggest that the role of the leaders is to create a situation where the 
members of the merging companies understand and embrace the acquisition’s purpose 
and recognize their own role in it. These views are in line with Olie (1994) who argues 
that leadership in the sense of symbolic reconstruction of new identity, superordinate 
goals and introducing multigroup memberships is a key to reinforcing integration. While 
cultural differences may decrease the extent of common identity, a common set of goals 
and objectives reinforce integration (Olie 1994).  
The importance of the leaders to create a common direction for the company is illustrated 
by a concept of leadership vacuum. According to Jemison & Haspeslagh (1991, p. 122) 
leadership vacuum refers to “the lack of appropriate leadership to articulate a new 
purpose for the combined firms”. Because there is a tendency of value to be destroyed 
in M&A, the role of leadership becomes even more crucial post-deal when the employees 
of the two entities are brought together and are expected to embrace the new 
organization (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 132). This is in line with Kitching (1967) 
who recognizes leadership as the determinant of success post-deal. Leadership vacuum 
that does not provide the employees with a new vision frequently limits the creation of 
the atmosphere for capability transfer thus negatively affecting the integration and deal 
value. Jemison & Haspeslagh (1991, pp. 132–135) recognize the need for both 
institutional and interpersonal leadership in order to create the atmosphere for capability 
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transfer and integration. The lack of institutional leadership leads to the decrease in 
capability transfer as the employees tend to retreat to their former behaviour thus causing 
organizational disruptions due to cultural and identity clashes in addition to reducing 
cause-effect knowledge, the willigness to participate, organizational slack and also 
decreasing interacion that hinders integration (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, pp. 133–
134). This is supported by Bligh (2006) who suggests that cultural clashes are 
detrimental for PMI success but can be controlled by proper leadership. In addition to 
the previously mentioned, the lack of institutional leadership also caused more resources 
to be used to solve problems that individuals face. In addition to consuming more 
resources, the absence of a common purpose leads to substandard performance thus 
potentially resulting in a situation where no additional resources can be attracted. All in 
all, leadership vacuum at the top management level results in misdirection in leadership 
both at the top and the middle management levels. When the common purpose is 
lacking, it tends to lead to substandard performance. Hence, leadership vacuum is a 
crucial concept for integration both in long and short term. (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, 
p. 135) Institutional leadership is needed to help the people from both entities develop, 
understand and embrace the purpose of the acquisition and to see their own role in it. 
Instutional leadership is the responsibility of the senior managers and they need to create 
a broad vision that accommodates the purpose of the acquisition, the needs of the two 
combined entities and results in the creation of a new identity for the new entity that is to 
promote the transfer of capabilities i.e. integration. However, the management attention 
tends to peak at the time of the deal, and once the deal has been completed, the senior 
management typically moves on to other pressing matters and leaves the 
implementation for the operational managers. (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 132-133)  
After this the senior managers in the companies where institutional leadership was 
missing, often solely focused on performance expectations and detached themselves 
from the acquisition process. They also stuck to the projections used to justify the 
acquisition and used those as beacons of precision that were to show people what was 
expected. However, this resulted in leadership vacuum as the senior managers told the 
appropriate managers of the two entities what the goals were but provided no plan how 
to get there . The managers only told them to “merge product lines” or merge “each 
others systems” in order to create synergies or to just “make money”. This way the 
employees were cast adrift and there was no real plan how to proceed with integration. 
(Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 133) This view is supoprted by Tetenbaum (1999) who 
recognizes the importance for senior management attention during PMI. Also the 
resolution to key questions regarding the acquisition were in many cases postponed until 
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the last minute and delegated to the lower level managers who were not part of the 
negotiation process and had no deep knowledge of the situation. In addition to that, it 
resulted in the senior managers not developing a thorough understanding about the 
acquisition integration situation and therefore often resulted in having no strategy for the 
new company and how it could be brought together to create value. This formulation of 
strategy is the responsibility of the senior managers and is of great essence for the 
integration and value creation. (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 134) This view is also 
suggested by Galpin & Herndon (2014, p. 26) who suggest that senior managers are to 
take care of different strategic decisions regarding the integration in order to make it 
successful. 
According to Balogun (2003) middle managers can be a strategic asset for the company 
as they have the ability to affect change in the organization. The operating middle 
managers are the ones who often are responsible for achieving the purpose of the 
acquisition as interpersonal leadership is their responsibility. However, the lack of 
institutional leadership will result in misallocation of the middle management’s time as 
they need to do more interpersonal leadership in order to solve personnel’s problems 
instead of concentrating on the real purpose i.e. value-creating aspects of the integration. 
(Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 134-135) This describes the importance of the senior-
level institutional leadership to the whole integration process.  
It has been also recognized by scholars, that leaders work as an example for the 
employees and are thus a key source of influence for the organizational culture. This is 
supported by Weber (1996) who recognizes that senior managers are key influencers in 
the organization as their beliefs and values are deemed premate. Therefore, they are 
essential for the change management. It is important, as described by Gomes et al. 
(2013) that the managers do not just talk but also “walk the walk” i.e. set an example with 
their actions. 
M&A literature also identifies a need for establishing clear roles and responsibilities in 
the acquisition integration process. Inkpen et al. (2000) suggest that decision-making as 
well as clearly determined structures regarding authority and responsibilities are vital for 
M&A integration success. Especially establishing clear relationships between the parent 
company management and the management of the newly acquired subsidiary is essen-
tial for successful acquisitions (Kitching 1967). According to Kitching (1967) “riding herd” 
and reporting procedure clarity are characteristics regarding the relationships between 
the management of the acquirer and acquired company that distinguish the most suc-
cessful acquisitions. The parent company is to appoint a top executive immediately after 
the acquisition to “ride herd” the process. Second success factor is that the reporting 
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relationships in the organization are made clear immediately and the temptation to 
change the reporting structures often is resisted. (Kitching 1967) According to Angwin & 
Meadows (2009) the use of outsider top executives to carry out this leadership function 
can be used to facilitate a higher degree of organizational change as they are less con-
strained due to not being a subject to organizational inertia caused by being embedded 
in the existing social system of the company. These views of Angwin & Meadows (2009) 
are in line with Anslinger and Copeland (1996, pp. 106–107) who state that outsiders 
can be used to provide an independent point of view. Angwin & Meadows (2009) propose 
that there seems to be a positive interrelationship between the strategic interdependence 
of the acquired company and the use of outsiders. Therefore, outsiders are more often 
used as top executives in case of absorptive integration whereas in-house managers are 
preferred in preservation acquisitions (Angwin & Meadows 2009). 
A crucial factor contributing to the importance of the leadership is the human integration 
aspect of M&A. A successful acquisition integration depends on leadership that enables 
both organizational and cultural integration to occur as well as on the management of 
expectations between the two organizations (Schweiger & Weber 1989; Weber et al. 
1996; Vermeulen & Barkema 2001; Angwin et al. 2004; Sitkin & Pablo 2005; Angwin & 
Meadows 2009; Vasilaki, 2011a, 2011b). What is more, Hyde & Paterson (2001) suggest 
that the leaders need to be proactive in order to manage the process of change and 
establish clear objectives that are aligned with the company strategy.  
Kavanagh and Ashkanasy (2006) suggest that the culture of an organization and the 
response of the people to change is to a great extent shaped by the behavior of the 
leader. Therefore, organizational leaders are key influencers in regard to organizational 
culture (Weber 1996). This is in line with the view of Mumford et al. (2002) who suggest 
that the organizational climate and culture represent a collective social construction that 
leaders have substantial control and influence over. A key to success in the cultural in-
tegration relies on the understanding of the cultures that are to be integrated. To change 
a culture, one must understand it first (Kavanagh & Ashkanasy 2006).  
Also, the leadership style and characteristics and their relation to M&A integration suc-
cess has been studied by many scholars. According to Olie (1994) charismatic leader-
ship is needed in organizational transformation processes. According to Waldman & Jav-
idan (2009) “a common aspect of charismatic leadership is the articulation of vision in an 
attempt to integrate multiple groups and achieve consensus”. It is also known, that char-
ismatic leadership is applicable and outperforms pragmatic leadership in an environment 
where different interests and unclear goals dominate and where the consensus is not 
evident and straight forward. These factors are characteristic for the M&A integration 
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process. (Waldman & Javidan 2009). Therefore, it can be concluded, that charismatic 
leadership is a CSF of the M&A integration process. However, not all types of charismatic 
leadership styles are equally good. Waldman & Javidan (2009) suggest that personal-
ized charisma will lead to resistance of change and employee turnover. However, social-
ized charisma will result in collaborative vision-formation and decision-making that will 
ultimately result in the transformation in both of the companies. What is more, it will also 
result in the formation of shared vision while positively contributing to information sharing 
within the company. Collaborative vision and decision-making as well as open infor-
mation sharing in the post-M&A phase is positively associated with increased integration 
and therefore a collaborative integration process will lead to improved synergy capture 
and creation as a result of the development of a unified and strong culture in the acquired 
firm. (Waldman & Javidan 2009). What is more, Schweizer & Patzelt (2012) identified, 
that relational, contextual, inspirational, supportive and stewardship-based leadership 
styles are associated with a stronger positive effect of fast acquisition integration.  
When talking about the leadership in M&A integration context, it is important to remember 
that the process deals with humans. Therefore, little things do matter (Bligh 2006). Best 
practices include CEO visits to the newly acquired company (Vester 2002) and talking 
with the employees in order to establish dialogue with all employees in addition to pro-
moting the new vision and teamwork. It is also important to provide the employees pos-
sibilities to ask questions and share their concerns (Ashkenas et al. 1998).  
M&A integration is a change management project and therefore project management at 
its fullest (Vester 2002). This is described by Kavanagh & Ashkanasy (2006) who de-
scribe leadership as “’the art of mobilizing others to want to struggle for shared aspira-
tions’”. The very success or failure of the integration often depends on highly disciplined 
project planning, plan execution and monitoring. It is not enough to just identify the prob-
lems, but also an effective integration plan is needed. Managers are responsible for cre-
ating the 100-day plan and following its execution in a disciplined manner. Discipline is 
also seen in the need for detail in the integration process planning and execution. (Vester 
2002) Therefore, advanced change management and project management skills are re-
quired from the leader. Vester (2002) stresses the importance of following a disciplined 
integration programme designed based on the best practices in order to make the inte-
gration successful. As M&A integration is a project involving many changes, the leader-
ship best practices should also consider practices involving change management. Ac-
cording to Bass (1985, p. 16-23) leaders can promote change by creating vision. What 
is more, according to Jemison & Sitkin (1986) lack of transformational support can fuel 
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uncertainty related to career, financial security, geographical relocation, feeling of alien-
ation and lack of co-worker trust. 
An interesting dimension of the leadership best practices involves the matter of time and 
the capability of the leaders to deliver quickly. Hyde & Paterson (2001) suggest that the 
senior managers leading the acquisition should be able to deliver quickly once a need is 
identified because change is better addressed in advance or at the time when it takes 
place than after the situation has escalated. According to Ashkenas et al. (1998) there 
are many issues that can be anticipated before the closing of the deal and therefore it is 
important for the leaders to be prepared for these issues by preparing answers and so-
lutions to them. This highlights the importance of starting the integration planning already 
pre-deal as starting the integration earlier results in increased effectiveness of the inte-
gration and thus starting earlier means that the integration can be carried out faster. 
(Ashkenas et al. 1998) Ashkenas et al. (1998) stress that integration should not be 
treated as a discrete phase that takes place after the closing of the deal. Rather integra-
tion is a process that begins with due diligence and runs until the two organizations are 
fully integrated. Therefore, the planning should already be started at the time of the very 
first discussions. 
Another factor regarding leadership is the fact that there is a vast amount of arising is-
sues that need the attention of the senior managers. Therefore, in addition to preparing 
for these issues pre-deal, also sufficient resources need to be available to address these 
problems. (Ashkenas et al. 1998) This means especially a sufficient number of employ-
ees available to concentrate on addressing the issues. Ashkenas et al. (1998) state that 
the integration manager is a key to integration and that integration management is a full-
time job and is to be recognized as a distinct business function. This is supported by the 
view of Vester (2002) who states that there are no shortcuts to success in acquisition 
integration and that help with time consuming integration management is a necessity.  
One crucial best practice related to PMI is linked to the decision-making process of the 
leaders. Ashkenas et al. (1998) suggest that critical decisions such as management 
structure, key roles, reporting relationships, layoffs, restructuring and other career-affect-
ing choices should be made, announced and implemented as soon as possible, prefer-
ably within days, after signing the deal. When change is inevitable, it is important to get 
it over and done with. Prevailing uncertainty and anxiety drain value from the acquisition 
and therefore it is essential for the leaders to address this issue. (Ashkenas et al. 1998) 
In these situations, it is also essential for the leaders to create motivation and direction 
and make the people understand their role in the new organization. This way post-merger 
drift can be avoided, and the detrimental effects of uncertainty minimized. (Tetenbaum 
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1999) Difficult people decisions are essential in other situations as well. According to 
Anslinger & Copeland (1996, p. 101) successful acquirers do not hesitate to replace 
managers when financial targets are not met. Often these difficult people decisions are 
postponed until the last minute so that feelings will not get hurt, yet they should be made 
as soon as possible as everybody knows what is coming in order to reduce uncertainty 
and to succeed in the integration (Vester 2002). This is in line with Jemison & Haspeslagh 
(1991, p. 11) who suggest that “the key to integration is to obtain the participation of the 
people involved without compromising the strategic task”. Therefore, insisting on com-
pliance and sticking too closely to a predetermined path or avoiding changes and making 
decisions that would result in as little resistance and disruption as possible are issues 
that are an obstacle to integration and lead to inability to capture value from the deal. 
This is because integration is perceived as the key process of the deal for value creation 
and value capture as this is the stage when capability transfer and collaboration are 
established. (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 11) In order for value to be created, inte-
gration should be seen as an evolutionary process of adaptation by the managers in-
stead of a completely predetermined and predictable activity (Jemison & Haspeslagh 
1991, p. 15; Gates & Very 2003).  
When dealing with important employee decisions, it is important for the leaders not to fall 
into a trap of acting without sensitivity. It is essential to gain the trust of the remaining 
employees and therefore practicing sensitivity and acting in a way that maintains every-
body’s dignity. Gaining the trust and respect of the employees is essential as the lack of 
them will mean that successful integration may not be possible. Treating the people in a 
respectful and dignified way will in addition to being the right thing to do, also send a 
powerful message to the rest of the people thus helping to build positive feelings which 
support integration. (Ashkenas et al. 1998)  
According to Olie (1994) the desire of people to preserve their previous occupational 
identity is a major obstacle for integration and thus the willingness of employees to fit in 
is compromised. This view is supported by Homburg & Bucerius (2006) who state that 
M&A alters social categorization process by giving the employees of the acquired com-
pany new group memberships that result in increased concerns about social identifica-
tion. In case the new group is similar to the old one it is easier for the people to abandon 
their old social identities but in case it is very dissimilar, this is unlikely to happen and is 
likely to result in difficulties regarding the emergence of the new group. (Homburg & 
Bucerius 2006) Ashkenas et al. (1998) imply that it is the job of the managers to help the 
personnel overcome issues regarding security and occupational identity. As these em-
ployees are the ones that are responsible for running the daily operations, it is essential 
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to address the issues in time in order to avoid deterioration in levels of productivity, cus-
tomer service and innovation due to the employees starting to focus more on their own 
needs instead of the ones of the company. (Ashkenas et al. 1998) Olie (1994) states that 
the identification with the new organization is a product of common experiences.  
Another fact related to leadership practices arises from the goal setting and group per-
ception of individuals. Intergroup cooperation and common goal allow people to see the 
members of both groups as one big group thus facilitating the development of a super-
ordinate entity and helping the integration process forward while helping to remove us 
and them division within the organization (Gaertner et al. 1989). Ashkenas et al. (1998) 
suggest, that the two groups should start to work together with common business prob-
lems as soon as possible in order to unite the groups by giving them a common problem, 
common enemy and common goal. This method of execution is one powerful leadership 
best practice that can be used to promote the integration. This view also demonstrates 
the importance of the leaders to create a common direction and vision for the organisa-
tion and works as a means for leaders to achieve this goal.  
Working together right from the beginning is found to have other benefits for the integra-
tion process as well. Ashkenas et al. (1998) suggest that the faster the employees from 
both companies get opportunities to work together on daily business issues, the faster 
integration will occur. Focusing on the real work helps to unite the employees and to 
accomplishing results that could not have been accomplished before thus being a pow-
erful method to integrate cultures (Ashkenas et al. 1998). This is in line with Gomes et 
al. (2013) who suggest that attaining early victories is a powerful tool to increase the 
confidence of the employees and other stakeholders to support the process of integration 
as the benefits of the acquisition can be seen in practice. While working together, people 
start to understand the culture, interaction patterns and practices of the company while 
getting to know each other better and building bonds with the employees of the acquiring 
company. Interaction can be a crucial tool that can be leveraged to facilitate integration. 
Therefore, having short-term projects that yield quick results is a powerful method for 
integrating cultures. (Ashkenas et al. 1998) Getting people to collaborate is essential, as 
value cannot be created before capabilities are transferred and people from both organ-
izations collaborate in order to work on the expected benefits of the integration (Jemison 
& Haspeslagh 1991, p. 11).   
One important dimension of leadership are the incentives offered to employees. Accord-
ing to Anslinger & Copeland (1996, p. 101) successful acquirers offer big incentives for 
top-level executives. Motivating the right managers is vital for the success of the integra-
tion and therefore having the right incentive programme can help to reach the integration 
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goals. For example, making the managers owners of the company by offering them eq-
uity stakes or linking their compensation to changes in cash flow are commonly used 
incentives. Many successful acquirers pay the key managers an average base salary but 
bring a major stake of their income into changes in cash flow. The best acquirers are not 
afraid to make the top managers wealthy. (Anslinger & Copeland 1996, pp. 101–104) 
Ranft & Lord (2002) suggest that promoting managers from the acquired company can 
be used as an incentive to reduce the post-acquisition autonomy of the acquired firm and 
to reduce employee retention thus contributing to the overall integration success. Other 
proposed incentives are golden handcuffs, long-term contracts, bonuses and pricing the 
employees out of the market in various ways. According to Jemison & Haspeslagh (1991, 
p. 113) the incentives can affect the willingness to work together which affects the at-
mosphere for capability transfer and therefore affects the deal success. It is important to 
maintain the value for the employees as not doing so will result in people not being willing 
to work towards the acquisition goal (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, pp. 129–130)  
According to Anslinger & Copeland (1996, p. 106) the best financial or corporate buyers 
appoint a gatekeeper to act as an interface between the owner and the operating unit 
manager. This person becomes closely involved in the operation related decisions of the 
acquired company and acts as a sounding board for management. What is more, they 
also suggest that the people integrating the acquisitions should be the best ones availa-
ble. Therefore, hiring the best people to integrate the acquisition can be of great value 
for the overall acquisition success. (Anslinger & Copeland 1996, pp. 106–108)   
What is more, a large majority of successful acquirers allow the top-level managers of 
the acquired company to have the final say on operational decisions as long as the fi-
nancial targets are met. The remaining minority make these decisions jointly. It is im-
portant to note, that successful acquirers rarely overrule the decisions regarding opera-
tions made by the acquired company management in case the financial targets are met.  
(Anslinger & Copeland 1996, p. 106) This power to overrule should be carefully consid-
ered before it is exercised.  
The role of leadership in acquisition integration is well summed by Kavanagh & Ash-
kanasy (2006) who suggest that leaders should carefully choose the integration ap-
proach, develop new culture, establish effective channels of communication involving 
employees from all levels of organization in order to inform about the stages to be fol-
lowed while outlining the outcomes for the employees. In addition, the leaders should 
select willing partners and gradually win over the rest of the people, as well as lead in a 
positive manner while recognizing that change involves emotions thus requiring justifi-
cation and dignity in the actions that are carried out (Kavanagh & Ashkanasy 2006).   
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Table 3. Leadership best practices 
Leadership 
”Don’t do the deal if you don’t find the leader” (Anslinger et al. 1996). 
Ensure the commitment of key employees and leaders (Anslinger & Copeland 1996, 
pp. 101–104). 
Express decisive action, establish clear company direction and articulate the new pur-
pose of the combined entity (Kitching 1967; Hyde & Paterson 2001; Sitkin & Pablo 
2005, pp. 209–210; Nemanich & Keller 2007; Angwin & Meadows 2009). 
Make the employees understand and embrace the purpose of the acquisition (Jemison 
& Haspeslagh 1991, p. 132). 
Little things do matter. Use symbols to reconstruct a new identity. (Olie 1994) 
Establish superordinate goals (Olie 1994). 
“Walk-the-walk” (Gomes et al. 2013). 
Establish clear roles, responsibilities (Inkpen et al. 2000) and relationships (Kitching 
1967).  
Use outside executives to facilitate change and obtain an independent point of view 
(Angwin & Meadows 2009). 
Be proactive: prepare solutions for potential problems pre-deal (Ashkenas et al. 1998). 
Utilize social charismatic leadership (Olie 1994). 
Pay attention to detail, CEO visits are important and express commitment (Vester 
2002). 
Commit sufficient resources to integration. Consider PMI a full-time job (Ashkenas et 
al. 1998). 
Make, announce and implement critical decisions immediately (Ashkenas et al. 1998). 
Act in a sensitive and dignified manner to gain trust (Ashkenas et al. 1998). 
Help the personnel overcome issues regarding security and occupational identity 
(Ashkenas et al. 1998). 
Make the employees immediately work together: Short-term projects yielding quick 
results facilitate integration (Ashkenas et al. 1998).  
Utilize incentives: golden handcuffs, long-term contracts, bonuses, stock options 
(Ranft& Lord 2002). 
Hire the best people to carry out PMI (Anslinger & Copeland 1996, pp. 106–108).  
Allow top-level managers of the acquired company to have the final say on operational 
decisions as long as the financial targets are met (Anslinger & Copeland 1996, p. 106). 
Establish clear channels of communication (Kavanagh & Ashkanasy 2006). 
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Table 4. Responsibilities of top and operational management 
Leadership at operational and top management levels 
Top-level management should create a vision for the new combined entity (Jemison 
& Haspeslagh 1991, p. 132-133).  
Top management is responsible for institutional leadership and operational manage-
ment for interpersonal leadership (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, pp. 132–135). 
Senior management integration detachment: Do not leave integration completely to 
operating managers post-deal and solely concentrate on performance expectations 
(Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 133). 
Senior manager should articulate the goals to the operational managers and employ-
ees while also providing a plan how to get there (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 133). 
Senior managers: do not postpone or delegate resolution to key questions (Jemison 
& Haspeslagh 1991, p. 134). 
2.2.4 Post-merger integration team 
In the study conducted by Anslinger & Copeland (1996) 65% of the respondents re-
garded managerial talent as the single most important instrument for creating value. 
Therefore, it is essential to ensure that there are right managers integrating the company. 
Kavanagh & Ashkanasy (2006) suggest that in order to have the right managers, the 
company should evaluate current executives, look for managers in the organization who 
are not yet in leadership position and hire outside industry experts. Therefore, one crucial 
assignment regarding acquisition integration is the creation of a leadership team capable 
of leading change (Kitching 1967; Gomes et al. 2013). The job of the leadership team is 
to rapidly identify the decisions that need to be made in order to rewire the business and 
surface issues that the executives must deal with (Vester 2002).  
As discussed previously, integration management is a full-time job and is to be regarded 
as a distinct business function due to the high amount of work caused by the integration 
(Ashkenas et al. 1998). Due to the time-consuming nature of the acquisition process, the 
managers time is often allocated to the integration to a great extent. Keeping an eye on 
the ball is essential in order to not let the competitors take advantage of the temporary 
state of vulnerability (Ghemawat & Ghadar 2000). This might lead to disregard of day-
to-day activities. These views are in line with Vermeulen & Barkema (2001) who con-
clude that funding as well as the time and attention of management might be misdirected 
away from the internal growth and innovation. As a result, for example R&D operations 
might be compromised (Hitt et al. 1991). It is essential to ensure discontinuity in the daily 
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business and internal growth and innovation while integrating the M&A as these functions 
form the core of the business. There are many authors suggesting, that successful ac-
quirers create a coordination team or top management team for the PMI phase (Schwei-
ger et al. 1993; Ashkenas et al. 1998; Inkpen et al. 2000; Vasilaki & O’Regan 2008). 
These post-merger integration teams are used for example by Cisco (Inkpen et al. 2000) 
and GE-Capital (Ashkenas et al. 1998) to coordinate the acquisition integration process 
in full. The faster the PMI team is created, the higher is the chance of pinpointing strategic 
fits between the combining firms as the integration team can also be used as a vehicle 
of due diligence if formed pre-deal (Schweiger et al. 1993). 
After recognizing the need for full-time employees working on integration as deemed 
necessary by Ashkenas et al. (1998), the next logical question is who would suit the work 
of an integration manager. The due diligence team often has the best understanding and 
deepest knowledge regarding the acquired company and therefore would know the best 
what integration efforts should be taken. However, after the deal the due diligence team 
is broken down and they return to their regular jobs. Then the responsibility for integration 
is often passed for the functional or business unit managers. However, the most effective 
integration manager would be one of the people serving in the due diligence team who 
has good interpersonal capabilities and who is sensitive to cultural differences. It is im-
portant to notice, that often the very position of the business leader limits his ability to 
facilitate business as people need a person they can freely ask “stupid questions” from. 
Therefore, the business leader i.e. the new boss is the last person who fits the role of 
integration manager as the will to impress the new boss will reduce the ability to ask 
questions. The employees need a person that functions as a bridge with the new organ-
ization and the acquired entity. (Ashkenas et al. 1998) What is more, the people chosen 
for the integration team should be highly motivated and committed to make hard deci-
sions and to commit to the process of integration (Anslinger & Copeland 1996, pp. 101–
104). This is in line with the findings of Weber (1996) who suggests that the lower the 
commitment of the top management team, the lower the effectiveness of the PMI process 
and the financial performance of the organization are. Also a sense of empathy demon-
strates respect and understanding and is a characteristic that the integration manager 
should have (Bligh 2006).            
The job of the integration team and integration manager is to build connective tissue 
between the two entities and keep that tissue growing. What is more, their job is to man-
age the integration process by facilitating and managing integration activities and by 
monitoring the integration process and that the integration plan is followed appropriately. 
This team is also important when it comes to communication, as it is responsible for 
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creating strategies to communicate appropriate messages in a timely and quick manner 
to the employees. Integration manager also works as a bridge that helps the acquired 
business to understand the acquirer, in particular its culture, reporting structures and 
working principles, business practices and other things that are relevant to the work and 
well-being of the employees. (Ashkenas et al. 1998) Cisco has a practice to have an 
orientation to Cisco lasting for 30 days where the employees are told about the hiring, 
sales and engineering practices at the company (Inkpen et al. 2000). This process also 
works the other way around, as the integration team also helps the acquirer better un-
derstand the acquired organization (Ashkenas et al. 1998). These views are in line with 
Schweizer & Patzelt (2012) who emphasize the importance of supportive leadership in 
the PMI process. This educational aspect is of great importance for PMI. The role of the 
integration team is also described by the responsibilities of the team. At GE Capital many 
integration managers are not having P&L responsibility, but instead are held accountable 
for the creation and delivery of a disciplined integration plan and for reaching the plan’s 
milestones because were they also responsible for the performance of the businesses, 
the accountability of the business leader and the leadership team would be reduced 
(Ashkenas et al. 1998). 
The composition of the post-acquisition team has got an effect on the communication, 
retention and autonomy in various ways. There is proof that mixing people by involving 
managers from the acquired company in the integration team can be used to facilitate 
two-way communication. By doing this, the focus from retaining the acquired company’s 
original executives shifted towards making employee retention within key functional ar-
eas a priority. Including managers from the acquired company was deemed one critical 
reason why the integrations had proceeded smoothly in the case study. (Ranft & Lord 
2002) According to Lakshman (2011) involving the target personnel early in post-acqui-
sition integration efforts can determine success and failure of the integration and this 
early involvement is likely to result in higher integration effectiveness. 
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Table 5. PMI integration team best practices 
PMI integration team 
The job of the leadership team is to rapidly identify the decisions that need to be made 
in order to rewire the business and surface issues that the executives must deal with 
(Vester 2002). 
Ensure that there is no disregard to day-to-day activities, internal growth and innova-
tion (Vermeulen & Barkema 2001). 
Create a coordination team. i.e. PMI team (Schweiger et al. 1993; Ashkenas et al. 
1998; Inkpen et al. 2000; Vasilaki & O’Regan 2008). 
Form the PMI team asap, already pre-deal if possible (Schweiger et al. 1993). 
Recognize the need for employees working full-time on PMI (Ashkenas et al. 1998).  
Utilize the knowledge of the DD team. A member of this team who has good interper-
sonal capabilities and who is sensitive to cultural differences makes the best integra-
tion manager (Ashkenas et al. 1998). 
Ensure commitment of the top management team (Weber 1996). 
Orientation can be an effective way to integrate (Inkpen et al. 2000). 
Integration managers should not have P&L responsibility (Ashkenas et al. 1998). 
Involve individuals from the acquired entity in the PMI team (Lakshman 2011). 
2.2.5 Communication 
Post-acquisition communication is considered to be critical to successful integration 
(Schweiger & Denisi 1991; Inkpen et al. 2000; Ranft & Lord 2002; Vester 2002) because 
communication is considered a facilitator of knowledge transfer (Rumyantseva et al. 
2002) and because communication works as means to reduce uncertainty (Ranft & Lord 
2002). What is more, communication has also been recognized to work as a critical way 
to disseminate the acquisition purpose and inform the employees of other relevant fac-
tors regarding the acquisition (Marks & Mirvis 2010, pp. 173–174) thus creating shared 
understanding and thus a more favorable integration climate (Ranft & Lord 2002). This 
is in line with Rumyantseva et al. (2002) who suggest that effective communication re-
duces anxiety caused by false information as communication facilitates interaction and 
increases transparency of decision making. Communication is also crucial to manage 
the employee expectations (Hubbard & Purcell 2001). Inkpen et al. (2000) recognize 
communication and networking as well as socialization as critical to M&A integration 
success. Indeed, by facilitating the interaction between the acquirer and acquired units' 
knowledge transfer and this way capability transfer can be promoted (Bresman et al. 
1999; Birkinshaw et al. 2000). Particularly the business case stating the reason of the 
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deal and preview of the future with vision about the combination including potential im-
plications for plants, products, services and people is deemed important. What is more, 
employees need a roadmap to integration that explains how and within what timeline 
combination and changes will happen thus helping them to focus on their personal sig-
nificance to move the organization forward while also forming a holistic framework for 
integration communication and corrections. Communication is also deemed important in 
disseminating the ground rules guiding the integration thus allowing the employees to 
understand what matters in the new organization and to make them feel like the manag-
ers are in control of the game and that the employees themselves play an important role 
in integration. (Marks & Mirvis 2010, pp. 173–174)  
Communication is also crucial in developing knowledge and capabilities through learning 
and teaching (Weber & Tarba 2010). This is in line with Jemison & Haspeslagh (1991, 
pp. 105–121) who divide communication into substantive, symbolic and administrative 
and suggest that via communication the atmosphere for capability transfer can be im-
proved and this way the transfer of capabilities facilitated. In other words, communication 
works as a critical tool that can be used to implement the strategy and inform and influ-
ence relevant stakeholders in order to drive them to the right direction and reduce the 
negative effects caused by uncertainty while also improving capability transfer and make 
the employees understand the reason, timing and rules of the integration. One of the 
most crucial characteristics of the communication process is that it deals with people. 
Human assets are vital for the success of the M&A as the value of many companies lies 
on the intellect and creativity of the employees (Marks & Mirvis 1997). Therefore, com-
munication is a key to make acquisition integration work. This is the case especially with 
consulting companies whose business is knowledge intensive and thus the employees 
form the basis of the corporate value.  
In order to ensure effective communication, a communication plan should be made well 
before the deal is signed i.e. at the time of due diligence and negotiations. When creating 
the communications plan, four dimensions should be considered; audience, timing, 
mode and message. In addition to having these things right in the communication plan, 
it is also inevitable to create forums for dialogue in order to keep the communication 
process going and to provide a forum for dialogue that reaches over the cultural chasm 
and helps to integrate the two cultures together. (Ashkenas et al. 1998) 
As the main rule of thumb, managers should communicate as early as possible (Schwei-
ger & Denisi 1991) as much as possible, as often as possible, in as many ways as pos-
sible and to as many employees as possible (Vester 2002) in order to reach all the rele-
vant employees and to get the message through to all the relevant stakeholders and 
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individuals. It is particularly important to communicate why the deal was undertaken 
(Vester 2002). The same process works both for internal and external communications. 
An important factor of communication is the feedback received via communicating. This 
helps to identify crucial issues and things that need attention while forming a more holistic 
and informed picture about the whole integration process and its progression. This flow 
of information in two ways facilitates the transfer and integration of the two firms and as 
this flow of information is facilitated by communication, communication works as a major 
tool to facilitate integration. (Vester 2002) Also Ranft & Lord (2002) acknowledge the 
importance of communication as a facilitator of two-way flow of knowledge thus facilitat-
ing integration. This two-way flow of knowledge can be facilitated by mixing and involve-
ment of managers from both acquired and acquiring company (Ranft & Lord 2000). The 
feedback and flow of knowledge received is vital for the management function to under-
stand the situation better and understand the most important issues to the employees 
(Vester 2002) and therefore the feedback should be used to adjust the integration plan 
in order to achieve successful integration (Ashkenas et al. 1998).  
The methods of communication are diverse and can differ from company to company or 
according to e.g. geographical location (Inkpen et al. 2000). Also the effectiveness of 
communications depends on the richness of the delivery method, timing and instructive-
ness (Gomes et al. 2013). According to Ranft & Lord (2002) open and frequent commu-
nication facilitate implementation, but the quantity and frequency of communication are 
not alone enough as also the richness of the communication i.e. the use of different 
methods is a critical component of the communication process. One best practice that 
has been found to be working well is the buddy programme established by Cisco. Ac-
cording to Papadakis (2007) Cisco has implemented a buddy system where the employ-
ees have a buddy that they can turn to during the early days of integration.  
 European companies tend to prefer personal contact, telephone, fax and email in the 
respective order from most preferred to least preferred whereas companies in Silicon 
Valley tend to prefer e-mail as a primary method of communication (Inkpen et al. 2000). 
Other viable delivery methods are e.g. company newsletters, merger newsletters, 
memos, telephone hotlines and bulletin boards (Schweiger et al. 1993). Any channel that 
is respected by employees and can delivered the message in a timely manner should be 
used in the communication process. Direct contact between senior managers and em-
ployees has been found to be particularly effective. (Schweiger et al. 1993) This view is 
also supported by Lakshman (2011) who suggests that higher levels of face-to-face 
knowledge sharing, or other personalized communication approaches, results in higher 
levels of PMI effectiveness. Also Ranft & Lord (2002) stress the importance of face-to-
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face meetings and being in touch with people also unexpectedly when walking on the 
corridors. Direct contact between senior managers and employees for example in cafe-
teria or other instances is an effective method of communication (Schweiger et al. 1993). 
Face-to-face communication can also be facilitated by creating teams containing man-
agers from both organizations, by arranging events to get to know each other, by organ-
izing formal and informal social events or by having individual meetings and discussions 
with the employees (Ranft & Lord 2002). However, it is important to notice that in some 
cases the managers at the middle level are more credible among the employees and 
might thus be used to make the communication more effective (Schweiger et al. 1993).  
As an example regarding credibility of managers, after discussing with the managers of 
the acquired entity at GE Capital, it was decided together in a case acquisition that the 
integrity policy should be introduced by the managers of the acquired entity in order to 
make the message better absorbed as the source was perceived credible and trustwor-
thy (Ashkenas et al. 1998). This credibility should however be assessed case by case. 
The messages should also be consistent across all the channels used. It is also im-
portant to pay especially close attention to communication when the cultural differences 
are big as they add an extra layer of challenge to the communication process. (Schwei-
ger et al. 1993) 
The importance of middle managers in communication is important to understand due to 
the credibility that is specific for them. The credibility arises from the fact, that middle 
managers can leverage informal power by utilizing friendships networks, trust networks, 
advice networks and communication networks (Pappas et al. 2004). What is more, com-
munication is deemed essential for any implementation, and therefore the key to make 
any implementation work is to use the middle manager’s clear and compelling commu-
nication in order to spread the word and get people on board. Middle managers usually 
have the most extensive social networks in the organization as they have worked their 
way up from the bottom and therefore the value of the middle managers for communica-
tion is undeniable. (Huy 2001) In other words, middle managers are key elements in 
organizational communication and for distribution of information. Because the middle 
managers have extensive networks within the organization and as they understand and 
stay attuned to the emotional needs of the organization during change and thus maintain 
the transformation momentum while managing tensions, middle managers are vital for 
organizational events requiring change (Huy 2001). “’Middle managers are like the sail-
ors in the crow's nest–sometimes they can see the icebergs and we need to rely on them 
to warn us and help redirect the ship through troubled waters’” (Pappas et al. 2004)  
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A characteristic phenomenon for M&A deal is the vast amount of questions and uncer-
tainty that arises among the employees. Therefore, communication should focus on is-
sues that are of particular concern to the employees during the integration such as 
layoffs, pension alterations, rules, compensation and other typical questions (Ivancevich 
et al. 1987). The typical questions are summarized in Table 6. 
Table 6. Typical integration related questions presented by the employees. 
Jemison & Haspeslagh 
(1991, p. 131) 
-Will the president be allowed to rule? 
-Who will be running our show now, us or somebody 
else? 
-How will my career and personal ambitions be af-
fected? 
-What effect will this have on my benefit package? 
Ashkenas et al. (1998) 
 
-Will I have a job?  
-Who is the acquiring company? 
-Can we trust what the they tell us? 
-Will my job be the same as before? 
-Why did our company decide to sell? Did we do a bad 
job, or did we get betrayed? 
Schweizer & Patzelt (2012)  
 
-How should we behave in the new organization? 
-What outcomes will my actions produce for me and the 
organization? 
-Will the leaders act in their own interest or act accord-
ing to employees’ interest? 
Schweiger & Weber (1989) 
 
-Who will be running different divisions? 
-Do I still have a job? 
-Who will I need to report to? 
-What will happen to my pension? 
Papadakis (2007) 
 
-How will the merger affect my career? 
-What will be my role in the new entity? 
-Why should I follow the new vision and strategy? 
 
Communication in M&A integration has got a central role in reducing the uncertainty 
throughout the integration process, but it is particularly important right after the deal. 
According to Bastien (1987) communication sets the atmosphere for uncertainty or as-
surance. Ranft & Lord (2002) support this view by stating that communication can be 
used to create a more favorable climate between the entities to help create a sense of 
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shared understanding and protect fragile knowledge. Therefore, it is thus an important 
part of the integration that defines the deal success. Schweiger et al. (1993) suggest that 
one of the most important things in the M&A integration process is to stabilize the work-
force from an early stage so that the negative effects of uncertainty and insecurity, such 
as employee turnover and losses in productivity, can be minimized. Frequent and honest 
communication according to the best practices can be used to stabilize employees while 
not doing so will destabilize them. What is more, it also symbolizes management‘s inter-
est in employee welfare. (Schweiger et al. 1993)   
According to Schweiger et al. (1993) and Schweiger & Denisi (1991) the employee un-
certainty, stress, absenteeism and employee turnover increase and employee satisfac-
tion and loyalty will decrease as a result of the M&A deal if not managed properly. Also, 
the way the organization trustworthiness, honesty and caring will be perceived will de-
crease (Schweiger & Denisi 1991). It is important to note the nature of stress when talk-
ing about communication. According to Marks & Mirvis (1997) the stress of a situation is 
determined by the perception of people instead of the reality. Communication is a pow-
erful tool to affect this perception and as suggested by Schweiger & Denisi (1991), real-
istic communication about the merger preview during the merger process can help the 
employees cope with the process and reduce employee uncertainty. Communication will 
also have a notable effect on the performance outcome as communication has been 
found to be positively related to performance (Weber et al. 2012). Therefore, it is im-
portant not to tell the acquired staff that it will be business as usual as it is clear that it 
will never be the same anymore (Ashkenas et al. 1998). This is supported by Bunnell 
(2000, p. 74) who suggests that Cisco tends to tell the acquired company realistically 
that they’ll change everything and tell all the plans upfront as trust is everything in acqui-
sition integration. After this the employees are made stay with compelling stock option 
programmes (Bunnell 2000, p. 74). 
However, this realistic communication can be of challenge, as the top management often 
does not know what will happen at the time of the beginning of the integration but will 
rather get this knowledge later on during the process. Therefore, realistic communication 
might be difficult, and managers might prefer to communicate nothing. (Schweiger & 
Denisi 1991) However, this is a misjudgment, as silence is perceived as a weakness 
(Papadakis 2007). It is better to communicate what you know now and explain why some 
questions cannot be answered in addition to making sure the employees understand that 
they are never intentionally deceived (Schweiger & Denisi 1991). This is in line with 
Schweiger et al. (1993) who suggest adopting the following philosophy: “If we can tell 
you, we will” and “if we cannot tell you, we will tell you why” and “if we do not know we 
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will try and find out”. It is important to aim to be realistic and not speculate when com-
municating (Schweiger et al. 1993). Giving the employees full and complete access to 
information as soon as it is legally possible is essential in order to create an environment 
of trust (Vester 2002). This is in line with Ranft & Lord (2002) who state that rich com-
munication can foster the building of trust and shared understanding. However, the man-
agers should only make promises they can and intend to keep (Light 2001). In addition 
to that, it is crucial that the managers do not just talk, but that they also “’walk the walk’”. 
This way the words will be validated by the employees forming the best situation. (Bas-
tien 1987; Schweiger et al. 1993; Gomes et al. 2013) However, overcommunication 
should be avoided as manager should maintain a degree of ambiguity and vagueness in 
order to retain some room for flexibility and maneuver so that the managers can cope 
with unexpected events and changing circumstances (Eisenberg & Witten 1987). 
What is more, information is also crucial for the spreading of rumors as rumors tend to 
spread fast in uninformed conditions (Marks & Mirvis 2010, p. 170). The lack of top-down 
communication causes rumour mills and distrust. The key challenge of communication 
is to address as much uncertainty as possible as fast as possible. (Applebaum et al. 
2000) It is better that the information comes from the managers as the employees tend 
to seek the information from anywhere in case they do not receive it from them hence 
increasing the risk that this information is not accurate leading to inaccurate rumors 
(Schweiger et al. 1993). Addressing these rumors and preventing them through infor-
mation shared via communication is essential. The best practices regarding addressing 
the rumors involve toll-free telephone hotlines where rumors can be shared as well as 
listing “’top-ten rumors’” regularly together with the accurate information. Particularly 
these upward communication channels were deemed important, but also the essence of 
addressing the uncertainty and rumors head-on are not to be forgotten. (Marks & Mirvis 
2010, p. 170) 
Also stakeholder anxieties are covered in the literature and it is suggested that the stake-
holder anxieties should be addressed immediately after the deal by using all possible 
types of communication channels (Gomes et al. 2013). The internal uncertainty and anx-
iety in the company can lead to dysfunctional outcomes when stress and employee turn-
over increases and job satisfaction, trust and commitment to the organization decrease 
resulting in lowered productivity (Schweiger & Denisi 1991). However, this work does not 
focus on the external stakeholders in more detail.  
It is also of great importance to manage the communication in order to send the right 
message to the acquired company. Sending right signals has been recognized to be of 
great essence by Perry (1986). He suggests, that the acquiring company should send 
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positive signals in order to make the acquisition work. The four positive signals that 
should be communicated from the very early stage are (1.) the acquiring company is fair, 
(2.) we respect you, (3.) we care about you and (4.) we are in this together. (Perry 1986) 
The fairness perspective is supported by the finding of Lakshman (2011) who suggests 
that making accurate and unbiased attributions of people’s key behaviors in conflict sit-
uations has a positive relationship with the increased participation of the personnel in 
post-acquisition integration.  
Even though integration speed has been positively related to increased employee com-
mitment due to reduced uncertainty, it is essential to acknowledge the dangers that the 
increase of speed possesses on the integration process. According to Schweiger & Pat-
zelt (2012) employees need time to develop an understanding of the motivations, rules 
and norms that govern the behavior in the new organizational environment as not under-
standing these rules might create uncertainty about the expected behavior and the con-
sequences of their current behavior. Therefore, they need to be communicated.  
Another important aspect of communication is its ability to promote trust building and 
shared understanding (Ranft & Lord 2002). Trust is important for daily operations and 
change management and as Bunnell (2000, p. 74) describes, “trust is everything” in PMI 
context. This is in line with Vester (2002) who identifies that developing scripted answers 
to acquisition related questions can help to improve the environment of trust.  
According to Ranft & Lord (2002) evidence of the commitment of the acquirer to the 
acquisition implementation is positively associated with communications. Therefore, it is 
essential that the acquiring company shows commitment to the acquisition in order to 
foster communication and this way facilitate integration. Ranft & Lord (2002) identify 
ways to show this corporate commitment and propose, that the acquiring company 
should generate positive media about the acquired company and its role in the new en-
tity. Also, frequent visits of the top executives from the acquiring company in addition to 
promoting the travel of the acquired company employees to the facilities of the acquiring 
company in case the companies are physically dislocated can be used as a sign of cor-
porate commitment (Ranft & Lord 2002). This is in line with Galpin & Herndon (2014 p. 
71) who recognize the importance of executive visits as an incentive for employees. Also 
supporting the training and development in the acquired organisation as well as investing 
in other ways to the acquired entity can be used as signs of corporate commitment. It is 
all about showing and communicating the acquired entity that the acquirer is committed 
to make the acquisition work. (Ranft & Lord 2002) 
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Table 7. Communication best practices 
Communication 
Make only promises you intend to keep (Light 2001). 
Make a communication plan pre-deal. Consider the audience, timing, mode and mes-
sage. (Gomes et al. 2013) 
Create forums for dialogue and ensure two-way flow of knowledge (Ashkenas et al. 
1998). 
Managers should communicate as early as possible (Schweiger & Denisi 1991), as 
much as possible, as often as possible, in as many ways as possible and to as many 
employees as possible (Vester 2002). 
Communicate why the deal was made (Vester 2002). 
Utilize feedback received via communication to understand the PMI issues (Vester 
2002) and adapt the integration process (Ashkenas et al. 1998). 
Identify the channels of communication respected by the employees (Schweiger et al. 
1993). 
Ensure high levels of face-to-face communication (Lakshman 2011). 
Consider the credibility of managers when choosing the messenger (Ashkenas et al. 
1998). 
Messages should be consistent across all the channels (Schweiger et al. 1993). 
Answer the questions the employees have. Prepare answers for typical questions pre-
deal. (Ashkenas et al. 1998) 
Stabilize the workforce from an early stage (Schweiger et al. 1993). 
Communicate a realistic merger preview, avoid speculation (Schweiger et al. 1993). 
“If we can tell you, we will” and “if we cannot tell you, we will tell you why” and “if we 
do not know we will try and find out” (Schweiger et al. 1993). 
Avoid overcommunication to ensure room for maneuver (Eisenberg & Witten 1987). 
It is better if the information comes from the managers than if it is found out elsewhere 
(Schweiger et al. 1993). 
Address the rumors (Marks & Mirvis 2010, p. 170). 
Send positive signals: we are fair, we respect and care about you, we are in this to-
gether (Perry 1986). 
Communicate the motivations, rules and norms that govern the behavior in the new 
organization (Schweiger & Patzelt 2012). 
Communicate commitment to the acquisition by words and actions (Ranft & Lord 
2002). 
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2.2.6 Managing cultural differences 
The importance of culture is undeniable in regard to the success of M&A integration and 
has been recognized by many scholars (Chatterjee et al. 1992; Weber 1996; Stahl & 
Voigt 2008; Marks & Mirvis 2011). Cultural issues have been recognized as one of the 
most common reasons for M&A failure as they possess a risk of becoming an obstacle 
to achieving integration benefits (Stahl & Voigt 2008). According to Weber (1996) cultural 
differences are negatively associated with the effectiveness of the integration process. 
They can induce negative effects such as acculturative stress (Very et al. 1996) resulting 
in e.g. lower commitment and cooperation of the acquired employees (Buono et al. 1985; 
Weber & Dori 2011), reduce the effectiveness of IT system integration (Weber & Pliskin 
1996), negatively affect strategy realization (Very et al. 1996) as well as negatively affect 
postmerger stock price performance and shareholder value (Datta 1991; Chatterjee et 
al. 1992; Stahl & Voigt 2008). Therefore, cultural differences can be extremely detri-
mental from the capital markets aspect of value creation. In particular the organizational 
cultural differences are more negatively associated with synergy realization and share-
holder value as well as sociocultural integration than national cultural differences (Stahl 
& Voigt 2008). Yet national cultural differences can fuel feelings of hostility and distrust 
in cross-border acquisitions too (Marks & Mirvis 2011). However, there are mixed find-
ings about whether cultural differences have a positive or negative effect on the acquisi-
tion integration and business of the cultural differences particularly in regard to interna-
tional acquisitions (Very et al. 1996; Morosini et al. 1998; Slangen 2006). For example, 
cultural differences can be seen as a source of value creation and learning and can thus 
be also beneficial for the company when managed well (Stahl & Voigt 2008). All in all, it 
can be concluded that it is of high essence that the cultural differences are managed well 
in order to avoid the detrimental effects and access the positive effects related to the 
cultural differences and their impact on the PMI performance.   
After understanding the importance of culture for PMI success, it is evident that in addi-
tion to strategic fit, also the cultural fit of an acquisition should be considered thoroughly 
before making the deal. This is due to the fact that poor cultural fit can lead to poor 
integration and thus reduce the value that can be achieved from the deal. Indeed, many 
scholars have recognized that poor cultural fit impairs the post-acquisition performance 
(Chatterjee et al. 1992; Cartwright & Cooper 1993; Weber et al. 1996; Weber 1996). 
Cultural differences are relevant in all acquisitions, but they are particularly relevant in 
international acquisitions where national cultural distance potentially broadens the cul-
tural gap between the combining organizations. The cultural differences are a major con-
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stituent of the organizational fit of the acquired company. It has been found, that espe-
cially the compatibility of management styles at the management level and top manage-
ment culture in general are most critical for the acquisition success (Datta 1991; Chat-
terjee et al. 1992). As a result, the cultural fit should already be considered pre-deal and 
instead of concentrating to just treat the problems caused by the differences in culture, 
a more proactive stance would allow these problems to be prevented. However, there 
are always problems arising due to cultural fit issues. However, for example HR practices 
can be used to treat these problems (Marks & Mirvis 2011).  
After understanding the importance and stance on cultural differences, also the nature 
and definition of the concept should be understood. Organizational culture is unique to a 
particular organization and is one of the most difficult change management objectives as 
culture works as a foundation of organizational life (Buono et al. 1985). This is supported 
by Weber & Pliskin (1996) who state that the culture is not easy to change. Therefore, it 
is important not to treat all acquisitions equally as the impact of cultural clash differs from 
time to time because acquisitions are not homogenous when it comes to culture (Weber 
1996).  
Organizational culture is a multifaceted concept and affects almost everything in the or-
ganization as interaction, way of working, dressing, decision-making, organizational pol-
icies and many other things are determined by this culture (Buono et al. 1985). Whether 
the cultural difference arises from national or corporate culture, it is inevitable to manage 
it (Olie 1994; Bligh 2006; Lakshman 2011). Cultural differences and cultural integration 
are a core concept when talking about PMI as they are an integral part of the complete 
integration process thus contributing to the deal success. Cultural differences often lead 
to cultural clashes and can therefore be detrimental for the overall deal performance as 
they have the potential to disrupt the functioning of the newly formed organization (Buono 
et al. 1985). As Buono et al. (1985) found out, whether there is an atmosphere of equal-
ness between the two organizations, whether the new organization resembles more the 
acquiring or acquired organization and whether the perceived benefit for both organiza-
tions is equal have an effect on the resistance for change as well as the magnitude of 
cultural shock among the employees. Bligh (2006) suggests that it is important for the 
managers to be able to put themselves into the position of the workers in order to under-
stand the emotional distress caused by cultural differences and this way figure out a 
solution for the problem. It has been stated that managerial efforts aiming to create and 
ensure the acceptance of strong organizational culture and unified belief system are im-
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portant keys to organizational success. It is suggested in the literature, that most em-
ployees will support the change if they acknowledge the need for change. (Buono et al. 
1985) 
In order to effectively manage cultural differences in M&A context, it is important to un-
derstand how the cultural clash unfolds. The stages are fourfold: Perceiving the differ-
ences, magnifying differences, stereotyping and putdown resulting in we-them division 
and making “them” appear inferior. (Marks, Mirvis 2011) It is important to be aware of 
the clashes and to aim to manage them and to mitigate the negative consequences 
caused by them. It is stated by Marks & Mirvis (2011) that the HR function is particularly 
important in mitigating the negative effects of the cultural clash. 
One concept central to the cultural change process is the concept of subjective cultures. 
Subjective cultures evolve as a result of shared experiences, and therefore the more and 
the faster shared experiences can be created, the faster a repertoire of symbols and 
shared meanings can be created helping the individuals to identify to them, thus allowing 
the new culture to get a hold and the integration to take place (Buono et al. 1985). This 
is in line with Schweizer & Patzelt (2012) and Ashkenas et al. (1998) who suggest that 
allowing people to work early with everyday business activities and by creating short-
term projects yielding fast wins can be used to facilitate integration because the process 
will result in facilitated development of a common culture.  
An important aspect of the cultural integration is the process of acculturation. According 
to Berry (1980, p. 215) acculturation is defined as "’changes induced in (two cultural) 
systems as a result of the diffusion of cultural elements in both directions’". A typical 
approach has been to expect the acquired company to adjust or adapt to the acquiring 
company. However, this results often in great resistance and proves that the preferences 
of the members of the acquired firm cannot be ignored.  It is suggested, that if the organ-
izations can agree on the modes of acculturation, problems regarding acquisition inte-
gration can be avoided. Therefore, the degree of agreement concerning the modes of 
acculturation is a key to successful merger integration as less organizational resistance 
and acculturative stress will take place.  These modes are integration, separation, as-
similation and deculturation and the choice of the right mode is a function of how much 
the members of the acquired entity value the preservation of the culture and how attrac-
tive the acquirer perceives the culture. Another option that can solve the problems of 
acculturation is firing the people in the team. This way there is no need for the accultura-
tion process. However, this would mean that the human capital would be lost and there-
fore might not be an optimum alternative depending on the acquisition motives. (Naha-
vandi & Malekzadeh 1988) 
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According to Weber (1996) senior managers are the most important group that shape 
and transmit corporate culture signals and as their beliefs and values are expected to be 
permeate, they also influence other levels of the organization. Therefore, top manage-
ment culture can be considered a manifestation of the overall culture of the organization 
(Weber 1996). Also, cultural differences on the top management level are most likely to 
affect the realization of synergy of the deal (Kitching 1967; Sales & Mirvis 1984; Weber 
1996). For these reasons, managing the senior managers is an important way to affect 
the corporate culture and change management in other levels of the organization too. 
There are many best practices recognized in the literature regarding cultural integration. 
Bligh (2006) recognizes the importance of cultural leadership i.e. “the process through 
which leadership influences cultural ideologies and expressive behaviors”. In this pro-
cess it is important to attract and unite followers and to replace elements of the old cul-
ture. These can be done by recognizing the effect of history on cultural differences, pro-
moting realistic expectations of challenges and opportunities, articulating the ideology 
for change, creating momentum for change process, utilizing symbols and working as a 
role model for commitment and change process. (Bligh 2006) 
It is also important to define and clearly state the strategy and values of the new company 
and to make them the cultural foundation of the combined entity (Galpin & Herndon 2014, 
p. 296). Galpin & Herndon (2014, p. 299) introduce fourteen cultural levers that can be 
used to change the culture and thus promote cultural integration. These levers are strat-
egy, values, staffing and selection, communications, training, rules and policies, goals 
and measures, rewards and recognition, decision-making, organization structure, phys-
ical environment, leadership behaviors, customs and norms as well as ceremonies and 
events. This model establishes an operational description of the culture that enables to 
manage it effectively. However, using one lever is not enough to induce sustainable 
change and cultural integration and therefore as many levers as possible should be used 
to achieve sustainable change and integration. (Galpin & Herndon 2014, pp. 297–301) 
After establishing the cultural anchors, i.e. the strategy and values, of the new organiza-
tion (Galpin & Herndon 2014, p. 298), the behaviors that every value entail should be 
clearly articulated (Galpin & Herndon 2014, p. 303). This is in line with Marks & Mirvis 
(2010, pp. 173–174) who suggest that communication is a crucial factor enabling em-
ployees to understand what matters in the new organization. In addition to that the cur-
rent state of the levers should be reviewed and the cultural levers should be redesigned 
based on the strategy of the new organization by making a plan for each lever and im-
plementing them to induce change (Galpin & Herndon 2014, p. 301). It is also important 
to note, that it is of great essence to stick to the cultural integration plan that has been 
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created as a result of identifying the strategy and values for each lever. Sticking to the 
plan is important, because not doing so will send a strong message to the employees 
that the management is not serious. (Galpin & Herndon 2014, pp. 307–308). For more 
detail about the levers as well as a cultural integration planning matrix, the reader is 
suggested to refer to the matrix presented in the work of Galpin & Herndon (2014, p. 
299). 
Table 8. Managing cultural differences best practices 
Cultural differences 
Acknowledge, the importance of cultural fit pre-deal (Chatterjee et al. 1992; Cartwright 
& Cooper 1993; Weber et al. 1996; Weber 1996) and that cultures are hard to change 
(Buono et al. 1985; Weber & Pliskin 1996). 
Establish a willingness to fit (Olie 1994). 
Making employees acknowledge the need for change will result in willingness to 
change (Buono et al. 1985). 
Acknowledge, that cultural fit at top management level is most crucial (Datta 1991; 
Chatterjee et al. 1992). 
Create an atmosphere of equalness (Buono et al. 1985). 
Utilize shared experiences and working together from day one to integrate the cultures 
(Buono et al. 1985). 
Create short-term projects yielding quick results (Ashkenas et al. 1998). 
Seek agreement regarding the modes of acculturation (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh 
1988). 
Senior managers are most important in shaping and transmitting corporate culture sig-
nals (Weber 1996). 
Influence ideologies and behavior through leadership (Bligh 2006). 
Recognize the effect of history on cultural differences and promote realistic expecta-
tions of challenges and opportunities (Bligh 2006). 
Articulate the ideology for change, create momentum for change process, utilize sym-
bols and work as a role model for commitment and change (Bligh 2006). 
Define and clearly state the strategy and values of the new company and make them 
the cultural foundation of the new company (Bligh 2006). 
Utilize the cultural levers to affect culture (Galpin & Herndon 2014, pp. 297–301). 
Stick to the cultural integration plan in order to send a message that the management 
is serious about it (Galpin & Herndon 2014, pp. 307–308). 
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2.2.7 HR management 
As already recognized before, humans are the heart of integration and a reason behind 
why acquisitions so often fail. According to Jemison & Haspeslagh (1991, p. 11) “the key 
to integration is to obtain the participation of the people involved without compromising 
the strategic task” According to Gomes et al. (2013) human resource challenges during 
the integration may prevent the value from synergies to be exploited. Part of the reason 
is that culture clash has a direct effect on the acquired company management attitudes 
and behavior (Weber & Drori 2011). Mitigating cultural differences between the two en-
tities is a key factor in creating the atmosphere for capability transfer during the integra-
tion process (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh 1988; Weber 1996). The atmosphere for capa-
bility transfer has been deemed necessary for PMI success (Jemison & Haspeslagh 
1991, p. 117) and therefore HR management is of great importance in the PMI process 
and is a key to deal value creation and value capture. This is supported by Schmidt 
(2001) who recognizes that there is a link between HR involvement and M&A success. 
What is more, appropriate HR-practices can increase employee motivation and commit-
ment hence supporting knowledge and resource transfer (Gomes et al. 2013). However, 
HR-related problems do not often receive enough attention from the integrating compa-
nies (Schweiger & Weber 1989). 
There are various HR problems arising during the integration. According to Weber & 
Drori (2011) the level of cultural differences correlates with the severity of HR problems 
i.e. stress, negative attitudes, low commitment and cooperation both among the acquired 
managers and the employees. The severity of HR problems correlates inversely with 
M&A performance and positively with employee turnover during the integration process 
and thus cultural differences can ultimately lead to ineffective integration and lower levels 
of deal performance. (Weber & Drori 2011) This is supported by Weber (1996) who sug-
gests that the higher the cultural differences in the top management teams, the lower the 
effectiveness of the integration and the financial performance of the acquirer are. It is 
important to alleviate the HR problems and make the employees and managers feel like 
they belong to the new company, like their input into key decisions are valued and wel-
comed and that they feel as little discomfort as possible in the organization. (Weber & 
Drori 2011) These factors should be addressed by the HR function. What is more, the 
organizational identification correlates with the severity of HR problems and employee 
turnover and is thus vital to the integration process. What is more, the negative effects 
of autonomy removal are inversely related to the organizational identification. Therefore, 
promoting the identification can promote integration as removing autonomy from the 
managers is found to be related to the severity of HR-problems. (Weber & Drori 2011) 
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This is in line with Weber et al. (2012) who state that increasing the autonomy granted 
to HR managers is positively associated with acquirer performance.  
The HR management strategy can be defined as the establishment of policies resulting 
in the creation of firm-specific, inimitable assets that can be e.g. knowledge, skills and 
abilities embedded in the human capital of the company (Gomes et al. 2013). Weber et 
al. (2012) suggest that the most commonly used HR-practices are training, communica-
tion and information sharing as well as involvement in decision making autonomy. Com-
munication will not be further discussed in this chapter as it has already been covered 
previously.  
Training is a central tool that can be used to manage cross-cultural situations. Therefore, 
it can be leveraged to address conflicts and other HR problems. Training is also a pre-
requisite for developing integration capability. (Weber et al. 2012) These views are sup-
ported by Nikandrou & Papalexandris (2007) who suggest that the adoption of various 
training methods is related to higher performance in companies with M&A experience. It 
is essential for integration, that employees from both organizations learn to know about 
the other company and its assets, people, structure and culture as well as HR practices, 
employees’ own roles in transferring and coordinating resources in addition to under-
standing the role of other people in this same process.  Training is also needed to un-
derstand specific cultural differences between the two organizations and thus training is 
an important tool that can be used to manage conflict and reduce resistance to change. 
Trainings are needed to transform tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge and vice 
versa. (Weber et al. 2012) These training related factors are in line with the practices 
used by Cisco. As discussed earlier, Cisco has a practice to have an orientation to Cisco 
lasting for 30 days where the employees are told about the hiring, sales and engineering 
practices at the company (Inkpen et al. 2000). This is a good example of how training 
can be used to reduce uncertainty, promote communication and decrease resistance for 
change. Training works as a forum for communication thus promoting integration. What 
is more, training is also essential for discovering knowledge about the acquired company 
that had not been identified during due diligence (Weber et al. 2012). By using trainings 
to learn more about the acquired company, one can better cope with new challenges as 
new potential problems can be identified. What is more, this process develops the inte-
gration capabilities of the company thus supporting integration success. However, the 
effect and amount of training and the methods of training differ from country to country, 
and there is no quantitative consensus whether training would have a positive effect on 
deal performance in Finland. However, in general it can be stated, that training employ-
ees to deal with conflict and new assignments as well as by using communication to 
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alleviate the uncertainty and stress of the human resources in addition to adjusting prac-
tices such as recruiting, reward and labor relations are HR-practices that can be used to 
improve the integration success. (Weber et al. 2012) 
It is also important to note the importance of the learning aspect for the whole integration 
process and success of the company. It has been suggested, that the learning process 
and lessons learned from the company’s previous own M&A integrations as well as 
benchmarks should be integrated into the HR systems and practices of the acquirer in 
order to achieve success (Nikandrou & Papalexandris 2007). Therefore, it is essential to 
study previous deals and learn from them in order to increase the likelihood of deal suc-
cess and potentially turn M&A into a competitive advantage of the company.  
According to Weber et al. (2012) HR managers involved in M&A need a bigger autonomy 
than they normally would in order to manage the new situation and the increase in un-
certainty. This is in line with Grant (1996) who suggests that the hierarchies of capabili-
ties should correspond to the firm’s structure, authority, communication and decision 
making in order for knowledge to be integrated effectively. Therefore, HR managers 
should be allowed increased autonomy in particular regarding decisions how to reward 
people in the new organization and how to deal with salaries in order to motivate and 
compensate for extra work and keep employees’ focus on the integration and the crea-
tion of integration capabilities. Also, autonomy regarding turnover management, recruit-
ing and labor relation issues is needed in order to facilitate knowledge transfer. (Child et 
al. 2013, p. 168) What is more, by Nikandrou & Papalexandris (2007) emphasize the 
importance of including HR in the strategic decision-making. Autonomy has been found 
to be important in maintaining the enthusiasm, creativity and commitment of the employ-
ees that facilitates integration. What is more, autonomy regarding training content, tim-
ing, duration and channels of communication is needed. Increase in autonomy has been 
found to improve acquirer performance. (Child et al. 2013, p. 168) Also Nikandrou & 
Papalexandris (2007) suggest that HR is important already pre-deal in order to assess 
the deals feasibility from the HR point of view. However, there seem to be limitations to 
this generalization as certain nationalities, such as British, German and Americans tend 
to prefer openness, low centralization and strong vertical hierarchy (Weber et al. 2012). 
It is also important to understand, that as the timeline is tight and as there is a vast 
amount of decisions to be made (Vester 2002), HR managers autonomy could potentially 
promote the execution of the integration and thus allow an increase in speed. All in all, 
HR-function is a critical function that is integrally linked also with the other CSFs of M&A 
integration, especially communication. 
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Figure 4. The effect of HR function on the M&A Performance (Modified from Weber 
& Tarba 2010) 
According to Vester (2002) the M&A integration process creates a heavy burden on the 
HR-function of the company due to a vast amount of demands and incidents that need 
to be addressed by the HR personnel. Common problems include arising competition, 
perceiving the two organizations as co-equal, having us-them division, uncertainty, lack 
of information, feeling of betrayal (Buono et al. 1985) as well as behavioral problems, 
employee turnover and arising conflicts etc. (Weber & Drori 2011). It is suggested that 
HR function often a lacks resources during the acquisition integration (Vester 2002). It is 
a prerequisite for the integration that sufficient HR resources are available, and therefore 
it is essential to have enough resources allocated to the HR function.   
One crucial responsibility of the HR function is to facilitate cultural integration. HR pro-
fessionals should be proactive and put culture on the integration agenda early in the 
process by steering business partners to manage cultural differences proactively. How-
ever, the ability of HR to do this is a function of how HR is perceived in the lead organi-
zation. It is important to engage HR in the integration and bring HR function to the pro-
cess already in the earliest days of planning in the premerger stage. (Marks & Mirvis 
2011) 
In order to excel in the cultural integration, four general stages designed to fit the needs 
of different companies and different integrations have been identified by Marks & Mirvis 
(2011). These sequential tasks are as follows: define desired cultural endstate, deepen 
cross-cultural learning, drive the combination toward the desired end and reinforce the 
emerging culture through substance and symbolism. The cultural endstates presented 
M&A PerformanceCommunication
Training
HR Manager 
Autonomy
Information Sharing
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are cultural pluralism (where the cultures coexist), cultural integration (where the cultures 
are blended together), cultural assimilation (in which the other company absorbs the 
other) and cultural transformation (in which both partner companies abandon key ele-
ments of their original cultures and create new values and norms) (Marks & Mirvis 2010, 
p. 15; Marks & Mirvis 2011). Deepening the cross-cultural learning can be used to un-
freeze the mind-sets of the people and facilitate change in the organization and values. 
Therefore, devoting time and resources to deep-cultural learning right after getting legal 
approval to the deal is the best way to go. Deep learning can take place e.g. by raising 
awareness of emerging cultural perceptions and stereotypes and to generate dialogue 
on the cultural endstate. It is important to figure out, how we see our own culture, how 
we see the other parties’ culture and how we think the other side perceives our culture. 
(Marks & Mirvis 2011) 
Table 9. HR-practices for each cultural endstate (Modified from Marks & Mirvis 
2011) 
Cultural integration 
 
Cultural assimilation Cultural transformation 
Educate employees 
about cultural clash. 
 
Work with the business part-
ners to adopt effective change 
management principles. 
HR interventions to help 
people find fault in their 
old cultures. 
Clarify values for the new 
entity. 
 
For effective change manage-
ment, over communicate the 
benefits. Why the deal was 
made? Why the culture of the 
lead company is relevant for 
the combined entity? It is 
good to emphasize how the 
solution will address weak-
nesses in the acquired com-
pany’s operations. 
Help people get over their 
old identities and cope 
with the loss. 
 
Incorporate culture into 
the PMI decision-making 
process. 
Participate people in decision 
making as this breeds support 
for decisions. 
Promote dialogue about 
the future identity. 
Create new values and 
norms in cooperation with 
the management team. 
HR is responsible for preserv-
ing the forces for change. 
 
- 
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In short, cultural change can be achieved by determining the desired endstate, unfreez-
ing the mindsets of the employees, using interventions to get to the desired direction and 
finally freeze the achieved cultural norms and values. HR-function has an important role 
in keeping culture on the table in addition to pressing cultural interventions. What is more, 
HR-function is to help executives articulate their desired cultural endstate for the combi-
nation. It is evident that HR function is an important factor in reducing the negative effects 
of the inevitable cultural clash by addressing these clashes via different ways, such as 
training programmes and workshops. (Marks & Mirvis 2011) This is in line with Zhang et 
al. (2015) who suggest that HR function is tightly linked to talent retention.  
It is also important to notice, that the different business functions might have different 
degrees of integration and therefore also different degrees of cultural integration affect-
ing the cultural endstate (Marks & Mirvis 2011). Higher degree of integration is needed 
especially when there is a need to transfer tacit and socially complex knowledge (Pura-
nam et al. 2003). Therefore, executives must make a case for combining cultures for 
each business function. HR function is needed in this process to make explicit what has 
been implicit in the thinking processes (Marks & Mirvis 2011). 
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Table 10. HR management best practices 
HR management 
Obtain the participation of people (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 11) and create an 
atmosphere that supports capability transfer (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, p. 117). 
Mitigate cultural differences (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh 1988; Weber 1996). 
Make the employees and managers feel like they belong to the new company (Weber 
& Drori 2011). 
Make the acquired managers feel that their input in key decisions is valued and wel-
comed (Weber & Drori 2011). 
Mitigate the feelings of discomfort (Weber & Drori 2011). 
Use training, communication and information sharing as tools to integration (Weber et 
al. 2012). 
Include HR in decision making and planning (Nikandrou & Papalexandris 2007; Weber 
et al. 2012). 
Use training to reduce uncertainty, promote communication and decrease resistance 
for change (Inkpen et al. 2000). 
Use HR to learn about the acquired company (Weber et al. 2012). 
Train people to deal with conflict (Weber et al. 2012). 
Integrate PMI lessons learned into the HR function (Nikandrou & Papalexandris 2007). 
Allow HR personnel increased autonomy especially regarding reward practices, re-
cruiting, labor management and motivating (Child et al. 2013, p. 168). 
Allocate enough resources for HR personnel (Vester 2002). 
Put culture on the integration agenda early. HR should be proactive (Marks & Mirvis 
2011). 
It is important to engage HR in the integration function and bring HR function to the 
process in the earliest days of planning in the premerger stage (Marks & Mirvis 2011). 
Comply with the following procedure (Marks & Mirvis 2011): 
1. Define desired cultural endstate. 
2. Deepen cross-cultural learning. 
3. Drive the combination toward the desired end. 
4. Reinforce the emerging culture through substance and symbolism.  
Promote deep cultural learning: deep learning can take place e.g. by raising aware-
ness of emerging cultural perceptions and stereotypes and can generate dialogue on 
the cultural endstate (Marks & Mirvis 2011). 
Define the cultural endstate (Marks & Mirvis 2011). 
HR function is responsible for keeping culture on the table (Marks & Mirvis 2011). 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Case company 
This research focuses on the Finnish division of a large multinational company. The 
Finnish division of this case company decided to acquire an established medium sized 
company of over 140 employees in order to gain larger market share and improved com-
petitive advantage on a chosen service offering of the acquiring company. 
The deal was characterized by an exceptionally good will by the acquired company. The 
acquiring company had a good reputation in the market and the brand was deemed su-
perior to the one of the acquired company. Because of this facelift, the employees were 
enthusiastic to come to work for the acquirer and were very willing to participate in the 
new organization. In other words, the baseline for the acquisition was excellent.  
The case organization is a typical PBO. PBOs are organizations in which the majority of 
products and services for internal or external customers are produced through projects 
(Pemsel & Wiewiora 2013). The employees from the acquired entity were mostly regular 
employees and middle managers. These people were then integrated to the functions of 
the acquiring company. It is good to note, that the organizational structure in the case 
company is very flat, and the different business functions mostly reside in the same peo-
ple. This cross-functional business expertise is typical for a project-based organization 
(Hobday 2000). The most important function in case of the case company is the opera-
tions function which forms the backbone of the company operations and income. The 
projects form the backbone of operations and are acquired via sales function. In practice, 
the same people doing the projects also manage the sales individually while searching 
for prospective projects and selling them to the customer. The function of middle man-
agement, i.e. business unit managers and project managers, is to manage the projects 
and the operations in addition to the sales process. The marketing function, financial 
services, R&D, HR and other functions were not relevant for the case, as the functions 
are executed as a centralized function independent of the merging entities and as there 
were no people working for these functions among the acquired company employees 
that were integrated into the new entity. 
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3.2 Research strategy 
This research is a cross-sectional study of the integration problems and solutions across 
different business functions. The research is carried out as an inductive case study and 
utilizes semi-structured individual interviews of nine middle and top-level managers as 
the main source of data. Therefore, the research is qualitative by nature.  An interpretivist 
approach is chosen in the research due to the socially complex and unique nature of the 
acquisition integration. Saunders et al. (2009, p. 116) highlights the significance of hu-
man factors as a basis for this analysis and suggest that interpretivism is particularly 
suitable in business and management research when studying complex and unique con-
cepts such as organizational behavior and human resources. Due to the central im-
portance of organizational behavior and humans for the PMI process, this view is most 
suitable in order to surface relevant problems accurately. The study thus adopts an em-
pathetic stance as suggested by Saunders et al. (2009, p. 116) and aims to understand 
the world from the point of view of the interviewed middle managers.  
The research strategy in this research is a combination between case study and action 
research. Case study allows to answer many “why”, “what” and “how” questions and 
therefore is good for explanatory and exploratory research (Saunders et al. 2009, p. 146). 
Furthermore, case study allows to gain a rich understanding related to the context of the 
research (Saunders et al. 2009, p. 146) thus providing more transparency to the funda-
mentals behind the analysis. This contextual understanding is essential in order to better 
understand the sociocultural factors behind the arising problems that are of great im-
portance for the PMI process. This is crucial when studying the cause-effect relationships 
related to PMI. The importance of understanding the context and the data right is also 
emphasized by the nature of qualitative research. According to Saunders et al. (2009, p. 
480) qualitative data is defined as all non-numeric or unquantified data that can be a 
product of any research strategy and in order to be useful, needs to be analyzed and 
understood. Action research on the other hand is suitable for situations where the reso-
lution of organizational issues, for example the implications of change, is studied together 
with the people that have experienced the issue directly. This strategy has a particular 
focus on promoting organizational change and is therefore ideal for studying PMI. Action 
research also utilizes information gained from other contexts through experience. For 
example, students implementing a research in the organization they work for can lever-
age the information and knowledge learned previously in action research. (Saunders et 
al. 2009, p. 147) The researcher has worked in the case company before and during the 
case acquisition and has been able to do participant observation in the company. These 
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observations contribute to the context creation, problem recognition and understanding 
of the corporate culture and organizational context. However, these observations are not 
documented and therefore the applicability of the observations is limited and highly sub-
jective. Therefore, they are mainly used to interpret the interview data and to increase 
the holistic understanding of the whole situation aiming to improve the quality of the re-
sults.  
All the objectives, research question, methods and approaches have been designed in 
collaboration with the demands of the university and the CFO and HR manager of the 
subscribing company. They are a result of many formal and informal meetings and dis-
cussions. 
3.3 Research process 
This research began by discussing the event history of the deal, problems that had sur-
faced and the solutions that the company was eager to have. The objective of the com-
pany was to improve the acquisition process in order to access more value from the 
future deals as well as to better understand the process and turn acquisition into a com-
petitive advantage.  
After establishing the objectives and goals of the research, a systematic literature review 
was initiated. The databases utilized in this work to search and identify literature were 
Google Scholar, Web of Science and Andor. In addition to various scientific publications, 
also books that have gained major attention in the M&A literature were included in the 
literature review. Due to the nature of M&A integration, books form an important source 
of information. Many books targeted for managers integrating acquisitions have been 
written over the years and some of these books have developed into core works in the 
M&A literature and should thus not be overlooked in the literature review.  
The first step to choose literature to be studied was to determine the subject of investi-
gation. At the beginning literature regarding PMI integration and PMI integration success 
factors were studied and the review was deepened around the M&A integration theme. 
The titles and abstracts were studied to identify key words such as merger(s), acquisi-
tion(s), M&A, PMI, integration, deal success, critical success factor(s) and best prac-
tice(s). 
Second step in the literature review process was to form the criteria for literature selec-
tion. The literature selection of this research followed predetermined criteria that was set 
to ensure the quality of the literature review. The literature was chosen by analyzing the 
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author and place of publication as well as the amount of citations that the work had 
gained as denoted by the specific search database utilized. Only sources that had been 
published in reputable journals and that had received many citations were accepted into 
the literature review. The chosen articles were also to be peer-reviewed in order to be 
included in the review. The reputability of the journal was evaluated using the Academic 
Journal Quality Guide by the Association of Business Schools as well as by searching 
for highly cited and reputable articles and looking into their citations. Majority of the arti-
cles reviewed in this research have been published in strategic and general manage-
ment, leadership, organizational studies, finance, business, human relations, marketing 
and change management journals. Also the scope of the sources was to conform with 
this research. Only information that is relevant for domestic acquisitions and absorption 
acquisitions was included in the research. 
The researcher read and analyzed the content of the research material and made notes 
on the content and key takeaways. The notes and key takeaways were collected into an 
Excel file as well as on paper notes. The reviewed works as well as the outcomes were 
divided into categories based on the topic they addressed. The notes and takeaways for 
each relevant theme were collected together and compared and contrasted to each other 
in order to form a consensus on the topic. As a result, the 7 critical success factors pre-
sented in Figure 8 were confirmed. The aim of the literature review was to form a holistic 
perspective to M&A integration and to find and articulate the integration best practices 
and CSFs currently recognized in the M&A literature.  
After finishing up the literature review, the research method and interview questions were 
established. In this research, semi-structured interviews are the main method of data 
collection. This interview method was chosen due to the qualitative nature of the acqui-
sition integration problems that result in quantitative financial problems. Therefore, rec-
ognizing the qualitative problems are the core of improving acquisition integration and 
thus improving deal performance. The interview questions were designed in collabora-
tion with the CFO and HR manager of the acquiring company and were based on the 
literature review and the CSFs and best practices identified. The results of the literature 
review of chapter 2 were discussed together and the questions were formed based on 
the identified critical success factors and best practices as well as themes that were 
surfaced to be typically challenging in the PMI process. The questions were mainly built 
based on the findings summarized in tables 1 to 10. Also the objectives of the research 
and experiences of the CFO and HR manager regarding the case acquisition were dis-
cussed in order to help in the process of formulating the questions. The themes that were 
perceived to have caused problems in the integration were discussed and questions 
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aiming to surface the specific problems regarding the themes were developed. The ques-
tions were open ended yet easy to understand in a non-ambiguous way. The aim was to 
give the interviewed people a possibility to freely tell their story of how they think the 
integration went and what the problems and chains of events taking place were. The 
questions were to provide the theme and work as a guideline for the interviews. As the 
interviews proceeded, the questions and the structure were modified and improved. The 
questions and the structure of the interviews can be seen in appendix A. 
In total nine middle managers and executives were interviewed in order to surface the 
problems that took place during the integration. Middle managers were chosen due to 
the fact that they work as intermediaries between the employees and the top manage-
ment, and therefore have a unique viewpoint to integration and possess the deepest 
knowledge of the integrated organization and the problems related to it. This is in line 
with Balogun (2003) who states that middle managers can be a remarkable strategic 
asset in implementation projects as they work as “’change intermediaries’”. What is more, 
they are the ones most affected by the lack of leadership and communication that were 
perceived as the most crucial issues in the case PMI process according to the executive 
managers of the case company.  
In this research a purposive sampling method was used. Purposive sampling is defined 
as a sampling method, where the judgement of the interviewer is used to determine the 
interviewed people so that the research question can be answered in the best possible 
way. It has been recognized to be most suitable for small sample sizes and case study 
in particular. The benefit of purposive sampling is that it allows homogenous sampling 
thus allowing the study to utilize one special sub-group. (Saunders et al. 2009, pp. 237–
240) The judgement of the interviewed individuals was applied by the interviewee in col-
laboration with the top management of the acquiring company. Both members of the 
acquiring company and the acquired company were interviewed in order to get a more 
holistic view to the integration. 
The selection of the interviewed candidates was done together with the case company. 
The attendees were selected based on their position in the organization in addition to 
predetermined criteria. The main criterion was that the interviewed people would need 
to be middle managers as they have a special viewpoint to integration as they work as 
intermediaries between the employees and the top management. Also a few top manag-
ers were selected to gain depth into the understanding of the case. Another criterion was 
the agenda, honesty and sincerity of the people. It was ensured together with the top 
management of the acquiring company, that the people chosen were objective and did 
not have any hidden political or non-political agendas that would make them answer 
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dishonestly to the interviews thus distorting the results. Honest views were pursued, and 
the interviewed people expressed eager and honest attitudes towards the interview. An-
swering honestly to the interviews was also made easier by conducting the interviews 
individually and by stressing the confidentiality of the interviews.  
The research consists of nine interviews of people holding a middle or top management 
position in the company. They were to be individuals that had been part of the integration 
process. They were also selected so that as many business units as possible could be 
covered in order to gain a more holistic picture to the integration. The interviewed indi-
viduals held a position as business unit managers, project managers or different posi-
tions at the top management level. Both employees from the acquirer and the acquired 
company were selected in order to gain a better view of the challenges from both view-
points. The interviewed candidates were selected in cooperation with the CFO and HR 
manager of the acquirer as they had deepest knowledge on the company and therefore 
were able to suggest the most useful candidates for the data collection process. The 
interviewed people and their position in the organization as well as the pre-merger or-
ganization they presented can be seen in Table 11. 
Table 11. The backgrounds of the interviewed people 
Interviewed person  Position and previous organization  
(acquirer/acquired) 
1. Business Unit Manager/Acquirer 
2. Business Unit Manager/Acquired 
3. Business Unit Manager/Acquired 
4. Former CEO, Current Business Area Director/Acquired  
5. Business Development Director/Acquirer 
6. Business Unit Manager/Acquired 
7. Assistant Business Unit Manager/Acquired 
8. Business Unit Manager/Acquired 
9. Business Unit Manager/Acquired 
 
The interviews were conducted either face-to-face, via Skype or via phone. The dis-
tances between the different business units as well as the tight schedule of the managers 
restricted the possibility to conduct all the interviews face-to-face and therefore also 
phone and Skype had to be utilized. The interviews took between 30 and 77 minutes 
depending on the manager and what they had to say. All the interviews aimed to gain an 
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understanding at the problems that took place at the business process level and to un-
derstand the effect of these problems on the integration speed and deal performance. 
All the interviews followed the structure presented in appendix A. By including people 
from different parts and functions of the organization, the research was able to gain 
deeper knowledge and different perspectives into the PMI process. This way a more 
holistic picture of the chain of events and problems was achieved.  
The concepts of reliability and validity were addressed closely in the interview process 
in various ways. Reliability was addressed in the integration phase by asking clarifying 
questions and by ensuring, that the interviewee had understood the message correctly. 
Also recording the interviews and documenting them by conducting transcription adds 
transparency into the data and thus improves the reliability of the research. Also the 
concept of validity was addressed by defining strict criteria for candidate selection. What 
is more, the relationship between the interviewer and interviewed people was not inter-
fering with the research and the answers as the interviewee works in a different inde-
pendent department and thus has no direct links to the interviewed people that could 
result in biases in the interview answers or the interpretation.   
After data collection, the data was analyzed by categorization and summarization in or-
der to reach conclusions and draw results. At first, a transcription of the interviews was 
produced in order to transcribe the audio data into written form for increased transpar-
ency and for further analysis. The data was then categorized into different categories by 
the process of color coding while maintaining the data attached to the context. After this 
the different chunks of data relevant to the research were summarized in the original 
context. As the conducted interviews were semi-structured, they included many narra-
tives and therefore the context of these narratives can be maintained via categorization. 
Finally, after gaining a thorough understanding of the chain of events leading to the prob-
lems, the problems in each business function were surfaced and summed up. After this, 
the best practices were looked into in order to discover actions that would have pre-
vented the problems from arising. This information was synthesized into an integration 
framework consisting of 17 propositions to help improve PMI process in PBO context. 
According to Saunders (2009, p. 492) categorization involves developing categories and 
subsequently assigning a category for each relevant chunk of data. The categories in 
this research are derived from the theoretical framework, i.e. the business functions un-
der study. Division into operations, sales and management was found to be very rough, 
and therefore further categories such as culture, atmosphere and communication were 
developed. However, these categories were later assigned under one of the three main 
categories when the results and conclusions were drawn from the data. Throughout the 
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whole data analysis, participant observations conducted by the researchers were re-
flected on the interview data. 
In regard to data analysis, triangulation was used to confirm the findings and this way 
increase the validity of the research as supported by the findings of Creswell & Miller 
(2000). The interview results were reflected on the literature review comprising of various 
different publications and authors. The publications used in the literature review are 
based on different theories and research material. The publications with different views, 
data collection methods and theories were also compared to each other in order to find 
a prevailing consensus in the literature as well as to identify common themes and cate-
gories as suggested beneficial by Creswell & Miller (2000). The interviews between dif-
ferent individuals were compared to each other and afterwards to the literature in order 
to check that the findings are consistent and in line with the prevailing literature. The 
interview data was also reflected on the information of the researcher gained through 
participant observations.  
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4. RESULTS 
4.1 Operations function 
As operations function is the core of a PBO, the most impactful integration related prob-
lems occurred in this function. The problems are roughly divided into four categories, 
which are tools, physical isolation and the moveout, education and atmosphere.  
4.1.1 Tools 
In the interviews, the lack of tools was regarded a problem that complicated the daily 
operations in many instances. In a few offices the internet connections were so unstable, 
that following the trainings via Skype were compromised leading to inferior learning out-
comes. The targets regarding the training outcomes were not met for example regarding 
IT system usage. However being able to use the IT systems would be essential for inte-
gration as well as daily operations. Also simple things such as hardware caused many 
issues. The employees were trapped with two computers for 12 months. It was hard to 
carry two computers all the time and switch the computer between projects. The old 
computer also works as a symbol of the old organization. What is more, the employees 
were also trapped with two emails. This was a problem as the email history was critical 
for the daily operations from juridical and operational aspects as the message history 
was crucial in order to validate what had been agreed upon during many years of docu-
mented email discussions. All the crucial information was there. Yet, all the employees 
or even managers do not know even today where these messages can be found. This 
point was deemed as a factor that made the daily project work and life harder. The same 
thing applied to the transfer of projects and old material. A lot of the material was una-
vailable, such as different model documents. This caused extra expenses and decrease 
in operational efficiency as the material had to be recreated. However, they should have 
been updated to the new format at some point in any case, so in a way this fact promoted 
integration even though it caused momentary problems with the operations. It was 
deemed that the material should have been there all the time as the tools needed for 
work need to be accessible at all times in order to ensure a fluent transition and a smooth 
flow of operations.  
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“In our role it is essential to have access to the email history for at least five years back 
in order to be able to do the daily work that has been initiated during years of email-dis-
cussion. Everything is done in a written format in order for the important information not 
to be lost. I would have needed the emails many times, yet it still remains unclear to me 
where they can be found.”  
 
“Access to the IT ecosystem of the acquirer should have been achieved sooner. Now 
people were trapped with two computers for a long time.” 
 
Another crucial tool related issue were the IT systems. For example, the management 
system was deemed inferior as it was perceived very complex. Also the search for infor-
mation in the management system was experienced to be difficult and required infor-
mation could not be found in an easy manner. For example, the work descriptions and 
responsibilities for a construction management supervisor are almost impossible to find. 
The red line in the system is missing, and the information in it is not easy to digest when 
you enter the company and see the system at the first time. It was concluded that a 
proper management system would have helped the integration by making it easier to 
absorb new practices and policies and to learn about the culture of the company.  
One crucial factor related to IT systems that was mentioned several times in the inter-
views was the fact that the IT integration was significantly delayed. In addition to causing 
confusion and decrease in trust in the top management’s capability to execute and man-
age the integration, it also caused severe operational problems as people could not carry 
out the responsibilities that they were supposed to do. For example, the project manag-
ers of the acquired company could not access the billing system and therefore the project 
managers of the acquirer had to do the responsibilities of the acquired project managers 
as they were the only ones with access to the IT systems. Therefore, they had to com-
plete the billing and other responsibilities regarding these projects. Yet they were in no 
other way involved in those projects and had no insight into them. This caused extra 
work and operational strain for the acquirer project managers. Also, not having access 
to the hour documentation system resulted in a vast number of hours not being recorded 
in the system and thus not being billed from the customer. This was negatively reflected 
in the financial performance and profitability of a few units. Not having access to the IT 
systems also led to difficulties in joint projects, i.e. in projects where both acquirer and 
acquired company employees were present. This was due to the fact that the IT systems 
and hardware between the project members were different.  
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When talking about the tools crucial for operations, it is also crucial to note that the tools 
need to support change. For example, when IT integration or new policies are imple-
mented in accordance with the integration plan, it is impossible to achieve the wanted 
change in case the tools do not allow that. For example, IT systems such as hour docu-
mentation and billing system were a critical component of the policies and corporate 
culture in the case company. Yet, using these systems was not possible for the acquired 
company employees as there was no access to the system where the requested actions 
were to be carried out. Also the project management culture differed in the new organi-
zation and accepting and implementing this change was deemed crucial for integration. 
Yet, the project managers could not access the system or had not learned how to use it 
and therefore were unable to adopt the change. 
 
“The policies of the new company were not learned, and old ways of working preserved 
because only old tools were available. You cannot switch to new ways of working if 
your tools don’t support it.” 
4.1.2 Moveout 
The second category, the physical proximity, formed into a central operational issue. The 
office question and physical proximity appeared various times in the interviews.  
 
“We were very isolated and physically in the same room with the old parent company.” 
 
The office question refers to the time in which the people should move out from the old 
office of the parent company to a new office and whether this office will be the same as 
that of the acquiring company or whether the mother company will be physically sepa-
rated. Based on the interviews, it was concluded that moving out of the old office and 
from the proximity of the old parent company as soon as possible is critical and doing so 
can speed up the integration. First, the old office has a symbolic value and reminds of 
the old parent company. Changing the office fast to a completely new environment away 
from the proximity of the previous parent company forces the people to move to a new 
environment while speeding up integration. The act of getting a new office also works as 
a symbol from the management that they care about the unit.  
Second, physical isolation or contact with the old parent company slows down the learn-
ing process essential for integration. In one of the case units the delay of move out 
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caused the employees to feel like they still acted independently and according to the old 
policies preventing the new policies from being learned. This eroded the integration par-
ticularly in one case unit. Some units also stayed for a long time in the same facilities 
with the old parent company. Hence, they were exposed to the old culture and ways of 
working and did not feel like they were part of the new company. This way the formation 
of reciprocal organizational understanding was delayed. When the office is changed fast 
into a new environment and proximity with the acquiring company employees, the ac-
quired employees are exposed to the new corporate culture, policies and practices as 
well as the new IT systems and other aspects relevant to the new organization and are 
this way forced to learn about them and work and act according to the new rules. In the 
case deal, there were a few instances where moving to a new office was significantly 
delayed or the new office building was physically separated from the acquirer and there 
was not much interaction between the acquirer and acquired company employees as the 
clearance to enter the office was extremely hard to get. This slowed down human inte-
gration and the exposure to the new culture and ways of working. Based on the research 
it was concluded that exposure to the new corporate culture earlier and communication 
about it would have increased the integration speed.  
 
“It was a mistake to stay in the facilities of the former parent company for such a long 
time. We should have got out from there earlier. I think it eroded the integration as our 
people did not feel like they had really transferred to the new organization before the 
moveout took place; 11 months after the deal.” 
 
Third, the question of office space is a crucial factor regarding uncertainty. People want 
to know where they will be working and therefore making the change fast will minimize 
the uncertainty and the effect of rumour mills. It will also increase the willingness to learn 
and improve the spreading of information within the organization as suggested by the 
research. Establishing a clear direction and future is essential for the deal success. This 
is important based on the interview data. It was concluded, that questions and worst-
case scenarios caused by uncertainty slow down integration as the willingness and mo-
tivation to learn decrease. A case in point illustrating the effect of the moveout time to 
new facilities on uncertainty and the integration atmosphere is one business unit that 
suffered from prominent employee exits and resistance to integration thus requiring a lot 
of time and resources to be allocated to fix the situation. The office was big with a low 
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number of employees and hence little interaction took place. Uncertainty, bad atmos-
phere and surroundings caused the people to shut down and not be ready or willing to 
learn anything new. However, when the office change was made, the situation faced a 
prominent change to the better as it became clear who will stay in the company to work 
and what the environment and location will be like. As a result, people did not question 
the orders to such a great extent, became more receptive to learning and also the 
spreading of the information within the organization was facilitated.  
Fourth, the physical separation of the unit also affects the work identity of the people. 
Still today, the difference between the “old” and “new” employees has not been dissolved 
in some of the units that have been left physically separated. The fact that this line still 
exists was suggested to be due to the physical separation and the lack of mixing up the 
employees within the units. In everyday talks, people still talk about us and them instead 
of using we-form. Based on the interview data, using the we-form in communication 
would promote integration. 
4.1.3 Education and support 
Third central category related to PMI in the case PBO is education and support. In sev-
eral interviews the managers expressed that they were unintentionally left alone or as 
described by one of the managers, “orphans”, for a long time without enough contact 
with the acquirer. Based on the interviews, this was one of the consequences of moving 
too slow as well as due to the challenging geographical location of some of the units. 
Sitting in the same office with the employees of the acquirer means that the help is close. 
Yet only in four units there are acquirer employees in the same facility but on eight there 
are none. In many instances especially regarding the IT systems and the responsibilities 
of the project managers, the employees of the acquired company felt lost. If there would 
have been a person at the same office that could have helped with the practical issues 
and questions, the integration speed could have been increased as learning would have 
been facilitated. Now, significant amount of resources and psychological power was di-
rected to overcoming the challenges and questions regarding everyday operational re-
sponsibilities and the way e.g. IT systems work. One of the managers described the 
situation quite well. 
 
“They used four hours to fill up the first hour report; and four hours multiplied by 12 
people is a lot of time.” 
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It was concluded, that the fact that information comes from close can increase integration 
speed as this information is easier to adopt. It was also discovered, that having the peer 
support and working in the same facilities, or even if just sending someone over to help 
with the assignment at the first time it fell due, would have promoted learning and re-
duced the amount of waste hours hence speeding up integration and increasing opera-
tional efficiency.  
One crucial aspect concerning education and the learning of the employees is commu-
nication. It was experienced, that the information was too fragmented and that commu-
nications were not planned and systematic. Also the trustworthiness of the communica-
tion was compromised as the schedules did not hold. Based on the comments, there 
were also too long breaks in the communication over the course of integration. It was 
suggested, that communicating the principles and practices in a clearer and less decen-
tralized way would have increased the integration speed. Keeping both communication 
and other things simple was concluded to be the way to go as it helps people to relate 
and understand the object in question easier.   
Among the most important factors regarding education and support in PMI context was 
timing. The research established, that the timing of the educations is an essential factor 
affecting the effectiveness of the training and thus the integration speed and outcome. 
The supervisor trainings were stated to be delayed. By completing the trainings earlier, 
integration could in the future be sped up. More crucial aspect to the issue of timing 
however was that in the case acquisition the IT integration was delayed, yet the trainings 
were held on time. As a result, people did not have access to the systems they were 
supposed to train to use in the training sessions. It was stated, that learning to use the 
systems from the PowerPoints via Skype does not work. Guiding by hand as well as the 
opportunity to play around with the system yourself was deemed critical for learning and 
successful trainings.  
 
“When conducting training via Skype, it is all the same if you are there to listen or not 
when you cannot play around with the system yourself while somebody checks if what 
you do is right or wrong.” 
 
The fact that there was no guiding from hand and no access to the systems in order to 
play around with them slowed down integration. The learning ended up taking place 
mostly independently and even today, many of the middle managers felt like the goals 
have not yet been achieved regarding training results.  
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“The IT systems are still not mastered. It is still very hard to make the write-offs and 
write-downs, forecasts and other things. Maybe in a year we’ll learn it, maybe never, I 
don’t know.” 
 
There is no point having trainings before there is access to the systems. Also, as de-
scribed earlier, the relevance of peer support in the learning process cannot be ne-
glected. One of the managers put it quite well.  
 
“All of a sudden there was nobody at the neighboring work-station to whom to turn for 
advice. We were separated in a different part of the city yet tried to integrate into a 
company and learn the new policies and ways of working. The most effective way to 
learn would be to be in the same environment with the parent company and its old em-
ployees.” 
 
The lack of a roadmap or an integration plan was reflected in the trainings as well. The 
orderliness was missing and the timing of the trainings was not right in regard to other 
integration related activities such as IT integration. The trainings began too soon and 
people “choked in the bun” as described by one of the managers. The problem was 
mostly not using the systems but rather what to use the systems for. Many middle man-
agers experienced, that the red line in the trainings was missing and that the why’s be-
hind the orders should have been better communicated. Now the IT environment was 
described to be a “black box”. According the interviews, there was a big cultural shift for 
the acquired company employees from an agile to a more bureaucratic environment. 
Communicating the why’s of doing things would have helped to accept the cultural 
change related to IT systems usage while removing the feeling of being just teased with 
all the responsibilities and rules. Now these cultural differences caused frustration and 
uncertainty as well as a degree of resistance to change, especially regarding the IT sys-
tem adoption. Some of that resistance is still present today. Also the official introduction 
of corporate culture was delayed. It would have been essential to give the employees a 
preview of what the culture is like and what things will be different. This would have given 
the employees time to prepare for the change still without obligations. The lack of this 
communication resulted in uncertainty about the right procedures and ways of working 
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in certain situations. An introductionary exposure to the new corporate culture earlier and 
communication about it would have increased the integration speed.    
As a result of ineffective training, many different setbacks occurred. Not knowing how to 
use the systems and work in the new organization caused frustration and uncertainty 
within the employees while also creating waste hours as a result of wondering how things 
work. This way it affected the integration atmosphere in a negative manner. Also, the 
number of unbilled hours and the extra strain faced by the billing personnel that corrected 
the mistakes increased the integration related expenses and decreased deal perfor-
mance in short term.  
4.1.4 Atmosphere 
The integration climate and the atmosphere in the organization are crucial for daily op-
erations. For example, the willingness to work together can be compromised by frustra-
tion and uncertainty leading to inferior work performance and closing up. Based on the 
interview data, not knowing where the necessary material for operations could be found 
or not knowing how to work in the new environment caused frustration and lack of moti-
vation resulting in protests. Things were done wrong intentionally, and the quality of the 
work-output was at times decreased. There were also wrinkles in the billing caused by 
the tantrums. These factors that caused frustration and tantrums as well as protests de-
creased the speed of integration. It is important that trainings and communication are 
timed right so that the migration to new systems takes place at the same time and that 
the new systems are in use early enough. If not, operational problems will occur as a 
result of lack of knowledge as well as tantrums. 
 
“Frustration and lack of motivation took place at the integration phase right after the 
moveout as the network drive did not work and as there was no access to the needed 
material. And we didn’t know how to act in the new environment. It caused frustration 
and resulted in sub-optimal work quality and tantrums.” 
 
What is more, the integration climate also has an effect on the employee retention. In 
the most problematic unit of the case integration, a bad atmosphere eroded the value of 
integration as bitterness was developed as a result of how things were handled. What is 
more, the change of titles and positions to conform with the acquirer organization’s poli-
cies caused extra friction. These decisions should have been made as soon as possible, 
yet they were delayed in the case integration. This combined effect caused 57% of the 
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employees of the case unit to leave the company thus fueling uncertainty in the remain-
ing employees as well. The same issue was faced with contracts. As the car benefit was 
removed, a few people decided to leave as a result.  
Also symbols related to operations affect the integration climate and atmosphere for ca-
pability transfer to a great extent.  In the case integration, the symbolism was not lever-
aged as a success factor contrary to the consensus in the literature. It is essential that 
the corporate culture is changed and that the employees of the acquired company are 
detached from the old. The organization had recently made a company image revision, 
yet the material given to the acquired company included material with the old image. 
Also, the work clothes of the acquiring company were not renewed but new logos were 
sewed on the new clothes instead. This caused some emotions. It sent a message that 
the management was saving money and not willing to invest into the new people. Giving 
the employees new working clothes with the new logos would have sent a message for 
the personnel that the management cares about them. It is essential to detach the people 
from the previous culture and symbolism and therefore new working clothes can be sig-
nificant in that sense. Also business cards were advised not to be ordered as the ad-
dresses would change soon. However, they are crucial when it comes to job identification 
and identification and acceptance with the new organization. The former CEO of the 
acquired company summarized it well:  
 
”The business card is for yourself. You can read there where you are working. Every 
time you look at it you read it.” 
 
In addition to the formerly mentioned, communication arose as an important factor re-
garding the atmosphere affecting the daily operations. The communication in the case 
integration was generally deemed irregular and non-systematic. It was stated that the 
messages should be systematic, better planned and also the timing of the communica-
tion should be better defined. Communication should take place early and the message 
should not change. The schedules need to stick, or the trustworthiness of the communi-
cation disappears, and uncertainty will be nourished.  
 
“A few days before the expected integration they told us that it won’t take place yet and 
that the timing will be transferred to time x. Then at time x they told us that it will be de-
layed still a bit more. It started to have tragicomic features.” 
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Communication should be consistent in order not to feed the rumour mill. Also, more 
attention should be presented to the way and form of presenting. The communication 
was at times deemed unprofessional as very short answers were given.  
Various questions to which managers should answer were reflected in the transcriptions 
and many of the questions that arose are listed in Table 6. In addition to those, also many 
other questions were mentioned related to new facilities, new address and how the new 
working environment will look like. By answering the key questions, an environment of 
safety can be promoted as suggested by the interview data. The vitality of communi-
cating and reducing the uncertainty was also well described by one manager. 
 
“The people close up under uncertainty. Everybody does their own job and does not 
share things. In the business unit meetings, people were divided into two distinct 
camps.” 
 
Another factor regarding communication was the communication of why the deal was 
done. It was deemed crucial for job related self-esteem to know why the old parent 
wanted to sell. It is important for integration and daily operations how you see yourself.  
 
“It could have sped up the integration if we had come to the new organization more 
confidently as a result of knowing that were acquired because we were good.” 
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Figure 5. Summary of the operational problems in the case integration 
4.2 Sales function 
The results related to the sales function follow three major themes: power relations, re-
sponsibilities and lack of proactivity. The sales function is the basis for the operations 
function and therefore vital for the revenue development of the company. The sales func-
tion ensures that the employees will have work to deal with also during the integration 
and is the one variable in the function affecting the revenue development of the company 
during PMI phase. As already suggested earlier, companies often experience a dip in 
the value of the combined entity during the integration due to suboptimal performance 
(Vester 2002). Problems in the sales function can contribute to this dip as sales devel-
opment is a crucial part of the revenue generation and thus company valuation. There-
fore, analyzing this business process is central when discussing about the deal perfor-
mance of a company.  
In the case company however, no major difficulties regarding sales took place. Vice 
versa, the quality of sales was deemed to have improved as described by one employee. 
 
Operations
• Tools
• Bad internet connection
• Trapped with 2 computers and emails
• Delayed IT systems access
• No access to information and 
documents
• Inferior management system
• Heterogenous hardware and software 
between project team members 
à hard to work together in joint 
projects
• Tools not supporting change
• Education
• Physical isolation and no peer support
• Information came from far
• Communication problems
• Information was too fragmented
• Long gaps
• The communication of why’s 
lacked à frustration, uncertainty, 
resistance to change
• The timing of IT-system trainings failed
• Orderliness and red line lacked
• Physical Isolation and new facilities
• Symbolic value
• Slows down learning and adaptation to 
the new culture
• Creates uncertainty and feeds rumour 
mills
• Creates us-them division
• Lack of peer-support
• Atmosphere
• Frustration and uncertainty induced 
closing up and protests.
• Bad atmosphere and bitterness                 
à employee exits
• The potential of symbolism was not 
effectively utilized
• Inferior communication degraded 
atmosphere
• No communication regarding why the 
old parent sold. 
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“The sales function became significantly more professional as a result of the acquisi-
tion. It is better directed and organized now.” 
 
Naturally, integration puts a strain on every employee and there are more things to take 
care of than usually due to various training events and other appointments that require 
immediate attention. It was said that there was sometimes not enough time to devote on 
sales. Yet there was also help available for sales in most of the business units from the 
assistants. However, the existence of this help was not acknowledged in all the business 
units referring to a lack of information transfer or inadequate communications. However, 
this was not perceived as a major problem as the help was found when it was needed. 
Also, the responsibilities and roles of the business unit and project managers regarding 
the offers were a bit unclear at the beginning as the culture and policies regarding send-
ing out bids were different in the acquired company than at the acquirer. In one unit this 
was complicated even further as the business unit manager was unclear due to a de-
layed publishing of the new organization.  
 
”Because we did not know which one of us formally leads the business unit, it was un-
clear who should sign the offers and send them to the clients.” 
 
It is important also at the sales function level to communicate the responsibilities and 
policies clearly to all relevant parties while establish clarity regarding the roles of the 
people. What is more, the organization and the people in it should be made to conform 
with the policies of the acquirer. In the case acquisition, there were business units where 
there was only one or few people with the project manager title. Yet the policies of the 
acquirer require an employee with the project manager title for every project to complete 
predetermined responsibilities. As a result, the people with project manager titles in these 
business units were flooded with the responsibilities. Hence, the resources needed to 
run the sales function were insufficient and either promotions, resource additions or ad-
justments to the policies should have been made to achieve a balanced workload for the 
people involved in the integration.  
 
“I was and still am a project manager in a project that I know nothing about. I just send 
the bills.” 
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“In the whole business unit there was only one project manager. As a result of the inte-
gration there was a huge number of projects that had to be founded, ongoing projects 
that had to be billed and many project evaluations that had to be done monthly. For a 
few months we were rolling our eyes and wondering how we should handle that mass.” 
 
Another factor that formed into a limiting factor regarding marketing integration was the 
lack of marketing material. There was no marketing material available before requesting 
for it. Yet, it was deemed important that this material would have been given proactively 
by the acquirer as the managers felt like they did not realize to request for it in time as 
they did not know it existed. This would have helped with the sales process as well as 
the customer relations management. Therefore, it is suggested that marketing material 
would be provided more proactively by the acquirer in order to secure the high quality of 
sales operations. 
 
“All the marketing material that we have so far received had to be requested. But we 
didn’t understand to request it at first as we didn’t have any insight into what’s availa-
ble.” 
 
Based on the research, the reasons for the setbacks in profitability in case of the case 
company are to a great extent explained by the undone hour documentations and un-
billed hours and time-consuming trainings that took away time from the daily operations. 
It was also stated, that the co-operation negotiations stop the company completely thus 
affecting the revenue development. It was stated that postponing the co-operation nego-
tiations to a later time increased uncertainty and job insecurity. It was concluded that the 
co-operation negotiations should have been done immediately after the deal in case they 
were necessary. What is more regarding the revenue dip, it was suspected that there 
might have been problems when transferring the projects from the ERP system due to 
different basis of calculation thus resulting in write-offs. Also, machine investments and 
paying out balances as well as potential failure in releasing the provisions could explain 
the dip in revenue instead of the problems in the sales function.  
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Figure 6. Summary of the sales-related problems in the case integration 
4.3 Management function 
The management level consideration has been divided into two parts: top management 
and middle management. The results related to the top management function are divided 
into five different themes: slow integration speed, emplopyee exits, inadequate re-
sources, leadership vacuum and missing integration plan. The results in the middle man-
agement level are divided into four themes: power relations, crucial people-decisions, 
organizational chart as well as communication and information availability.   
4.3.1 Top management 
The most apparent problem surfaced in the interviews that was mentioned by several 
middle- and top-level managers was that the integration proceeded too slowly. This was 
well described by two managers:  
 
“During the spring nothing really happened. I think the long time was a problem. The 
integration took too long.” 
 
 “We were in a limbo for too long.” 
 
It is evident that the integration speed being too slow caused various problems and plenty 
of uncertainty. However, it is vital to find the reasons why this was the case regarding 
the integration speed. The major reasons that were discovered in the research are key 
manager commitment and shortfalls in integration plan and roadmap creation.  
Sales
• Too little time available for sales.
• Unclarity in responsibilities and roles regarding bids.
• Insufficient manager resources to match the requirements of the 
acquirer regarding project management responsibilities.
• No marketing material given proactively.
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One of the most significant problems in the integration was the fact that the people man-
aging the whole company and the integration left the company. The situation was de-
scribed as follows: 
 
“When I first time met them, I realized that these people are exhausted. You could see 
they were working long hours” 
 
“I realized that the key group of three people was overly loaded. They left for winter hol-
idays, one for two weeks and one for three weeks and the CEO disappeared after the 
holidays. Nobody answered my emails or the phone.” 
 
The exit of the key managers leading the integration caused various problems and was 
one of the biggest factors leading to the slowdown of integration. Decisions were not 
made as the CEO and HR manager were on holidays due to too much work. And after 
the holidays the CEO and HR manager both left the company. There was a long time 
during which mails and phone calls were not answered by them and the exit of these 
people from the company caused a lag in the integration process. The situation was 
described as follows by the former CEO of the acquired company.  
 
“The leadership of the acquirer was disorganized. That was reflected in the fact that 
there were no decisions made and things did not progress. It wasn’t before the begin-
ning of September that the integration really began after the organization chart was 
published.” 
 
This disorder was stated to be the most crucial factor leading to the slowdown of integra-
tion according to the former CEO of the acquired company. Also the relationships within 
the management seemed to be infected and this also caused disorganization within the 
management based on the interviews. It is also good to put the acquisition into context. 
Just one month before the acquisition the same company had acquired another com-
pany. And 1,5 years before another one which was described to still live a life of its own.  
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“They took a big bite. They had just one month before the case acquisition acquired 
company X and also 1,5 years back company Y which is still today living a life of its 
own.” 
 
This reflects the long-term stress that the managers had been under. Based on the re-
search it is suggested that in the future a facilitator should be hired to help with the ac-
quisition integration. This is in line with Ashkenas et al. (1998) who suggest that integra-
tion should be recognized as a full-time job. There are many other multinational compa-
nies that have a team exclusively dedicated for M&A activity such as Daikin Industries 
just to name one.   
Another issue that resulted from the key employee exit was the creation of leadership 
vacuum. The situation was described as follows:  
 
”The key people who were responsible for taking over the employees left and the 
things came to a halt. The responsibility to integrate was transferred to lower organiza-
tional levels as well as the CFO” 
 
This demonstrates that the responsibility of the acquisition was moved to the line man-
agers, with no understanding and no prior experience of integrating companies. There 
was no vision coming for the acquisition from above. It is suggested based on the data 
that defining the vision and communicating it can be used to speed up integration. This 
suggests that leadership vacuum was formed between the top management and the 
middle management. 
Another issue that caused leadership vacuum to take place was the fact that the deal 
was done and managed in a centralized manner from country X. Also the due diligence 
was partially conducted there. After the deal was done, Finland was informed that it is 
done. Based on the interviews, there was a lack of understanding about the acquired 
entity. This was also caused by restricted access to information. A case in point describ-
ing the importance of understanding more about the company that is being bought is the 
failure of one of the business units of the acquired company, where differences in man-
agement cultures sparked the failure of the unit. By recognizing this pre-deal would have 
helped to prevent this from happening.   
Another issue that was recognized in the interviews is the fact that an integration plan 
was missing. This is among one of the most serious problems surfaced in the interviews 
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that negatively affected PMI and deal performance. There was no integration plan done 
pre-deal, but one was started to be made after the deal was published. The situation was 
described as follows by the former CEO of the acquired company.  
 
“They didn’t have a plan. They started to come up with the integration plan only when 
the deal was done. That job had been left undone.” 
 
Another manager simply stated that “the roadmap was missing”. Not having this plan 
ready after publishing the deal caused the integration to get delayed while causing un-
certainty among the employees. This was reflected in the disorderliness of communica-
tion and trainings. As timing is important for the communication, the integration and com-
munication plan would have been essential. The red line in the execution and processes 
was missing. In addition, the lack of a plan had numerous negative effects on the oper-
ations. For example, the necessary material and tools were not always available. Many 
employees also experienced that the presentation of a roadmap or integration schedule 
would have helped to prepare for the integration and reduce uncertainty and frustration 
within the employees. Having a plan would also have made it possible to execute faster 
as decisions could have been made in faster, easier and more organized manner. This 
would have allowed the dip in revenue to be decreased and the everyday activities to 
start. The plan was also deemed important, as it helps to create schedules and stick to 
the schedules. Sticking to the schedules is crucial in order to create trust towards the 
management among the employees.  
 
“We do project management for a living and this was one good example of how a pro-
ject is not managed. It is necessary to have a plan about what to do and to execute it 
systematically.” 
 
The plan should include the workload division and the people responsible for each divi-
sion. Everything should be planned and put into a form of a checklist as suggested in the 
interviews. It was proposed in the interviews, that the lack of a roadmap and integration 
plan slowed down integration. Parts of the integration were even left undone. It was con-
cluded that having an integration plan and communicating it to the people would have 
increased integration speed and thus reduced uncertainty and frustration among the 
workforce. It was also suggested, the employees of the acquired case company should 
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be used in the future acquisitions to help with the onboarding plan creation and to point 
out thoughts that the integration arises in the masses in order to prevent employee turn-
over. 
4.3.2 Middle management 
When moving to the middle management function, many issues regarding power rela-
tions emerged. One of the most crucial issues that came up in numerous interviews was 
the importance of publishing the organizational chart. The power relations were de-
scribed as follows by two different interviewed people. 
 
“It took long, it wasn’t before autumn when the organization was published.” 
 
“The foreman relations were in disorder for a long time, approximately 10 months.” 
 
In one unit there was uncertainty which person would lead the unit. This resulted in un-
certainty within the employees and the managers. The manager described the situation 
well:  
 
“The organization was published in November; this was not fast enough. It could have 
been dealt with earlier. It was both for me and person X a time of uncertainty.” 
 
The fact that the power relations were not clear complicated the internal operations of 
the company. Also the co-operation negotiations necessary for the organizational chart 
formation were delayed, and it was concluded that these critical and uncertainty arising 
events should have been taken care of as soon as possible in order to minimize uncer-
tainty among the employees. As a result of the delay the human integration did not take 
place. It was described well by the manager.  
 
”There were clearly my subordinates and the subordinates of person X.” 
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The new organization should have been formed sooner. It was discovered based on the 
interviews that establishing power structures early can increase the speed of human in-
tegration. This is mainly due to the fact that the publishment of the organization chart 
decreased the uncertainty among the workforce as they saw their place in the new or-
ganization. Before that the closeup of people took place due to sustained uncertainty.  
 
“Ideal situation is that when you buy a company you immediately present the new or-
ganization.” 
 
Also communication was found to be crucial for the middle management function. As 
middle managers are the ones to transfer the information from the top management to 
the subordinates, these managers are the middlemen who the subordinates come to with 
questions. Yet, they often do not have answers to these questions as the information has 
not been given to them from the top management. It was suggested in the interviews, 
that more information should have been given to the middle managers. Right now, the 
middle managers received the same information as everybody else, yet it was deemed 
important that they would have had more information to better answer the questions of 
the subordinates and promote the integration in the best way possible. It would have 
been important to gain a better understanding of the integration situation at the middle 
management level. Giving more information to the middle managers was also found to 
increase the integration speed as that way the atmosphere of frustration could have been 
alleviated as there would have been someone close with more answers. This could have 
also improved the result of the integration.  
 
Figure 7. Summary of the management-related problems in the case integration  
 
Management
• Top-Management Level
• Too slow execution
• Key-employee exits
• No sufficient resources available relative to the context
• Leadership vacuum
• Communication of the vision and roadmap to the vision was not sufficient
• Not understanding enough of the acquired company
• No integration plan made predeal (reason between many operational level problems)
• Roadmap was missing
• Middle-Management Level
• Leadership vacuum
• Unclear power relations
• Delayed publishment of the organizational chart
• Not enough information given to the middle-managers
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5. DISCUSSION 
This section is devoted to discussion based on the theory and results part of the research 
and aims to discuss the results in the light of the empirical data. The results of chapter 5 
are reflected on the goals and research questions of the research as well as the literature 
review in chapter 2. Figure 8 summarizes chapter 2 into a framework for synergy reali-
zation. 
 
Figure 8. Recipe for synergy realization 
The discussion is structured based on the business function view adopted in the results 
chapter. The discussion chapter also establishes recommendations and guidelines for 
the managers engaging in PMI activity in order to maximize integration speed and deal 
performance. As a reminder for the reader, the research questions defined in the begin-
ning are  
1. What integration problems are typical for a PBO management, sales and opera-
tions functions and what are their effects on deal performance? 
2. How can integration linked problems in different business functions be fixed with 
different PMI best practices in order to improve deal performance? 
3. What are the determinants of integration speed i.e. what things help or prevent 
the integration from moving forward and that way affect deal performance. 
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The first research question is answered in the results part of the research. The summary 
of the discussion part builds on this research question while answering the second and 
third research questions.  
5.1 Operations 
At the operations level, four general challenges were faced concerning tools, physical 
isolation and support, education as well as atmosphere. Whether the problem regarding 
tools was related to bad internet connection, being trapped with two computers and 
emails, not having access to the IT systems and material or not having compatible tools 
with other project team members, they all caused problems in company operations and 
therefore acted as obstacles for achieving the state of business as usual. This state of 
business as usual is the status quo and the goal of integration as described by Jemison 
& Sitkin (1986). In addition to causing extra strain and affecting the integration climate, 
these problems also have many direct implications on the integration speed.  
First of all, the empirical data in operational business function context suggests that not 
having access to the relevant tools such as IT systems, material or hardware lead to 
difficulties in joint projects, i.e. in projects where both acquirer and acquired company 
employees were present. This was due to the fact that the IT systems and hardware 
between the project members were different. These tool-related problems have also 
been addressed in the literature review. As suggested by Ashkenas et al. (1998) related 
to the leadership and managing cultural differences CSFs, making the employees work 
together on projects yielding quick results is a powerful tool that can be used to promote 
learning, demonstrate the benefits of the acquisition, increase cultural integration and 
increase integration speed. What is more, Ranft & Lord (2002) recognize in the commu-
nications part of the literature review the importance of mixing up the teams for commu-
nication and increasing the two-way flow of knowledge which results in better under-
standing of the situation, i.e. reciprocal understanding and therefore facilitates the inte-
gration. Having tools that allow this process to take place on the operational level is 
therefore a prerequisite for cultural integration, learning, reciprocal understanding and 
human integration and is hence essential for PMI success. This is also in line with 
Jemison & Haspeslagh (1991, pp. 113–114) who suggest that working together is 
deemed essential for the synergy realization. Hence the availability of tools is also linked 
to the integration speed. When reflecting the empirical data to the communication, man-
aging cultural differences and leadership CSFs, the research arrives at proposition num-
ber one.  
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Proposition 1: Having the tools relevant for everyday project work is a prerequisite for 
working together on everyday business problems. Establishing joint projects yielding 
quick results facilitates two-way flow of knowledge, demonstrates the benefits of the ac-
quisition and promotes learning and human integration thus increasing the overall inte-
gration speed and deal performance.  
 
Second factor related to the tools part of operations function is related to the delayed 
access to IT systems that caused the change measures taken to be ineffective. Based 
on the empirical data, the project managers and other team members could not access 
the system or had not learned how to use them. Yet, the organization expected them to 
change their behavior to conform with the policies of the acquirer, as this would be a 
necessary step regarding integration. However, without having tools to respond to the 
required change, no change can be implemented. Therefore, not having the tools re-
quired to conform to the change formed into a limiting factor regarding change measures 
and worked as an obstacle for acculturation. Acculturation is the process of cultural inte-
gration as described by Nahavandi & Malekzadeh (1988) and is an essential part of 
managing cultural differences CSF. What is more, based on the interview data old ways 
of acting are promoted if the tools do not support the new consensus hence meaning 
that the rate of learning slows down. As recognized in the value creation part of the 
literature review, decrease in the learning rate decreases the integration speed and deal 
performance because reciprocal understanding is deemed essential for the synergy re-
alization as suggested by Jemison & Haspeslagh (1991, pp. 111–112). Also the leader-
ship CSF addresses the issue of preserving old ways of working. According to Olie 
(1994) people tend to preserve their old ways of working which is a major obstacle for 
integration. Therefore, it can be derived that not having access to relevant tools slows 
down integration as planned change measures cannot be implemented, acculturation is 
prevented and as the rate of learning is decreased. Based on the empirical data and the 
value creation, managing cultural differences and leadership principles the research ar-
rives at proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2. Not having tools that support change decreases integration speed and 
deal performance as old ways of working are preserved, acculturation is prevented and 
learning as well as the effectiveness of change measures are decreased. Therefore, it is 
essential to ensure the availability of tools that support change.  
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Based on the data related to the moveout theme of the operations function, the timing of 
moving out from the old office was found to be critical for the success of integration as 
staying too long in the old office can cause many problems reflected at the operational 
level. Moving out from the office was found to have a symbolic value, affect the rate of 
the learning process as well as uncertainty and work identity of the employees. The delay 
of moving to a new office from the old parent company facilities resulted in minimal in-
teraction, i.e. communication between the acquirer and acquired company employees, 
as the entities were physically separated and as the clearance to enter the office was 
extremely hard to get. Yet the interaction is essential for integration success as recog-
nized by Bresman et al. (1999) and Birkinshaw et al. (2000) in relation to the communi-
cation CSF. The delay of moving out was stated to have slowed down the exposure to 
the new culture and ways of working as well as the human integration. Based on the 
research it was concluded that exposure to the new corporate culture earlier and com-
munication about it would have increased the integration speed. In addition, it was also 
suggested that communicating the principles and practices in a clearer and less decen-
tralized manner would have increased the integration speed. These are in line with the 
views of Jemison & Haspeslagh (1991, pp. 111–112) presented in the value creation part 
of the literature review as exposure to new culture and ways of working promote the 
creation of reciprocal organizational understanding and thus the transfer of strategic ca-
pabilities e.g. the synergy realization. This is also backed up by many scholars who state 
that communication is considered to be critical to integration success (Schweiger & Den-
isi 1991; Inkpen et al. 2000; Ranft & Lord 2002; Vester 2002) as recognized in the com-
munication CSF part of the literature review.  
Moving fast to the new facilities was also deemed a factor affecting uncertainty. People 
want to know where they will be working and therefore making the change fast will min-
imize the uncertainty and the effect of rumour mills while increasing the willingness to 
learn and improving the spreading of information within the organization. As recognized 
related to the integration speed CSF, uncertainty is one of the most corrosive factors to 
PMI success (Angwin 2004) and that reducing this time of uncertainty is beneficial for 
the integration (Vester 2002; Angwin 2004). The results suggest that questions and 
worst-case scenarios caused by uncertainty slow down integration as the willingness 
and motivation to learn decrease. As identified in the value creation section of the theo-
retical background, the willingness to learn is key to the formation of reciprocal under-
standing and is together with the willingness to work together required for synergy reali-
zation (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, pp. 113–114). It was also concluded that similar to 
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moving out fast, a proper management system would have helped the integration by 
making it easier to absorb new practices and policies and learn about the culture of the 
new parent company. As suggested by Jemison & Haspeslagh (1991, pp. 111–112) in 
the value creation part of the literature review, absorbing and learning about the other 
company helps to promote reciprocal understanding and thus facilitate integration. 
Based on the synthesis of the empirical data and the support from the integration speed 
CSF and value creation parts of the literature review, the research arrives at the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 3. Moving out fast from the old parent company facilities and increased ex-
posure to the new culture and ways of working increase integration speed and deal per-
formance by decreasing uncertainty and the effect of rumour mills, by increasing the 
willingness and motivation to learn and by increasing the spreading of information in the 
organization.  
 
Related to the education and support theme, it can be stated that actions promoting 
learning help to achieve this reciprocal understanding and this way speed up integration. 
This is based on the view of Jemison & Haspeslagh (1991, pp. 111–112) who state in 
the value creation part of the literature review that reciprocal understanding is needed 
for synergy realization and that learning is essential part in the creation of this under-
standing. In the results it was suggested that if there would have been a person at the 
same office that could have helped with the practical issues and questions, the integra-
tion speed could have been increased as learning would have taken place faster. This 
way also the people would be made to work together thus promoting integration based 
on Jemison & Haspeslagh (1991, pp. 113–114). This is also in line with the view of 
Bresman et al. (1999) who suggest linked to the communication CSF that the amount of 
communication and visits or meetings can be regarded as a facilitator of knowledge 
transfer thus promoting the transfer of capabilities. Also, the fact that information comes 
from close is suggested to increase integration speed based on the empirical data as the 
information is easier to adopt. This view receives support from Schweiger et al. (1993) 
who suggests in the communication CSF part of the literature review that the credibility 
of the source where the information is received increases the effectiveness of communi-
cation. Both these views come down to the availability of peer-support. Based on the 
empirical analysis, having the peer support and working in the same facilities, or even 
just sending someone over to help with the assignment at the first time it falls due, would 
91 
 
promote learning and reduced the amount of waste hours while also speeding up inte-
gration. This view is in line with the buddy-programme practice introduced in connection 
with the communication CSF. Cisco uses a buddy programme to integrate its acquisitions 
(Papadakis 2007) as this method provides a credible source of information, peer support 
an promotes learning. It is recommended, that in the future a similar programme would 
also be considered at the acquiring company. Based on the interview data as well as the 
previously mentioned communication and value creation related principles, the research 
arrives at proposition 4.  
 
Proposition 4. Ensuring peer support from the acquirer employees in everyday opera-
tional challenges and trainings promotes learning and increases integration speed. 
Therefore, establishing a buddy-programme and moving to the same facilities as soon 
as possible has the potential to increase integration speed and improve deal perfor-
mance.  
 
One of the biggest problems regarding the operations function is related to the problems 
in the IT integration. The timing of the trainings was deemed essential for the educational 
outcome, and failure to achieve the educational goals was to a great extent explained by 
not having access to the IT systems as well as the delivery method of the trainings. The 
fact that there was no guiding from hand and no access to the systems in order to play 
around with them slowed down integration as the effectiveness of the trainings was 
suboptimal. There should have been IT system access before starting the trainings 
based on the interview data. This view is supported by the literature review. The path-
dependency of the events has been recognized in the integration speed part of the re-
search suggesting that the order in which PMI measures are implemented affects the 
success of the integration (Gomes et al. 2013). Trainings are also an integral part of the 
HR management CSF and they are needed for example to transform tacit knowledge 
into explicit knowledge and to promote integration (Weber et al. 2012). It was also sug-
gested related to the HR management CSF, that the adoption of various training methods 
promotes PMI (Nikandrou & Papalexandris 2007). Due to not having access to the IT 
systems the training methods were limited to following presentations. Based on the em-
pirical data, the effect of communication could be increased when one could try to do the 
assignment themselves and would have immediate feedback on the result. This is in line 
with the previously presented support from the literature review. It is also important to 
understand, that facilitating the learning process would also increase the integration 
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speed based on the view of Jemison & Haspeslagh (1991, pp. 111–112) as introduced 
in the value creation part of the literature review. The synthesis of the empirical data with 
the value creation, integration speed and HR management parts of the literature review 
is presented in proposition 5. 
 
Proposition 5. Master the timing game for efficient integration and increased investment 
effectiveness. Timing the IT integration and the trainings so that IT system access is 
granted before the trainings while ensuring peer support at the trainings improves learn-
ing, increases integration speed and promotes deal performance.  
 
Before any capabilities can be transferred i.e. synergies realized the right atmosphere 
needs to be created (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, pp. 110–111) as concluded in the 
value creation section of this research. However, many things can disturb this atmos-
phere. Many events, such as not having access to material or not knowing how to use 
the IT systems caused frustration and lack of motivation resulting in protests. Things 
were done wrong intentionally, and the quality of the work-output was at times de-
creased. There were also wrinkles in the billing caused by the tantrums. Based on the 
data, the factors that caused frustration and tantrums as well as protests decreased the 
speed of integration. This is in line with Jemison & Haspeslagh (1991, pp. 113–114) who 
state that willingness to work together is needed for synergy realization as it is essential 
for the transfer of capabilities as concluded in the value creation part of the study. Yet 
frustration and uncertainty lead to uncooperative behavior that slowed down integration. 
The importance of the integration climate on the integration speed can be understood 
even better after taking a look at the results stating that the changing of the titles and 
positions to conform with the acquirer organization together with a few other issues 
caused 57% of the employees to leave the company in one specific unit fueling uncer-
tainty in the remaining employees as well. This describes how certain actions taken af-
fected the atmosphere to such a great extent that the willingness to work together was 
reduced to such a low level that people decided to leave the company thus negatively 
affecting the transfer of capabilities. These views are in line with the leadership CSF 
related views of Ashkenas et al. (1998) who state that uncertainty can be detrimental for 
the PMI success as it drains value from the acquisition. Also the cultural clashes can be 
detrimental for the overall deal performance as they have the potential to disrupt the 
functioning of the newly formed organization (Buono et al. 1985) as recognized in the 
managing cultural differences part of the research. HR practices are vital in controlling 
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these clashes via different ways, such as training programmes, workshops (Marks, Mir-
vis 2011) and communication (Weber et al. 2012). Based on the results and the theoret-
ical reflection related to HR management, leadership and value creation, proposition 6 
is formed.  
 
Proposition 6: Problems that affect the integration climate negatively e.g. by establishing 
uncertainty, frustration, anger or bitterness indirectly increase the risk of arising problems 
and this way indirectly slow down the integration speed and cause permanent loss in 
deal value and thus reduce the deal performance. These integration climate related is-
sues should be addressed with HR practices such as training, workshops and commu-
nication.   
 
Based on the results, the symbolic factors such as new working clothes and business 
cards are crucial for creating the culture and are integral part of the integration plan as 
these factors are also central for the formation of job identity. It was found that for exam-
ple business cards are important for the development of job identity. Related to the lead-
ership CSF, the desire of people to preserve their previous occupational identity is a 
major obstacle for integration and thus the willingness of employees to fit in is compro-
mised (Olie 1994). This illustrates the importance of the job identity and the small things 
that it comprises of. What is more, symbols such as business cards and new working 
clothes are an important tool for institutional leadership, as institutional leadership aims 
to create a new identity for the new entity and this way increase the transfer of strategic 
capabilities i.e. integration (Olie 1994). Institutional leadership has been found to be es-
sential for the capability transfer process (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, pp. 133–134). 
The little things in the integration matter also according to Bligh (2006). All the previously 
mentioned leadership CSF related points emphasize the importance of leadership 
through symbolism in order to promote PMI success. Based on the empirical data and 
the previously described leadership related principles, the research arrives at proposition 
7. 
 
Proposition 7: Little things do matter. Detaching the people from the previous culture and 
symbolism while promoting the building of new organizational identity increase integra-
tion speed and deal performance.  
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As found out based on the interview data, symbolism does not always come free of 
charge and therefore it is important to reserve slack resources for the PMI process in 
order to more effectively change the corporate culture and effectively integrate the two 
entities. This is in line with views recognized in the value creation part of the theoretical 
background. The slack is vital for capability transfer i.e. the synergy realization. Slack 
resources are also needed for dealing with strategic contingencies and prevents fixation 
on short-term results therefore allowing full concentration on the PMI process. The extra 
resources can also be vital to fight and deal with unanticipated problems thus alleviating 
arising conflicts and improving the PMI process. (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, pp. 115–
116) This is supported by the the leadership part of the research where the importance 
of top-management to reserve enough resource for integration was recognized to be key 
to PMI success. By reflecting the results with the value creation and leadership princi-
ples, proposition 8 is formed.  
 
Proposition 8: Reserving slack resources for the PMI process has the potential to speed 
up integration and increase deal performance.  
 
5.2 Sales 
The sales function faced the least problems during the integration. Problems occurred 
related to power relations, lack of people with a project manager title entitled to take 
responsibility for billing as well as the lack of proactivity in offering the marketing material 
to the acquired company employees. However, these factors were regarded minor and 
it was concluded that there were no significant problems related to sales that would have 
negatively caused the number of projects to drop, the integration to get delayed or the 
deal performance to be decreased. Therefore, it is perceived that there is no need to 
cover these factors any further in the discussion part as the sales function is not in this 
case relevant for the research questions 2 and 3.  
One reason for the sales process to be successful in the integration arises from the fact 
that the acquirer is an international multinational that has a strong and organized sales 
function globally with a lot of support, a global brand and readily available marketing 
material. Also the networks of the acquirer in the target market are extensive and it was 
perceived that there was help available for selling as the function was well organized in 
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the acquired company and as there were sufficient resources reserved for the sales pro-
cess. The availability of support and resources was one of the major reasons differenti-
ating sales function integration from the integration of other business functions and ex-
plaining why sales integration succeeded better than the integration of operations and 
management functions. With these slack resources problems arising in the sales inte-
gration were managed and integration was promoted as a result of increased learning 
through support. Also the synergies from joint networks were realized as a result of the 
availability of support and people dedicated for the sales process. In other words, the 
sales integration is a case in point related to proposition 8 illustrating how the availability 
of resources can be beneficial for the PMI integration. Hence, the research arrives at 
proposition 9.  
Proposition 9. Establishing support and reserving sufficient resources for sales is the key 
for increasing integration speed and improving deal performance.  
5.3 Management 
Among the most important factors that caused a delay in the integration and decrease in 
the deal performance was the fact that the key managers managing the integration and 
the company left the company. The exit of the CEO and the HR manager caused a situ-
ation where leadership was missing, and the management team was disorganized. This 
caused various problems and it contributed to many of the operational level challenges 
listed in chapter 5.1. For example, problems in decision making occurred and the exe-
cution of integration was delayed thus increasing the overall integration time. It was de-
scribed by many interviewed managers that nothing happened and that the integration 
proceeded at a very slow pace. The manager exits also negatively affected communica-
tion as emails and phone calls were not answered and as there was a gap in communi-
cation for the employees. The exits also caused the institutional leadership to vanish. 
According to Jemison & Haspeslagh (1991, pp. 132–135) both institutional and interper-
sonal leadership are needed as recognized in context with the leadership part of the 
literature review. The lack of institutional leadership leads to the decrease in capability 
transfer as the employees tend to retreat to their former behavior thus causing organiza-
tional disruptions due to cultural and identity clashes in addition to reducing cause-effect 
knowledge, the willingness to participate, organizational slack while also decreasing in-
teraction thus hindering integration (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, pp. 133–134). As lead-
ership is a widely acknowledged PMI success factor (Kitching 1967; Jemison & 
Haspeslagh 1991, pp. 132–133, Angwin & Meadows 2009), it is essential to ensure that 
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managementwise critical employees stay within the company. This is in line with An-
slinger & Copeland (1996, pp. 101–104) who suggest that the integration team should 
be highly committed and motivated as recognized in the post-merger integration team 
CSF context. Also Weber (1996) suggests that the lower the commitment of the top man-
agement team, the lower the effectiveness of the integration process and the financial 
performance of the organization. By reflecting the results with the leadership and inte-
gration team principles, proposition 10 is formed.  
 
 
Proposition 10. The retention of key employees managing the integration should be en-
sured at all cost as they are vital for timely decision making and execution of the deal. 
Not doing so will result in slower integration speed and decreased deal performance. 
 
Anslinger et al. (1996, pp. 101–102) suggest that the commitment of the key managers 
can be increased with the right incentive systems in which the managers cannot afford 
to fail. The need for incentives to increase commitment is recognized in the leadership 
part of the literature review. It is also important to put the acquisition to a context. As 
described in the empirical part of the study, the company had recently engaged in other 
deals as well. When taking into account, that the key managers left the company due to 
being overly loaded, it can be deduced that not sufficient resources had been reserved 
for the integrations. As suggested by Ashkenas et al. (1998) in the post-merger integra-
tion team part of the research, it is essential to recognize integration as a full-time job 
and reserve enough resources for it. In the results it was suggested that a facilitator 
should have been hired to help with the integration process. When reflecting the empiri-
cal data to the PMI team and leadership CSFs, the research arrives at proposition 11. 
 
Proposition 11. Integration should be recognized as a full-time job and sufficient re-
sources should be reserved for it in order to increase the integration speed and the deal 
performance.  
 
Another crucial result that caused problems in the integration was the fact that the inte-
gration plan was missing and was started to be made after the deal was announced. As 
the plan was not done predeal, integration delay and uncertainty among the employees 
occurred. There were various negative implications on the operations as the roadmap 
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and orderliness were missing. Based on the results, many people agreed that the lack 
of a roadmap and integration plan slowed down integration. Parts of the integration were 
even left undone. It was concluded that having an integration plan and communicating it 
to the people would have increased integration speed and thus reduced uncertainty and 
frustration among the workforce.  This becomes evident when reflecting the empirical 
data to the to the leadership part of the literature review. As suggested by Ashkenas et 
al. (1998) starting the planning already during the due diligence phase could speed up 
the integration. It is recognized that instead of seeing integration as a discrete phase, 
integration should be seen as a process starting from the very first discussions during 
the due diligence and ending when the two entities have met integration goals. GE Cap-
ital is a case in point of a company that aims to have a head start by starting the planning 
already during the very first discussions. (Ashkenas et al. 1998) Having an integration 
plan is also essential in order for the middle managers to develop the cause-effect un-
derstanding. Without a plan this cause-effect understanding is limited as there is no plan 
that denotes the important aspects of the integration and establishes the way the execu-
tion should take place in order to ensure effective capability transfer. Based on the em-
pirical data and the leadership CSF practices, proposition number 12 is formed. 
 
Proposition 12. PMI should be seen as a process staring from the very first discussions. 
Starting the planning already during due diligence, completing the integration plan al-
ready pre-deal and presenting it to the people immediately after the deal announcement 
speed up integration and improve deal performance.   
  
Based on the empirical data, it is evident that the integration proceeded slowly, and the 
decisions were not made on time. The co-operation negotiations, moveout decisions as 
well as decisions regarding the power relations were not made in a timely manner. Yet 
these decisions are ones that involve the employees at a very personal level and are 
prone to create uncertainty. A case in point was the mood shift of the problem unit where 
57% of the employees left. After deciding about the moveout to a new office, it became 
evident that the job will go on and there is future for the employees in the company. As 
a result, the productivity and atmosphere improved remarkably. This illustrates how mak-
ing these critical people related decisions as fast as possible is a factor that can vastly 
contribute to the atmosphere for capability transfer and speed up integration. This is in 
line with the leadership best practices recognized in the leadership part of the literature 
review. According to Vester (2002) the difficult people decisions should be executed as 
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soon as possible in order to reduce uncertainty and succeed in the integration. Based on 
the empirical data and the leadership part of the literature review, the research arrives at 
proposition 13. 
 
Proposition 13: Execute the difficult people-related decisions as soon as possible to re-
duce uncertainty and increase integration speed as well as deal performance. 
 
Based on the results, the integration was passed to a great extent to the middle manag-
ers as the top management exits took place. The middle managers had no understanding 
and no prior experience of integrating companies. There was no vision coming for the 
acquisition from above. This way leadership vacuum between the top management and 
the middle management took place. It was suggested based on the data that defining 
the vision and communicating it can be used to speed up integration. When reflecting to 
the literature, it can be concluded that the leadership vacuum and lack of vision slowed 
down integration and decreased deal performance. Support for this view can be found 
by considering the concept of atmosphere for capability transfer by Jemison & 
Haspeslagh (1991, pp. 111–117) covered in the value creation part of the literature re-
view concluding that the missing vision coming from above slows down integration speed 
by negatively affecting the reciprocal understanding and as cause-effect understanding 
that is required for the middle managers to proceed with the integration is not estab-
lished. Without the understanding of the purpose of the acquisition and the way the en-
tities can work together, a retreat to former and more familiar behaviors will follow ac-
cording to Jemison & Haspeslagh (1991, pp. 133–134) as recognized in the leadership 
part of the theory. It is also essential to note, that both institutional and interpersonal 
leadership are needed to create the atmosphere for capability transfer and as leadership 
vacuum leads to a situation where institutional leadership disappears, it will also slow 
down integration and the transfer of capabilities. Leadership vacuum at the top manage-
ment level also results in misdirection in leadership both at top and middle management 
levels thus negatively affecting integration. (Jemison & Haspeslagh 1991, pp. 132–135) 
Another factor that caused leadership vacuum was the fact that the deal was managed 
from abroad. The due diligence was partially done in country X and Finland only deliv-
ered information there. That way they had no deeper understanding of the company. 
According to Ashkenas et al. (1998) the due diligence team is the one that has the deep-
est knowledge of the company and the best insight into how the integration should be 
carried out. Therefore, the best person to fit the role of the integration manager and the 
99 
 
integration team are the ones that have served in the due diligence team (Ashkenas et 
al. 1998). When reflecting this to the views of Jemison & Haspeslagh (1991, pp. 111–
112) about integration value creation process, the view is sound with the idea that the 
fact that the deal was partially led from country X reduced the creation of reciprocal un-
derstanding. As described by one of the interviewed people, “they (Finnish division) knew 
nothing”. In the future attention should be paid that leadership vacuum would not take 
place within the international top-level management and the national top-level manage-
ment as well as between the national top-level management and the middle manage-
ment. Based on the empirical data and the value creation, leadership and post-merger 
integration team best practices, propositions 14 and 15 are formed. 
 
Proposition 14. Leadership vacuum and lack of communicating the vision and the route 
to the vision slowed down integration and decreased deal performance. This vacuum 
should be avoided by defining and communicating the vision and road to the vision 
clearly. The integration should not be left completely to the middle managers.  
 
Proposition 15. By including members of the due diligence team in the integration, more 
understanding of the target company could be brought in and this way integration speed 
and deal performance increased. 
 
One more major issue regarding middle management was the unclear nature of power 
relations due to delayed publishing of the new organization. This process took 10 months 
which was deemed too long by many different managers. Due to the delayed publishing 
of the organization, internal operations became more complicated, human integration 
was prevented as a result of camp-formation and uncertainty prevailed. Based on the 
empirical study, the ideal situation would be that the new organization would be pre-
sented immediately when the deal is announced. It was concluded in the interviews that 
establishing power structures early can increase the speed of human integration. The 
importance of publishing the new organization is also described by Tetenbaum (1999) 
according to whom post-merger drift and up to 25-50% drop in productivity can be faced 
when going through a large organizational change as recognized in the integration speed 
part of the literature review. This is because people face psychological shock and be-
come preoccupied with their own self-interests and are thus distracted from work. (Te-
tenbaum 1999) The importance of the organizational chart is also recognized in context 
to the integration speed CSF. In order to be able to effectively work in the new entity, the 
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employees need to know what their role in it is. Until they do know this and feel secure, 
commitment problems are likely to occur. (Tetenbaum 1999) By reflecting the empirical 
data with the leadership and integration speed best practices, the research arrives at 
proposition 16. 
 
Proposition 16. The power structures should be established early and the new organiza-
tion should ideally be presented right after the deal is announced. This way integration 
speed and deal performance can be increased. 
 
Based on the results, more information should have been given to the middle managers. 
Giving more information to the middle managers is proposed to increase the integration 
speed as that way the atmosphere of frustration could have been alleviated as there 
would have been someone close with more answers. This could have also improved the 
result of the integration. This is supported by factors recognized in the communication 
part of the literature review. Huy (2001) states that key to make any implementation work 
is to use the middle manager’s clear and compelling communication in order to spread 
the word and get people on board. Because the middle managers have extensive net-
works within the organization, as they understand and stay attuned to the emotional 
needs of the organization during change thus maintaining the transformation momentum 
and as they manage tensions, middle managers are vital for organizational events re-
quiring change (Huy 2001). They also have exceptional credibility among the employees 
that arises from the fact that middle managers can leverage informal power by utilizing 
friendships networks, trust networks, advice networks and communication networks 
(Pappas et al. 2004). Therefore, it is proposed, that the middle management is a CSF 
for the PMI success. This is to a great extent due to the fact that middle managers pos-
sess a crucial role both for operations as well as communication and as they have a 
unique vision on the organization and its problems as described by Pappas et al.  (2004). 
Based on the empirical data and communication best practices, the research arrives at 
proposition 17.  
 
Proposition 17: Giving more information to the middle managers can be used to promote 
change, increase the spread of information and to alleviate the environment of frustration 
and hence increase integration speed and deal performance.    
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this section the achievement of the objectives, scientific contribution of the work and 
limitations regarding the work are presented. Also topics for further research are sug-
gested. 
6.1 Achieving the objectives 
The objective of this research was (1) to identify typical integration problems for a PBO 
management, sales and operations functions, (2) to identify how integration linked prob-
lems in different business functions can be fixed with different PMI best practices in order 
to improve the deal performance and (3) to provide determinants of integration speed 
i.e. what things help or prevent the integration from moving forward. The research was 
conducted as a case study and therefore the company and the context were described 
in order to set the results into a context. 
At the beginning, the deal performance and value creation processes as well as the PMI 
CSFs are presented as a result of a literature review. In the literature review it was found 
out that there are various general CSFs that can contribute to the PMI success when 
applied appropriately. Yet there is a vast amount of M&A literature concentrating on the 
best practices and the information is deemed fragmented (Gomes et al. 2013). This sec-
tion of the research aims to form a holistic picture into the factors that shape success in 
PMI integration and form a consensus based on the literature review. Also, the effects of 
speed are considered in detail in order to shed light on the advantages that moving fast 
provides. The key outcome of this part is the consensus formed about the CSFs. Based 
on the result, the CSFs can be divided into seven categories: integration strategies, lead-
ership, post-merger integration team, communication, managing cultural change, HR 
management and speed of integration.  
The empirical part of the research comprises of expert interviews. The first significant 
result was the establishment of operations, sales and management related problems in 
the case acquisition. These problems are summarized in figures 5, 6 and 7. In general, 
it can be concluded that the operational problems were linked to four categories; tools, 
moveout, education and support as well as atmosphere.  In case of the sales function, 
the major result is that there were no major problems regarding sales that would have 
affected the integration speed or deal performance negatively. However, most crucial 
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problems in regard to the case integration were related to the management function. 
Various problems occurred both at top management and middle management levels. 
When analyzing the data, it was aimed to keep at the context and therefore coding and 
categorizing data as well as summarization were used to draw conclusions from the data.   
After this, the results were discussed by drawing connections between the literature re-
view and the empirical data. A consensus of the factors affecting integration speed and 
about the actions that should have been taken were established successfully. As a result, 
17 propositions were formed addressing the problem related to the business function 
and the effect of that problem on the integration speed and deal performance. These 
propositions work as a solution to how integration related problems can be solved based 
on the PMI CSFs and the empirical data in order to increase integration speed and deal 
performance. This way all the research questions are answered. It can be concluded, 
that the research succeeded in answering the research questions and thus reached the 
objectives.  
6.2 Scientific contribution 
This research answers the call for research by Angwin & Vaara (2005), Homburg & Bu-
cerius (2006), Gomes et al. (2013) and Bauer & Matzler (2014) to create linkages be-
tween different CSFs of the integration process and to determine factors affecting the 
integration speed. In addition to previously mentioned, the research also answers the 
call of (Bauer & Matzler 2014) to provide determinants of integration speed that has been 
stated to be broadly neglected in literature. What is more, the M&A literature has been 
deemed fragmented and lacking connectedness (Gomes et al. 2013). This work aims to 
unify the literature by conducting a literature review on M&A CSFs. The connectedness 
of the literature is increased by applying these practices to a case context in order to 
create understanding of the effects of individual research outcomes on the integration 
speed and deal performance in the case environment.  
This study is among the first ones to adopt the cross-sectional view across all relevant 
business functions in a PBO and thus provides a new viewpoint for the M&A literature. 
This view is particularly beneficial to better understand the problems arising at the busi-
ness function level. This adds more concreteness into the research and therefore pro-
vides a different viewpoint to the factors contributing to the success of PMI. What is more, 
the M&A literature tends to be very generic when it comes to organizational types and is 
thus lacking the PBO context. This distinction between different organizational types is 
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essential as different types of organizations have different business functions and there-
fore different integration related problems. This research thus provides a better context 
for the results thus increasing the relevance and accuracy of the findings for PBO’s spe-
cifically.  
In addition to contributing to the performance perspective of the acquisition integration, 
this study also has a significant social contribution. M&A result in plenty of strain for the 
people involved in it. However, the work takes into account the people as a factor that is 
critical to the PMI success. This research carries a deep social impact as a result of the 
interpretivist research strategy and interviews of the employees involved in the acquisi-
tion integration. This way the research links the human side of mergers to the PMI best 
practices. This social aspect to acquisition integration has been often neglected in the 
literature, yet the importance of human capital for PMI success cannot be denied.  
6.3 Limitations 
As every research, also this one has a set of limitations that need to be taken into account 
when examining the results. The most significant limitations are linked to the generaliza-
tion of the results as well as the limitations caused by the interview method that was used 
as the main source of data collection.  
The research was conducted as a semi-structured interview of 9 people holding a posi-
tion at the middle or top management level. The most evident restriction to the results is 
the small sample size. Most of these people worked at different business units and there-
fore had their own story to tell. By listening to a greater number of stories from the same 
business units, the accuracy of the data as well as more accurate analysis could have 
been attained. Also the participant observation has the potential to improve the interpre-
tation of the results. However, the fact that the observations have taken place over the 
years and have not been documented is a major limitation for the study reducing the 
transparency of the analysis.  
The fact that there is only one case deal under study and that the organizational and 
deal context are strictly defined allow a deep and case-specific consideration of the topic. 
In the light of the prevailing literature, the results of the research can be regarded valid. 
However, generalizing them possesses a danger as the findings are specific to the case 
organization and might not apply in every other case. Therefore, the results should be 
considered relevant to a PBO with similar organizational and operational intentions and 
a similar acquisition target. As the organizational culture as well as numerous other rea-
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sons including the acquired company size affect the challenges and nature of the inte-
gration, the results should be applied critically and case specifically. Another factor re-
stricting the generalization of the findings is that the case acquisition is a domestic ac-
quisition. Therefore, the relevance might not be as good in an international context as 
the challenges faced in such a context are different. Also, the integration strategy type in 
question is absorption acquisition, which limits the findings to the absorption acquisition 
context. 
It is also important to note, that the research relies on the capabilities-based view on PMI 
value creation. Therefore, it studies the integration speed and deal performance relative 
to the capability transfer i.e. synergy realization. Yet this is only one way to define the 
goals and progress on an integration and therefore other measures could be formulated 
as well to perfect the integration speed and deal performance.  
6.4 Reliability and validity 
The nature of the interviews causes certain limitations for the credibility of the results, 
i.e. reliability and validity of the data. According to Saunders (2009, p. 156) reliability 
refers to the degree to which your data collection techniques produce consistent findings 
i.e. how likely other researchers would arrive in the same conclusion based on the data 
collection methods. The reliability of the research was aimed to be maximized by de-
scribing the data collection method in great detail in chapter 3.3. Also the participant bias 
is relevant to the topic. Integration causes many problems, many of which might be 
deemed delicate in nature. Therefore, there is a risk that the interviewed people might 
not say their honest opinion, but rather reply as they believe their managers would want 
them to. This restriction was tried to be minimized by stating it very clearly at the begin-
ning of the interview, that the interview can be conducted anonymously in case the par-
ticipant prefers so. Strict measures concerning data handling and sharing the content of 
the interviews were followed to ensure the quality of the data. 
Another factor affecting the reliability of the research is the observer error. Due to the 
semi-structured nature of the interviews, the interviews were relatively laid back and the 
questions were asked slightly differently in different interviews due to the contextual re-
quirements set by the discussion. This negatively affects the repeatability i.e. the relia-
bility of the research and might lead into slightly different understanding of the question 
and thus distorted answers. What is more relevant for an interview though, is the ob-
server bias. According to Saunders et al. (2009, pp. 156–157) observer bias refers to 
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how the answers have been interpreted. As the interviews are based on subjective inter-
pretation of the researcher, there is a risk that a bias due to biased interpretation will take 
place. This implies that another researcher might thus end up having a different interpre-
tation of the same piece of data. The observer error and observer bias were tried to make 
transparent by transcribing the interviews in order to increase the transparency of data 
and this way the reliability of the research. However, it is important to note that the inter-
viewer has been working for a longer time in the organization which might increase the 
observer bias. What is more, the fact that the interviews were conducted face-to-face or 
via Skype or phone might have added to the risk of misinterpretations, as body-language 
related context was lost in Skype and phone interviews. The observer bias was ad-
dressed by asking clarifying questions and concluding during the interviews what had 
been said and asking whether the way the explanation had been interpreted was correct 
according to the person interviewed. Also the number of interviews done reduces the risk 
of faulty interpretations. 
The validity describes if the findings are actually what they appear to be about (Saunders 
et al. 2009, p. 157). In this research, a major factor affecting the validity of the results 
was the risk of hidden agendas within the interviewed managers. In case the interviewed 
people believed, that the interview would somehow disbenefit them or in case there 
would have been hidden political agendas, the results might have been distorted due to 
that reason. This limitation was addressed by stating that the interviews could be con-
ducted individually and anonymously if the participant so wanted, and by selecting the 
interviewed managers in cooperation with the top management team of the company 
who personally knew the interviewed people and could tell whether there are hidden 
agendas or ulterior motives. The strict predetermined criteria set for candidate selection 
is a measure taken to address the validity of the research. What is more, the relationship 
between the interviewer and the interviewed people was secured not to interfere as the 
interviewee works in a different independent department and therefore has no direct links 
to the interviewed people that could result in biases in the interview answers or the inter-
pretation. 
Observer error and observer bias arising from the subjective interpretation of the results 
by the researcher can cause misinterpretations and therefore decrease the validity and 
applicability of the results. This validity related issue was addressed by triangulation. 
According to Creswell & Miller (2000), triangulation is a validity procedure that can be 
used to increase the validity of the research. In this research, the findings from a literature 
review comprising of many different works utilizing different theories, researchers and 
types of data were compared together to form a consensus on the theory and later on 
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the findings from the interviews were reflected and tested against this literature. What is 
more, the results were also run through and discussed with the top management team 
of the company and they all received acceptance and were seen to be truthful, valid and 
relevant to the case.  
Even though triangulation was used to increase the validity of the research, it is essential 
to note that the new findings in this research are a subject for researcher bias. As a result 
of subjective interpretations and conclusions of the researcher made based on the inter-
views and the conducted literature review, the risk of the findings being biased exists. 
What is more, the groupings of the results were formed subjectively by the researcher. 
As a result, the benefits of triangulation are limited as the method can only be used to 
see if these findings are in line with the literature but does not prove that the interpreta-
tions and conclusions are true. Researcher bias is a major risk in this research as it 
exposes the findings as well as the interpretations for bias. For example prior expecta-
tions, prior information or assumptions of the researcher are factors that can cause re-
searcher bias. Also confirmation bias is a central factor related to researcher bias sug-
gesting that the results of the research can be biased as a result of the researcher trying 
to portray either knowingly or unknowingly a certain outcome a result of selectively inter-
preting and using the evidence (Nickerson 1998). The risk of the researcher influencing 
the outcome and findings of the research decreases the reliability and validity of the 
research and is the most crucial source of error for this research. The risk for researcher 
bias and especially confirmation bias is particularly relevant due to the prior working his-
tory of the researcher and the participant observations as these result in expectations 
and subjective views and might thus have a potential to distort the results. The problem 
of researcher bias was addressed by reviewing the results with the top management 
team of the company as well as with the interviewed managers. However, the researcher 
bias is still a major limitation affecting the reliability and validity of this research and 
should thus be taken into account when applying and assessing the findings of this re-
search.   
As stated earlier, there are various limitations affecting the interpretation of the results 
caused by the nature of the research. In addition to affecting the reliability of the research 
they also have an effect on validity. The fact that the participant observations have not 
been documented over the years reduces the transparency of the method as well as the 
data analysis. Therefore, this limitation is a major factor reducing the reliability of this 
research. Also the fact that the research was carried out by using only one case acqui-
sition reduces the generalizability and external validity of the research. Therefore, the 
case context should be carefully considered to gain understanding and when applying 
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the findings to other cases. By involving more researchers in the project and taking a 
multiple case acquisition perspective by allocating more resources to the project, also 
the external validity of this research could be increased.  
6.5 Topics for further research 
Due to the case specific and highly defined contextual and organization specific nature 
of the research, there is a need for a similar research also in other contexts. Studying 
the problems arising at different business processes and evaluating their effect on the 
integration speed in other organizations than PBOs would be needed as it still lacks from 
the literature. For example, studying a traditional manufacturing company might have 
different relevant business processes and capabilities than a PBO thus setting new re-
quirements for the integration process. Also the motives and nature of the integration 
would likely differ.  Different business processes are likely to result in different problems 
and therefore studying these processes would contribute to the current M&A literature. 
By studying different organization types and different business functions, the findings of 
this research could be complemented and thus a more holistic perspective about PMI 
from the business process perspective could be achieved.  
Also other similar cases in the PBO context should be studied further. This would in-
crease the external validity of this research and would further confirm the results outside 
the case context. What is more, the same research method and view could also be ap-
plied to international context by selecting an international acquisition and reflecting these 
findings on the findings of this research in an attempt to see how the problems and so-
lutions differ in the international context.  
Another interesting area for further research is the integration speed function. This re-
search identified factors that affect the integration speed and stated the nature of this 
relationship. Yet, little can be said about the magnitude and thus of the significance of 
each measure relative to each other in scientific terms. Empirical study defining the mag-
nitude of change caused by different PMI speed variables could complement the findings 
of this study and provide valuable knowledge for managers and scholars dealing with 
PMI. 
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APPENDIX A: THE STRUCTURE OF THE 
INTERVIEWS 
Nimi:  
Positio: Original organization: X/Y 
Rooli integraatiossa: 
Paikka:  
Yleinen 
1. Miten integraatio eteni ja mitä ongelmia siinä ilmeni? Miten nämä ongelmat vai-
kuttuivat integraation nopeuteen? 
Operatiivinen toiminta 
2. Mitä ongelmia projektitöihin/tuotantoon liittyen nousi esiin? Eli mitkä asiat haitta-
sivat työntekoa? Mistä nämä ongelmat johtuivat? Miten vaikuttivat integraation nopeu-
teen? 
• Päästiinkö kiinni projekteihin 
• Millaiset olivat tiimijaot; sekatiimit projekteissa? 
• Millaisia projekteja tuli alkuun (quick wins?) 
• Miten ostettuun yritykseen suhtauduttiin? 
• Odotusten ja vastuiden selkeys 
3. Miten kuvaisit työntekijöiden työmotivaatiota ja työskentelyn tehokkuutta sekä nii-
den kehitystä integraation aikana? Oliko ongelmia ja mistä ongelmat johtuivat? 
4. Uusiin järjestelmiin siirtyminen (human side). Miten työntekijät kokivat sen ja saa-
tiinko siirtymiseen riittävästi tukea?  
Myynti  
5. Mitä ongelmia myyntiin liittyen esiintyi? Miten kuvaisit myynnin kehitystä integraa-
tion aikana? 
• Miten myynnin integraatio eteni? Mitä haasteita nousi esiin? 
• Tarjouskäytännöt 
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• Selkeys tarjouksen tekemisestä, kenen nimi, mikä brändi? 
• Työnjako ja vastuujako 
• Vanhojen ja uusien projektien integrointi 
• Oliko riittävästi hankkeita 
Keskijohdon integraatio 
7. Mitä ongelmia johtamiseen liittyen esiintyi? Miten keskijohdon integraatio eteni? 
Mitä ongelmia nousi esiin? 
• Vastuujaot 
• Käytännöt  
• Valtasuhteet 
• Miten keskijohtoa yhdistettiin? 
• Leadership vacuum? 
• Odotusten selvyys 
8. Tiesikö keskijohto roolinsa integraatiossa? Viestittiinkö se selkeästi? 
9. Miten kuvaisit ylimmän johdon ja keskijohdon tiedonvaihtoa? Viestikö ylin johto 
selkeän vision ja polun tähän visioon? (leadership vacuum) 
10. Oliko yritysoston syy ja tarkoitus kaikille selvä? 
Syvennys 
11. Missä vaiheessa ei enää tunnistanut kuka on yrityksestä x ja kuka yrityksestä y?  
12. Sujuiko jokin asia integraatioon liittyen liian hitaasti hidastaen integraationo-
peutta? 
13. Mitä pelkotiloja integraatioon liittyi? Miten näihin pelkotiloihin vastattiin? Epätietoi-
suus? 
14. Miten kuvaisit kommunikaatiota integraation aikana?  
a. Oliko alaisilla paljon kysymyksiä, vastattiinko niihin? Koitko joutuvasi välikäteen 
vastausten annon suhteen? 
15. Miten kuvaisit kulttuuri-integraatiota ja kulttuurieroja sekä niistä syntyneitä mah-
dollisia ongelmia? Olivatko X:n toimintaperiaatteet selvät? 
16. Miten kuvaisit integraation johtamista ja siinä mahdollisesti ilmenneitä puutteita? 
17. Miten kuvaisit epätietoisuutta, muutosvastarintaa sekä niistä aiheutuneita mah-
dollisia ongelmia integraation aikana? 
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18. Tiesikö jokainen oman tehtävänsä ja vastuunsa sekä mitä itseltä odotettiin? Vas-
tuujaot selkeät myynnissä, operaatioissa, ja johtamisessa?  
Lopetus 
19. Haluaisitko nostaa esiin vielä jotain mikä ei ole tullut keskustelussa esiin? 
Question Bank 
20. Miten kuvaisit HR-johtamista integraation aikana? 
21. Miten integraatio otettiin vastaan yritys Y:ssä? Entä Yritys X:ssä?  
22. Miten kuvaisit työntekijöiden epätietoisuutta sekä sen kehitystä? 
23. Miten ostetun yrityksen keskijohtoa hyödynnettiin integraatiossa? (credibility, 
knowledge and understanding of the acquired entity, kommunikaatio) 
24. Miten ostetun yrityksen henkilöitä otettiin mukaan integrointiin? 
 
